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1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1917, the three Caribbean islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John 
that made up the colonial possessions known as the Danish West Indies 
were sold to the United States of America for the sum of 25 million US 
dollars. The transaction put an end to Danish colonial authority in the West 
Indies that had been present since the settlement of St. Thomas in 1666. In 
the year prior to the sale, in 1916, a parliamentary commission had been 
established with the objective of ascertaining whether or not it would be 
beneficial to sell the West Indian colonies on the terms that had been 
negotiated with the United States. If the commission found that it could not 
agree to the terms of the sale, it was to consider what measures should be 
taken to bring the colony’s state of affairs in order.1 On 3 November 1916, 
former Governor of the Danish West Indies, Lars Christian Helweg-Larsen, 
was called to give testimony at the legal hearings conducted by the 
parliamentary commission. Helweg-Larsen was an experienced official in 
the Danish West Indian administration. He had served as a colonial officer 
since 1888 and held the position as Governor during these final years of 
Danish colonial rule in the West Indies (from 1911 to 1916). He had 
resigned his office only a month before his appearance at the hearing.2 
When asked by the hearing committee how the state of the Danish islands 
was judged by their American and British neighbors, Helweg-Larsen 
recalled a conversation that he had allegedly had with former President of 
the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, during a visit to St. Croix. During 
the conversation, President Roosevelt was supposed to have given the 
                                                
 
1 ("Lov Om Nedsættelse Af En Rigsdagskommission Og Afholdelse Af En 
Folkeafstemning Angaaende Konventionen Mellem Danmark Og De Amerikanske 
Forenede Stater Om Overdragelse Til De Nævnte Stater Af Øerne St. Thomas, St. Jan Og 
St. Croix I Vestindien," 1916, p. 13) 
2 (Larsen 1940, p. 74) 
 
 
2 
following diagnosis of the governmental condition of the Danish West 
Indies: 
There could only be one explanation to the state of the Danish West 
Indian Islands, namely … that the conditions of the negro race was 
unknown to those in the Mother Country and as such was not aware that 
it [the negro race] has to be ruled and governed by different rules than a 
white race is ruled by in Europe.3  
Given Helweg-Larsen’s career within the colonial administration, it 
must have felt very convenient for him to be able to invoke the authority of 
a United States President pointing the finger of blame for the colony’s 
unsustainability at the Danish Home Government rather than local colonial 
officials. Accordingly, questions could be raised as to the veridicality of 
Helweg-Larsen’s rendering of Roosevelt’s comment. The commission 
majority, nevertheless, concurred in their report with the assertions made by 
Helweg-Larsen, via President Roosevelt, and concluded that “Danish rule 
had by no means been exemplary” and that “the Mother Country had been 
too removed and too alienated from the islands’ conditions”.4  
The maybe-quote by President Roosevelt and the conclusions of the 
parliamentary commission provide an entrance to some central concerns of 
this dissertation. The hearings and the report of the parliamentary 
commission amounted to a veritable trial of Danish colonialism’s legitimacy 
and justification, but also its efficacy and progress. The verdict was quite 
clear, as shown in the quote above. Danish rule over the tropical islands and 
its inhabitants had been a failure. But what was it that had brought on this 
failed development? Was it due to unfavorable climatic conditions? Did 
external economic developments in European and World markets render the 
islands’ sugar production and commercial trade unprofitable and thereby 
destabilized the colony’s fiscal foundation? Were governmental activities 
blocked or even threatened by anti-colonial movements? These were all 
mentioned by the commission report as contributing factors to the 
unsustainable state of the Danish colony. But the real culprit in this trial was 
                                                
 
3 (Rigsdagskommissionen angaaende de Dansk Vestindiske Øer 1916, Bilag B. 
Kommissionens Vidneafhøringer, p, 138) 
4 (1916, Betænkningen, p. 38) 
 
 
3 
the inability of ‘government,’ colonial and metropolitan, to manage these 
factors in a way that would procure a favorable outcome. Furthermore, as 
the Roosevelt quote alludes to, the favorable government that Danish rule 
had failed to install in its Caribbean colonies was directed by rules that were 
discernibly different from favorable government in a Western European 
context. The populations of the two distinct political constructions required 
particular types of management. The inability of Danish colonial 
government to recognize this crucial factor was the primary cause of its 
failure.  
A more explicit articulation of a similar criticism of Danish government 
in the West Indian colonies, was voiced in the same period. Following the 
failed sale negotiations with the United States in 1902, a group of technical 
experts, academics, industrial and commercial representatives, politicians 
and government officials formed the association De Danske Atlanterhavsøer 
(The Danish Atlantic Islands). Through their journal, Atlanten (The 
Atlantic), the association campaigned for increased integration between 
Denmark’s Atlantic colonies and the general administration of the Danish 
State, and the cultivation of the different populations’ interwoven identities 
and commercial interests. In 1916 a contributor to Atlanten wrote a piece 
with the ominous title: “Each Nation has the Negroes it Deserves” (“Ethvert 
Land har de Negere, det fortjener”). The author of the piece, A. Paludan-
Müller, launched a staunch criticism of the Danish government’s inability to 
ascertain the local preconditions for a proper colonial government. Like 
Roosevelt, Paludal-Müller argued that it was the disinterestedness towards 
knowledge of the “negro race” that had created the social and political crisis 
that the colonial government was facing in the shape of ongoing labour 
disputes: “Had the government gained close knowledge of the Negro’s 
character, it would probably not had entered a downward path, leading 
towards inevitable trouble.”5 The “negro’s character,” as Paludal-Müller 
saw it, was a product of governmental neglect; a product of the residual 
effects of slavery and a subsequent “lack of understanding” on the part of 
                                                
 
5 (Paludan-Müller 1916, p. 448) 
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government.6 What colonial government had failed to accomplish in the 
post-emancipation period was to comprehend the natural conduct of “the 
black field laborer.” Colonial government had forgotten the ease with which 
that “giant, good-natured, docile wool head” would unleash the 
ferociousness that his tropical nature sustained, if his respect for authority 
was not maintained. The black field laborer was “the incomplete man,” 
lacking the ability to reflect and who’s actions were determined by the spur 
of the moment.7 In his tour de force of racial stereotyping, Paludan-Müller 
provided an explicit formulation of the recipe for governing the black race 
that Roosevelt and Helweg-Larsen had merely alluded to: “We do not 
cultivate a man of such character with the help of democratic institutions; he 
requires a particular treatment, without necessarily constituting a policy of 
oppression.”8 
A contemporary description of Danish colonial government as “one of 
the best examples of a liberal colonial policy developed to meet difficult 
conditions and maintained with unfaltering resolution by the home 
government, even in the face of an inevitable financial loss”9 would not 
have impressed Palludan-Müller. He viewed the liberal cultivation of the 
black race as a dangerous endeavor and a main cause of current 
predicaments. Paludan-Müller made that clear by making reference to the 
labor riots on St. Croix in 1878, known as ‘the Fireburn,’ as well as the 
general crises that the political project of liberalism had encountered when 
enacted in the context of the black race:  
It was the French Revolution’s ideas about freedom, equality and 
fraternity that the undeveloped, primitive brains did not comprehend, but 
thought that the path to such ideal conditions was paved by the murder of 
all whites in the colony [of St. Domingue (Haiti)], men, women and 
children; it was the British liberalism transferred to the unclear, dark 
minds on Jamaica that caused the Gordon riots, and those ideas that 
during this new era have proliferated in our little, democratic nation can 
                                                
 
6 (1916, p. 446) 
7 (1916, p. 447) 
8 (1916, p. 447) 
9 (Tooke 1900, p. 144) 
 
 
5 
not yet be ascertained by our black children's imperfect brains; their 
system is not yet capable of digesting such heavy diet.10 
Here, Palludan-Müller evoked the principles of a benevolent racism, a 
despotic paternalism that in patronizing terms disenfranchised and 
incapacitated the capability of the colony’s Afro-Caribbean population to 
embrace the progress of liberal civilization. There was an inherent danger in 
the project of educating the Afro-Caribbean population that would have to 
be counteracted. The ever present risk of governing colonial populations in 
accordance with liberal doctrines included a constant potential to erupt in 
unpredictable explosions of ‘native barbarism.’ 
This dissertation takes as its object of study the long duration of this 
double assertion, coined at the end of Danish colonial sovereignty in the 
West Indies, that the Afro-Caribbean population had a condition that should 
be ascertained by government, and that the objective of government was to 
conduct the progress of that condition, and to so conduct in a way that was 
in accordance with the knowledge of “the nature of the negro.” As such, this 
dissertation is a genealogical study of what Michel Foucault referred to as 
‘governmentality’ in the context of the Danish West Indies. 
Governmentality is a somewhat elusive concept that has found usage in a 
range of disciplines and been applied to many different areas of study. But 
at the core of the concept lies a principle that conceives of relations of 
power in the practice of government as ‘the conduct of conduct.’ Still a very 
broad definition, ‘the conduct of conduct’ refers to a mode of power that 
entails a structuring, a guidance, a governance of the possible actions of 
others. It is a definition of the exercise of power as “a mode of action upon 
the actions of others,” which entails a calculation or consideration of the 
mode of action that will act to “structure the possible field of action of 
others.”11 In the basic exercise of government, then, lies a series of 
questions and calculations about the reality of the object of government: 
What type of action should be taken when faced with this or that type of 
problem involving these or those types of people, and with what desired 
                                                
 
10 (Paludan-Müller 1916, p. 447) 
11 (Foucault 1982, p. 790) 
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outcome? Together, such series of questioning about the nature and reality 
of problematic elements to the exercise of government, constitutes a 
technology of security. The aim of the dissertation is to analyze the 
formation of rationalities, techniques and subjects involved in this 
technology of security that formed part of a governmental endeavor to 
solidify colonial rule against the backdrop of a political economy under 
constant revision. As such, the exercise of government was never simply an 
act of repression, but fundamentally an act of intervention and production; 
always an effort to restructure, recreate, and act upon the reality that was 
being made intelligible. By applying this perspective to the colonial 
Caribbean, and the practice of slavery, the dissertation extends the analysis 
of governmentalities to a geopolitical area and a type of social order to 
which it has not previously been applied.     
It was not at all uncommon that the exercise of government in the 
Danish West Indies remained within blueprints, plans, and imaginings of 
ordering techniques that contained visions of social taxonomy, techniques to 
manage behaviour, and promises of favorable outcomes. Much of the 
criticism of colonial government at the end of Danish rule was hinged upon 
the inability of colonial authorities to convert visions into reality; its failure 
to turn plans into practice. However, in what contemporaneous critics 
interpreted as failure, I find poignant analytical substance. As Ann Laura 
Stoler has remarked, the disjuncture between visions of order and actually 
implemented policies were not unique to the government of Danish West 
India: “Colonial empires were always dependent on social imaginaries, 
blueprints unrealized, borders never drawn, administrative categories of 
people and territories to which no one was sure who or what should 
belong.”12 Furthermore, Stoler’s remark directs us to the importance of this 
process of governmental failure in shaping the governmentalities on which 
“[c]olonial empires were … dependent.” Picking up from this lead, the 
dissertation’s analytical approach does not dismiss strategies of government 
that remained on the drawing board as ‘failed’ attempts at state building, but 
                                                
 
12 (Stoler 2006, p. 52) 
 
 
7 
rather retain within them their role as formative elements in the ongoing 
configuration of governmentality in the Danish West Indies.  
In these preliminary paragraphs we have established that the problem of 
the character of colonial government in the Danish West Indies was of great 
importance to the ‘evaluation’ of the state of colonial rule in the process of 
transferring sovereignty over the Danish West Indies to the United States of 
America. The basic argument of this dissertation is that this problematic of 
colonial government had a long and contingent genealogy. The specific 
conception of government that was being criticized at the end of Danish rule 
in the West Indies was a result of historical developments that cannot be 
contained within standard chronologies of slavery and liberty, and reaches 
well beyond the spatial confines of a delineated Danish West Indian colonial 
state. The abolition of slavery in 1848 rearranged the rules of the political 
and economic game of control and exchange. The order of slavery had to be 
redrawn as the order of freedom. This reorientation of political legitimacy 
was, however, not a movement from one set of fixed categories to another. 
The era of slavery did not constitute a coherent and clear demarcation of 
rights and privileges between slave and slaveholder, between colonial 
officials and a colonial public. Likewise, the post-emancipation era was 
never merely a time of social reform and modernization, nor simply a time 
of slavery reinstated and economic disaster. Despite the obvious importance 
as a defining historical event, the abolition of slavery, and a clear 
demarcation of a before and after emancipation, has little meaning beyond 
marking the official change in the juridical regime of the colony. Viewed at 
the level of governmental rationality, strategies of slavery and strategies of 
freedom represented two extreme poles of government that were intertwined 
and applied at different degrees throughout the period of Danish rule. The 
economy of slavery was under ongoing revision and, at different degrees, 
and at different times, was complemented by techniques of freedom. 
Likewise, the shift to free labor was marked by a high degree of constraint 
on the freedom of the labor market.   
Following from this basic analytical argument, a series of new questions 
emerge. How could it be that the government of a colony that until 1848 
was built on and around the institution of slavery, in its final evaluation was 
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considered to have been unsuccessful in ‘knowing’ the conditions of the 
formerly enslaved? What were the developments that led to a conception of 
colonial government as ‘knowing’ and ‘adapting’ to the specific conditions 
of the colonial milieu and its population, rather than simply forcing 
everything into its right place? After all, the structure of slavery that 
dominated colonial politics, economy, and law for almost two hundred years 
was mediated by mechanisms of force, coercion, and violence, was it not? 
This introductory chapter will provide a framework for analyzing the 
contingent genealogy of governmentality in the Danish West Indies; it will 
situate the dissertation within a scholarship and historiography of the Danish 
West Indies, specifically, as well as broader conceptualizations of the 
character of colonial governmentality and theories of relations of power.  
A quick disclaimer might be prudent at this moment. My concern with 
colonial government should not be taken as a normative reevaluation of the 
Danish colonial project in the West Indies along the lines of the 1916 
commission’s objectives. My purpose is not to analyze the causes of ‘the 
demise’ of Danish colonialism, nor will I evaluate the ‘successes’ or 
‘failures’ of the Danish colonial project, and neither should the reader 
expect a normative judgement of the ‘rights and wrongs’ of colonial 
authorities. Rather the dimensions of government that forms the object of 
this study, relates not to the justification and legitimacy behind the exercise 
of government, but to the strategic implementation of governmental practice 
that follow specific objectives and exhorts specific effects—intentional as 
well as unintentional.  
These strategic configurations of governmental practice cannot be 
contained within binary conceptions of the nature of rule between 
‘despotism’ and ‘liberalism’ or placed along the temporal axis of ‘slavery’ 
and ‘emancipation.’ To simply say that the government of slavery is 
despotic, while the government of freedom is liberal is not sufficient to 
explain the shifts in the development of colonial government in the Danish 
West Indies. The unpacking of the problematic of colonial government in 
the Danish West Indies cannot be limited to a consideration of 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures or the political struggles 
between politicians and officials ‘within’ government. An unavoidable 
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correlation exists between the concept of ‘government’ and issues of power, 
the nature of ‘the state,’ and the particularities of colonialism in relation to 
concepts of ‘civilization’, ‘progress’, ‘modernity’, ‘the economy’, ‘the 
social’, and not least ‘race.’ A different conceptualization of power relations 
and of governmental reason is needed. This dissertation turns to Michel 
Foucault’s concepts of productive power and ‘governmentality’ to give a 
different interpretation to the character, strategy, implementation, and 
consequences of colonial power and government. The specifics of this 
approach will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter. But for now it is 
important to keep in mind that it implies a distancing from conceptions of 
power relations as determined by the capacity to enforce one’s will on 
others and that the exercise of government implies nothing more than 
enacting this capacity.  
In the course of conducting a historical analysis of colonial practices of 
government and configurations of mechanisms of power, based on the 
analytical framework of governmentality, several issues emerge. One has to 
do with the perception of Foucault in colonial studies in general and 
governmentality in particular. Can theoretical and analytical insights from 
Foucault’s work be applied outside of the geographical-historical 
boundaries that formed his object of study, and, if so, how must an analytics 
of colonial governmentality frame its approach, and at which elements must 
it direct its attention? A question that is made more pertinent in the colonial 
context of a possibly more ‘withdrawn,’ ‘neglecting,’ or ‘disinterested,’ yet 
still aggressive and repressive state-power. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will help to elucidate for the 
reader the details of these aspects of ‘government’ in the context of 
colonialism; it will review the historiography on Danish colonialism, with 
specific reference to the Danish West Indies; and finally discuss the 
relevance of Foucault’s conceptualization of power to the study of slavery. 
 
Colonialism and Government 
Roosevelt’s conclusion that the ‘decline’ of the Danish colony was to be 
blamed on the inability of Danish imperial authority to make “the conditions 
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of the negro race” intelligible and to configure its mode of governance 
accordingly, raises some important questions about the object, the strategy, 
and the limits of government, particularly in the multiracially framed 
context of colonial and postcolonial politics. What were those rules of 
government that he spoke of, and in what way were they different from their 
metropolitan counterparts? In the quote, Roosevelt asserts a difference 
between the rules of governing “a white race” in Europe and the rules of 
governing “the negro race” in the Americas. The specificities of this 
government of “the negro race” remained illusive, but it seems evident that 
the ‘needs’ of black subjects could and should be interpreted differently 
from the ‘needs’ of European citizens. 
The opening pages of this introductory chapter have already made clear 
that the conduct of conduct in the Danish West Indies was a contested issue. 
Indeed, historians of colonialism have shown it to have been an issue of 
contestation inherent to colonial politics in general. The problematic of a 
‘colonial difference’ in the principles of government has long engaged 
scholars of colonialism. Partha Chatterjee’s seminal conclusion that the 
signature of race marked a ‘colonial rule of difference,’ seems to echo the 
assertions of racial particularity by statesmen such as Roosevelt. The ‘rule 
of difference’ that Chatterjee finds ingrained in the political ideology and 
practice of colonial rule in British India, takes the form of racial 
discrimination. In this sense, ‘the rule of difference’ marks the limits of a 
self-proclaimed liberal British colonialism in India. It draws the line where 
ideals of self-government reverts into a repressive mode of governance that 
rejects the Indian’s capability to take political or legal offices on the 
grounds of indigenous inferiority and the legitimacy of a benevolent 
despotism. “[T]he point was,” writes Chatterjee, “to lay down in ‘practice’ a 
rule of colonial difference, to mark the points and the instances where the 
colony had to become an exception precisely to vindicate the universal truth 
of the theory [of responsible government].”13 Uday Singh Metha affirms 
Chatterjee’s thesis at the scale of political ideology by arguing that the 
context of empire presented the British theorists of liberalism with an 
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anxious unfamiliarity: “in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, liberal 
thought and India encounter each other as strangers.”14 
The technique of colonial difference also existed as an element of state 
security, and drew its reason from British fears of subversive conduct from 
indigenous state officials that could potentially erode the power structure of 
the colonial state from within, leading the way for an anti-colonial 
nationalism. Accordingly, Indians were ultimately denied the bureaucratic 
positions that they had been trained for in academies erected specifically for 
that purpose.15 Similarly, a recognition of native civil society and the right 
of free speech was rejected due to racial anxieties of the British public 
opinion.16 Perhaps this repressive reaction by colonial government was 
indeed the “different rules” of government that the Roosevelt quote invokes; 
that concerns of state security overrules the principles of civil rights and rule 
of law. Interpreted in this way, Chatterjee’s colonial ‘rule of difference’ 
parallels Carl Schmitt’s conception of the “state of exception,” referring to a 
form of government that acts not on the imperative of rule of law or civil 
rights of citizens, but rather from the principle of sovereignty, of the 
sovereign’s juridical prerogative to secure the safety of the state, or rather 
the safety of the sovereign himself.17 The propensity of the colonial state to 
use excessive force in the disciplining of its native inhabitants and to evoke 
the extraordinary authority of martial law, state of emergency, and state of 
exception has been aptly documented by historians of colonialism. In the 
colonies perhaps most of all places Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’ 
dictum “that politics is the continuation of war by other means”18 has been 
shown to hold true in the most literal sense. Achille Mbembe takes this 
proposition even further, suggesting that  
in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and 
imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists 
fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (ab legibus 
                                                
 
14 (Mehta 1999, p. 23) 
15 (Chatterjee 1993, pp. 20-22) 
16 (1993, pp. 22-26) 
17 (Schmitt 1922/2005, pp. 1-15) 
18 (Foucault 2003b, p. 15) 
 
 
12 
solutus) and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war 
without end.”19 
If the colony was the site of a continual war then slavery would be its 
corresponding practice, which John Locke justified as “the state of War 
continued, between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive.”20  
This theme of exception and emergency has been taken up by scholars 
such as the legal historian, Nasser Hussain, who argues that the introduction 
of a rule of law in colonial India evolved into a process of justifying and 
legitimizing legal exceptions and authorizing the state’s emergency powers. 
Hussain himself describes the narrative of his study in the following 
manner: “In short, I tell the story of the extension of English law and 
constitutionality to the colonies: the haphazard introduction of a rule of law, 
its colonial mutations, and its enduring consequences.”21 Thus, Hussain’s 
narrative of “colonial mutation” in the legal production of rules of 
government does not directly follow Mbembe’s claim of the exercise of 
colonial sovereignty as “a power outside the law.” It does, however, parallel 
the master narrative of colonial difference that shapes many histories of 
colonialism. It does so by drawing out the hypocrisy with which so called 
universal rights were given a particular framework in the colony, 
emphasizing how ‘colonial difference’ referred both to the ‘different’ legal, 
social, and political status of colonial subjects vis-a-vis metropolitan 
citizens, and the ‘difference’ with which metropolitan concepts of law, 
order, and governance were conducted in the colonies. The idea of ’colonial 
difference,’ then, not only reflects the racial or ethnic discrimination 
inherent in colonial regimes, but also illustrates a political logic that dictates 
a particular shaping of juridical and state institutions to buttress the 
principles of difference and hierarchical order. Modern Western political 
institutions that in principle promotes equality and self-government are thus 
reshaped when infused with the political logic of colonial difference. 
It has, then, been argued that the avenues followed by officials in 
establishing sovereignty in the colonies have been inherently different from 
                                                
 
19 (Mbembe 2003, p. 23) 
20 Quoted in(Davis 2001, p. 132) 
21 (Hussain 2003, p. 2) 
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similar processes in the West. In some cases this difference has been framed 
as a lacking or incomplete political engagement by colonial administrations 
with colonial political society. Thus, in a footnote to his seminal article on 
“Necropolitics” Achille Mbembe assures the reader that he is “mindful of 
the fact that colonial forms of sovereignty were always fragmented.” He 
then goes on to quote Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat’s framing of 
colonial forms of sovereignty as “less concerned with legitimizing their own 
presence and more excessively violent than their European forms.” In fact, 
“European states never aimed at governing the colonial territories with the 
same uniformity and intensity as was applied to their own populations.”22 
This is a claim that parallels the argument of world system theorists 
regarding the underdevelopment of the third world. Rather than arguing for 
the economical underdevelopment of post-colonial states, Mbembe, Hansen, 
and Stepputat are arguing for the political underdevelopment of post-
colonial citizens. They also argue for a strategical negligence by European 
states in their government of colonies, resulting in a post-colonial deficit of 
civil rights. 
The characterization of colonial rule as following a protocol of 
difference found a firm foothold within the study of colonialism following 
Edward Said’s book, Orientalism, published in 1979.23 In his seminal study, 
Said documented the (mis)representations by orientalist discourse of 
oriental culture and people, and its implications on contemporary foreign 
policy, especially regarding the Middle East. During the following decades, 
the influential group of scholars on Indian colonial (and postcolonial) 
history known as the Subaltern Studies Group, explored further the 
composition and effects of colonialist discourses of rule, interrogating the 
                                                
 
22 (Mbembe 2003, pp. 22, n. 37). Mbembe quotes from a 2002 unpublished paper titled 
“Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Post-colonial World”. Similar 
arguments are put forward by Hansen and Stepputat (2005, p. 20) in the introduction to 
their edited volume of the same title: “As a result of this gradual process, and the 
controlling principle of colonial legislation and colonial subjects as permanently exempted 
and different from rule “at home” in Europe, colonial sovereignties became (1) partial and 
provisional; (2) spectacular and yet ineffective in their exercise of territorial and social 
control; and (3) marked by excessive and often random violence. Our proposition, similar 
to that of Hannah Arendt (1951), is that colonial sovereignty remained a naked version of 
modern sovereign power, the raw “truth” and racist underside of the modern state.” 
23 (Said 1979) 
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possibilities of subaltern agency and structures of institutional dominance. 
Inspired by Orientalism, but also taking their theoretical cue from European 
thinkers such as Gramsci, Marx, and Foucault, who each formulated 
conceptualizations of the relation of power, its directions and mechanisms, 
members of the Subaltern Studies Group formulated a critique of the 
historical shaping of Indian subjectivities, social and political imaginations, 
and the nature of the postcolonial Indian nation-state. This strategy of 
criticism was formulated with ‘the rule of difference’ as the central pivot.  
The common formula for the works of the Subaltern Studies Group 
followed a method of operationalizing ‘European’ theories on Indian cases, 
and documenting the alternative trajectories of an Indian colonial modernity 
vis-á-vis standard Western narratives of modernity. For Ranajit Guha, 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony served as the point of departure for his 
coinage of colonial rule in India as ‘dominance without hegemony.’ In 
Guha’s rendering of the nature of the colonial state in India, the element of 
persuasion that characterized power relations in the metropolitan state was 
replaced by coercion. This fundamental difference from metropolitan power 
relations constituted a governmental paradox in which the colonial state, 
ultimately founded on bourgeoise ideology, eliminated the possibility of a 
civil society, and, by extension, the conditions of hegemonic dominance. 
The core argument that the confrontation between Western political 
principles and the particular colonial condition transformed the principles 
and practices of the colonial state, vis-á-vis the metropolitan state, has since 
been reiterated many times in the literature on colonial history.  
The trope of difference and dislocation is evident in the work of 
historians, and Subaltern Studies Group members, such as David Arnold, 
Partha Chatterjee (whose work I commented on above), Gyan Prakash, and 
Dipesh Chakrabarty. The focus on colonial difference served as a critique of 
the universal claims of liberal government and the rule of law that had 
fueled the ideological justification of colonialism and exposed the 
hypocrisies of the colonial state in India. But at the same time it could be 
argued that the endeavor to ’provincialize Europe’ by assuming the position 
of subalternaity and exploring the divergence of colonial principles of rule, 
actually reserved a privileged position for an idealized Western original 
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against which the specific, more muddled, historical manifestations of rule-
in-practice rather than rule-in-theory could be excavated and evaluated. 
Emerging from this interrogation of the difference of the political 
rationality of the colonial state compared to the metropolitan state, 
historians of colonialism began to look to Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality in the mid to late 1990s as a new analytical tool to further 
investigate the character and development of the colonial state. In 1995, 
David Scott published an article entitled “Colonial Governmentality” in the 
journal Social Text. Scott’s motivation for submitting his “notes” that made 
up “the tentative explorations of a working paper,” as he described his now 
frequently cited article, stemmed precisely from the discussion about the 
position of ‘Europe’ in the “theoretical knowledges of the colonial and 
postcolonial world.”24 More specifically, what role should ‘Europe’ be 
given in historians’ interpretation of modernity’s transformations in the 
colonial world. Scott’s proposition was to reorientate the “decentering” of 
Europe that in Scott’s view was often confused with “programmatically 
ignoring Europe.” For Scott, this “polemical dismissal of Europe” amounted 
to a “conceptual reformulation that seeks little more than an inversion of the 
colonial habit of deploying ‘Europe’ as the universal subject of all 
history.”25  
Instead of ‘forgetting’ Europe, Scott proposed a reorientation of the 
analytical focus on European transformative agency in the colonial world. 
He argued for replacing the “critique of colonialist discourse” that was 
concerned with demonstrating, on one hand, the colonialist production of a 
“distorted representation of the colonized,” denying them of “voice, 
autonomy, and agency,” and on the other, the political inequality entailed in 
liberal principles of the “institutional mechanisms of colonial dominance.”26 
Instead of the problematic of colonialist discourse that worked to expose the 
“internal economy” of the colonizers’ dominance as well as highlight the 
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resistance of the colonized, Scott would place a “problematic … [that] takes 
as its object … the political rationalities of colonial power.”27  
The analytical reorientation towards political rationalities precipitated an 
emphasis on the organization of colonial power as “an activity designed to 
produce effects of rule.” This meant a specification of, what Scott referred 
to as, “the targets of colonial power,” which consisted of a three-step 
movement to identify “the point or points of power's application, the object 
or objects it aims at, and the means and instrumentalities it deploys in search 
of these targets, points, and objects.” It also entailed designating “the field” 
of colonial power’s operation, i.e. “the zone that it actively constructs for its 
functionality.”28 Scott’s methodology represented a clear move away from 
problematics of European representation and dominance of colonized 
subjects towards a more general conceptualization of transformations of 
modernity. And as such, the problem of ‘Europe’ shifts from an 
epistemological problem of European interpretation of colonialism’s 
discursive structures, to an empirical and analytical problem of interrogating 
“the practices, modalities, and projects through which the varied forms of 
Europe's insertion into the lives of the colonized were constructed and 
organized.”29 This movement, in turn, aligns Scott’s project more with a 
general history of modern forms of power, rather than specifically with 
investigations of particularly colonial forms of power. Scott makes this 
dimension clear by specifying the nature of his interest in colonialism as 
being focused on  
the emergence at a moment in colonialism's history of a form of power—
that is, therefore, a form of power not merely coincident with 
colonialism—which was concerned above all with disabling old forms of 
life by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with 
constructing in their place new conditions so as to enable—indeed, so as 
to oblige—new forms of life to come into being.30 
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With this formulation of a research agenda for the analysis of the 
political rationalities of colonial power, Scott outlined a direction for a 
postcolonial scholarship, separated from a sequestered search for the 
particularities of colonial modernity and a critical ‘writing back’ at Europe, 
and aimed more directly at a general history of forms of power, and as a 
way af critically addressing the configuration of modernization and the 
rationalities that shaped its organization. But Scott’s intervention also 
prompts us to return to Roosevelt’s comments on the government of Danish 
colonialism.   
While Roosevelt asserted the particularity of colonial rules of 
governance, his emphasis on the importance of making “the conditions of 
the negro race” intelligible to government, also pointed toward an implicit 
axiom of governance that was not particular to the rules of colonial 
government, but had a universal applicability: That government necessarily 
had to take account of those being governed and calibrate its governmental 
strategy in accordance with the needs of the governed. Once again, the 
conditions for such a claim and the historical specificities of the ‘strategic 
calibration’ of government is what this dissertation holds as its central 
object. Scott’s highlighting of political rationalities and forms of power “not 
merely coincident with colonialism” leads us to believe that answers cannot 
be found solely within a framework of colonial particularity or difference. 
When those involved in the formulation of principles for governing black 
colonial subjects referred to a framework of paternal despotism, they did not 
necessarily separate such formulations from a framework of liberal 
governmentality. The point that Scott seemed to be making was that 
processes of modernization, the political form of modernity, were taking 
place in metropolitan as well as colonial context, or to stretch the argument 
even further, the emergence of modern political rationalities and the forms 
of power they engendered were not depended nor limited by specific socio-
political contexts.31 
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Besides David Scott, another early utilization of the concept of 
governmentality in the context of colonialism was Gyan Prakash’s book, 
Another Reason, published in 1999. Prakash’s approach was, however, quite 
different from Scott’s. In his 1995 article, Scott had analyzed the 
modernization reforms of Ceylon’s legal administration. The purpose was to 
show the construction of a field of operation for a new political rationality 
of colonial governmentality. As such, Scott was interested in documenting a 
shift in the target of power and the reconstruction of institutional structures 
that would enable the targeting of the reformulated points of application of 
power. Scott, then, was, in his analysis, engaging with governmentality at a 
programatic level. He did not seem to be concerned with the outcomes of 
implementing the programs of colonial governmentality (just as Foucault 
had not been concerned with the practical implementation of technologies of 
discipline or government in his analyses).  
Prakash was in his approach more devoted to the circumstances of the 
concrete functioning of governmentality in its intervention in the lived 
environment of colonial subjects, the regulation of populations, and the 
construction of space. And in this confrontation of a program of 
governmentality with a colonial reality, or rather a colonialist discourse of 
colonial reality, Prakash documented a “fundamental dislocation” of 
colonial governmentality from its Western form.32 Prakash found the cause 
of this dislocation in the seminal conclusions of his colleagues from the 
Subaltern Study Group, namely that British rule in colonial India was 
structured as “dominance without hegemony” and conditioned by “a rule of 
difference”: 
Colonial governmentality was obliged to develop in violation of the 
liberal conception that the government was part of a complex domain of 
dense, opaque, and autonomous interests that it only harmonized and 
secured with law and liberty. It had to function also as an aspect of 
coercion, that is, instituting the sovereignty of alien rulers.33 
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Prakash’s point is, however, not that colonial governmentality simply 
served as the negative correspondent of Western governmentality—a history 
of modernity failed—but rather was a “productive breach,” generating a 
specifically “colonial ‘complex of men and things.’”34 Governmentality in 
the colonial context was not a failure or a lack of modernity or liberalism, 
but a dislocation and a breach that meant that the problem of a colonial 
population was formulated differently and viewed through a different lens, 
resulting in divergent trajectories of governmental technics, e.g. an 
excessive role of state medicine.35 
The only ‘dialogue’ that Prakash had with Scott’s “Colonial 
Governmentality” article occurred in an endnote where Prakash remarks that 
Scott had ignored Partha Chatterjee’s conclusion about race as a colonial 
rule of difference. But rather than ignoring Chatterjee’s emphasis on the 
fundamental function of race as the dividing prism through which all 
calculations of colonial rule passed and was distributed, Scott wrote his 
essay on colonial governmentality as a response to what he viewed as the 
hegemonic status of the concept of race in analyses of colonial relations of 
power. 
The governmentality approach to the study of colonialism—regardless 
of its internal disputes—has been criticized for not being attentive enough to 
the pluralities of historical contexts in which governmentalities could and 
have developed. Frederic Cooper has argued that the governmentality 
concept runs the risk of missing “the historical specificity of different 
colonization regimes.”36 One of Cooper’s apprehensions towards the 
usability of governmentality in regard to colonialism, other than the issue of 
generalization, lies in his preconception that analyses of governmentality 
presupposes the existence of a strong, rationalized government that was 
thoroughly attentive to the calculable composition of its population and 
excelled in the art of producing observable individual subjects. An art that, 
according to Cooper, took on a “collectivized and reified notion of 
traditional authority” in many colonial contexts when compared to European 
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government.37 In this instance, Cooper seems to be guilty of the same sort of 
generalization that he accuses the colonial governmentality approach of by 
assuming that colonial power relations were “arterial” as opposed to the 
“capillary” power that Foucault saw in modern Europe.38 Consequently, 
Cooper characterize imperial states as having “long arms and weak 
fingers.”39 Prakash, in his analysis of colonial governmentality, had in fact 
promoted a similar characterization of the British Indian colonial state, 
describing it as “underfunded and overextended laboratories of 
modernity.”40  
If we do accept the notion that the colonial state was made up of “strong 
arms and weak fingers,” it does not, however, follow automatically that 
colonial society was bereft of techniques of government. Rather, one may 
conclude that the agency of government was distributed differently.   
Arguably, it is pertinent to adhere to the complex particularities of the 
specific context in which one’s study is carried out. But the perception that a 
governmentality approach to colonial history precipitates the existence of a 
strong and effective, centralized state-administration and the presence of 
‘total institutions’ does not seem tenable. As this dissertation will show, and 
as Foucault also embraced and made clear in his lectures on 
governmentality, the concept of governmentality does not refer to a 
historical state in which a high degree of correlation between programs of 
government and their implementation was established and fixed. Rather 
than the fulfillment of every sovereign’s fantasy of a completely disciplined 
and docile population and territory, the new rationality of government that 
Foucault identified in connection with his ‘history of governmentality’ was 
one that accepted, promoted even, that not everything could be controlled by 
government. Instead, the instrumentality of governmentality as it evolved, 
according to Foucault, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consisted 
of a series of calculations of the cost and effect of a multiplicity of possible 
outcomes and the different mechanisms to affect them. Rather than 
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operating with single, absolute objectives of government, governmentality, 
as Foucault identified it, operated within an acceptable bandwidth of 
problematic elements in dimensions of the social or the economy. In that 
sense ‘failure’ or ‘limits’ of government becomes an incorporated element 
in the calculations of governmental strategies, and forms part of the range of 
unknown elements that can influence their outcomes. 
The question still remains whether there is something about the 
condition of colonialism that facilitates the fundamental dislocation of 
governmentality, or renders the analytics of governmentality impossible. In 
regard to the latter problem, I argue in the next chapter that it is quite 
possible to extract from Foucault’s lectures on governmentality an analytical 
framework that can be applied to the analysis of governmental power 
regardless of the political conditions of particular contexts. Regarding the 
former problem, the next chapter will also make clear that governmentality 
should not be conceived as a singular concept. Foucault often referred to 
governmentalities, articulating the concept in the plural. For instance he 
traced the transformation from a ‘governmentality of police’ to a 
‘governmentality of economy’ in the eighteenth century. This was a process 
of conflicting conceptions of the rules and mechanisms of the nature of 
economy and the role of government in these mechanisms. As such it was 
profoundly a process of critique of government that led to the 
transformation of the rationality of government. The point here is that 
Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality did not exclude the 
existence of multiple forms of governmentality, or at least that 
governmentalities could consist of multiple configurations of power 
mechanisms. In fact, the transformations of governmentality presupposed 
the existence and mutual critique of multiple governmentalities. Therefore, 
the proposition that the configuration of governmentalities in the colonies 
differed from governmentalities in the metropole is not at all unlikely. But 
the general labeling of a singular colonial governmentality risks 
overemphasizing the separateness from metropolitan forms, while also 
obfuscating the diversity of colonial governmentalities, in the plural. To that 
extent, I would tend to agree with Cooper’s criticism that the concept of 
 
 
22 
colonial governmentality flattens the diverse landscape of strategies of rule 
and mechanisms of power in the myriad of colonial sovereignties. 
Cooper’s criticism has to a certain degree been addressed by recent 
studies of colonial governmentality. These studies emphasize the 
importance of analyzing colonial governmentality in terms of scales and 
comparisons. Stephen Legg has studied the “sexual governmentalities” of 
prostitution in Delhi as shaped by the scalar networks of “urban civil 
society,” “colonial government,” “imperial hygiene,” and “internationalist 
apparatuses.”41 The resulting paradigm of this analytical approach is one 
that questions, yet takes seriously, the ‘coloniality’ of colonial 
governmentality. Legg shows how the interwar turn from toleration of 
prostitution in Delhi to a policy of abolition was constituted by interlocking 
problematizations and campaigns by agents and institutions at the local, 
regional, national, imperial, and international scales, including 
philanthropists, the British military, the government of India, and the 
League of Nations. Through this approach, Legg highlights the need to 
move beyond specificities of the particular context in order to grasp the 
many constitutive components of local governmentalities. 
Comparative studies of the different character of colonial government 
within the same imperial structure or between different imperial powers 
have also documented the diversity in forms of colonial governmentality. 
George Steinmetz has shown how governmental strategies within the 
German empire differed greatly depending on the specific colonial location 
and the ethnographic conceptions of local populations. Steinmetz compares 
three very different colonial contexts within the German empire: German 
South West Africa (present day Namibia), Samoa, and Qingdao in China’s 
Shandong province. The central claim is that “precolonial ethnographic 
representations shaped colonial native policy.”42 Framed in the sociological 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu, Steinmetz argues that within the semi-
autonomous field that the colonial state constituted, it was ethnographic 
capital that shaped the specific practices of rule that were pursued in each 
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colonial context. As a result, the native population of each colony was 
governed according to very different principles. In German South West 
Africa the Ovaherero and Witbooi communities were decimated by war, 
genocide, and expulsion in their ‘encounter’ with German imperialism.43 In 
Samoa, German native policy took the paternalistic form of “salvage 
colonialism” through which native culture was to be ‘protected’ from the 
intrusions of capitalist modernity.44 In Qingdao, colonial policy moved from 
segregationist towards more inclusive approaches by which Chinese civil 
rights were recognized and educational programs introduced.45 A similar 
comparative analysis has been conducted by Julian Go. Go compares the 
colonial policy of the United States with the policies of the British empire 
and finds that both empires fostered a variety of colonial 
governmentalities—ranging from “preservationist governmentality”46 to 
“democratic tutelage,”47 or from “liberal governmentality”48 to 
“decentralized despotism.”49 In regard to Danish imperialism, equally 
diverse strategies of government existed within the same imperial frame. 
The protectionist governmentality deployed in Greenland, as analyzed by 
Søren Rud, resembled the strategies deployed by the British in Fiji, the 
Germans, and subsequently the Americans, in Samoa.50 In contrast, the 
strategy of slavery pursued by Danish colonial authorities in the West Indies 
and on the Gold Coast was not at all concerned with the preservation of 
traditional cultures. 
One historical geopolitical context in which the analytical approach of 
governmentality has not yet been explored is the colonial Caribbean. Since 
most of the colonial governmentality studies have centered on the history of 
British India a general proliferation of the approach to other colonial and 
imperial geographies would do much to help reconcile the residual 
problematic of colonial particularity versus metropolitan universality. By 
                                                
 
43 (2007, pp. 10-12) 
44 (2007, p. 13) 
45 (2007, pp. 18-19) 
46 (Go 2011, p. 86) 
47 (2011, p. 70) 
48 (2011, p. 238) 
49 (2011, p. 80) 
50 (Rud 2010, 2014) 
 
 
24 
taking the history of the Danish empire in the West Indies as its research 
object this dissertation attempts to add to the complexities of the history of 
governmentality. Simultaneously, however, by broadening the analytical 
lens of governmentality to the context of imperialism in the New World—
including Atlantic slavery—I also expand the area of research to which the 
perspectives of the governmentality approach can be applied. A double 
movement, then, of contraction and expansion; zooming in on the particular 
history of the Danish West Indies while expanding the analytical scope of 
governmentality. 
I move now to first consider the particular by means of a review of the 
historiography of the Danish West Indies. Afterwards, I consider the 
universality of a Foucauldian approach to the context of colonial history in 
general and in particular the history of Atlantic slavery to which Foucault’s 
notion of productive power, which forms the groundwork of his conception 
of governmentality, appears particularly controversial. 
 
The Danish West Indies in Danish Colonial History 
The historiography of the Danish West Indies has in general been dominated 
by three strands of analytical emphasis.51 i) An administrative-economic 
focus taking the point of view of the colonial administrators and trading 
companies; ii) a cultural and social focus seen from the perspective of a 
“slave society;” iii) and a recent pragmatic, but critical middle ground. 
The first strand, which can further be divided into two successive sub-
strands, was marked by the publication of the edited volume Vore gamle 
tropekolonier (Our Old Tropical Colonies) in 1952, a second edition was 
published in 1966. The project brought together historians that worked with 
hitherto unused archival material, producing eight volumes, in the 1966 
edition, on Danish possessions in the West Indies, the Gold Coast of West 
Africa, and the settlements of Tranquebar and Serampore on the east coast 
of India. In the eyes of the authors, the publication made available to the 
                                                
 
51 Several reviews of the historiography of the Danish West Indies and Danish colonialism 
in general have been published in recent times. See e.g. (Brimnes 1992; Olwig 1981; 
Simonsen 2003) 
 
 
25 
general public, for the first time, a history of Denmark’s tropical colonies 
that was thoroughly grounded in scientific historical methodology. This 
was, however, a history marked by an overtly attention to the administration 
of the colonies and, most importantly, the struggles of Danish administrators 
to represent the small-state interests of the Royal Danish Kingdom in 
competition with other European imperial powers in the hazardous 
conditions of a tropical environment and a population prone to trouble. 
The volume’s approach was non-theoretical, descriptive, Eurocentric, 
and provincial in the sense that the Danish colonies were thought of as 
separate, detached spheres of administration with communications, 
ordinances, and reports running back and forth between the central 
administration in Copenhagen and the different governors, trusted to 
conduct the local administration of the colonies. The authors made no effort 
to locate the colonies in a broader framework of Danish imperialism. Nor 
were the colonies placed within imperial networks of commodity trade and 
ideological circulations that significantly widened its scope and impact on a 
global scale during the three to four hundred years that spans Danish 
colonial activity. Finally, they showed no interest at all in the interactions 
and relations of Danish colonizers and local populations.  
Parallel with the publications of Vore gamle tropekolonier a series of 
studies by mainly economic historians from the 1940s onward 
complemented the administrative history of those volumes with a more 
narrow focus on conditions of production, commerce, and trade, including 
the trade in slaves.52 In a review article, the historian Niels Brimnes coined 
this scholarship as “a history of company rather than a history of colony.”53 
Brimnes also remarked that the economic historians did not substantially 
differ in their grounds of inquiry from Vore gamle tropekolonier. They 
merely broadened the scope of analysis, while retaining the Eurocentric 
point of departure. He pointed out that while seeking to fill a gap in history 
of colonialism that Vore gamle tropekolonier presented, the focus on 
economy and trade led the historians further away from the true sinews of 
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colonialism that could only be found in the relationships between colonial 
actors on the ground, not in the abstract numbers of trade records. 
This objection towards the Eurocentric approach of administrative and 
economic histories of Danish colonialism brings us to the second major 
historiographical strand, which emerged in the 1980s. This strand owes its 
formation to at least two historiographical developments. Firstly, it was 
influenced by the currents put into motion by the publication of Edward 
Said’s influential book Orientalism in 1978 and the emergence of 
postcolonial studies in the 1980s and 90s. Secondly, it drew inspiration from 
the anthropological turn within cultural and social histories of the Caribbean 
and Atlantic where scholars such as Sidney Mintz, Robert Price, Douglas 
Hall, and Kamau Brathwaite were important point of reference. The 
influence can be seen in the sense of a political incentive of wanting to write 
a history that made room for Afro-Caribbean agency, providing today’s 
postcolonial citizens a place in their own history. The influence did not, 
however, necessarily include a comprehensive engagement with the 
theoretical and methodological advances of the postcolonial critical 
movement. But it did involve a welcomed interaction with an international 
historiography of colonialism.54 
If the first strand of Danish colonial historiography can be seen as 
Eurocentric, the second can be labelled as Afro-Caribbean-centric. The 
analytical aspiration of this strand was to know the history of the colonized, 
the social life of enslaved Africans that were brought to the West Indies as 
forced labor, and how these diverse groups of people developed specific 
creolized cultural traits, traditions and conventions, both in spite of, because 
of, and as resistance to slavery and colonial domination. 
Much of the literature that has been reviewed thus far in this section can 
be criticized for being somewhat provincial in its approach to the study of 
colonialism. There is a tendency to limit the object of analysis to certain 
geographical areas or a specific area of colonial relations, e.g. the trade of 
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the East India Company or slave societies on St. John. More challenging 
conceptual approaches that makes comparisons across colonial sites, e.g. of 
interracial marriages/sexual relations in Greenland and the West Indies, 
have generally been avoided. Likewise, there has been a lack of studies that 
situate the experiences of Danish colonialism within a wider context of 
colonial and imperial modernities. Recently, however, a number of authors 
have done their part to redeem this cavity. This third strand of scholarship 
on Danish colonialism is to a greater extend connected to a wider 
international scholarly field on colonialism, and has extended the 
boundaries of what can be termed a colonial field of enquiry by locating the 
‘colonial moment’ in the encounters, circulations, and subjectivities that 
European expansion facilitated, as much as in the records of administrations 
and trade companies. Favoring practices of power relations in the broad 
sense of the term, aspects of Danish colonialism have been found to unfold 
itself in such divers settings as criminal trials in the lower courts of St. 
Croix,55 human exhibitions in the Copenhagen Zoo and Tivoli Gardens,56 
nineteenth century Copenhagen’s boarding houses for promising 
Greenlandic students and relief homes for the city’s poor danes,57 and in 
orphanages belonging to Danish missionaries in southern India after official 
Danish colonial evolvement had ceased.58 
These and other works expands the colonial category to include unequal 
power relations in general, going beyond the relations of direct dominance 
between colonizers and colonized. As Pernille Ipsen and Gunlög Fur 
explains in an article on Scandinavian colonialism, 
[w]hen the definition of colonialism is broadened to include more than 
colonies and colonial institutions, Scandinavian engagement in the 
European expansion is therefore a larger and more complicated history. 
Indeed, when tracing colonialism beyond colonies to specific historical 
localities that may or may not have been called colonies, but that, 
nevertheless, were structured by European colonialism, it becomes clear 
                                                
 
55 (2007) 
56 (Andreassen 2015; Andreassen & Henningsen, 2011) 
57 (Rud 2010) 
58 (Vallgårda 2014) 
 
 
28 
that Scandinavian colonisation, trade, exploration and mission were all 
part of a larger system of European expansion.59 
Favoring the category of encounters (colonial, cultural, economic) as their 
site of analyzes, the limited scope of Danish/Scandinavian expansion, in 
comparison with the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, etc., is made more 
“colonial” by broadening the effects of colonialism beyond the limits of a 
traditional definition of colonialism. 
While the effort, as mentioned earlier is much needed, such an approach 
runs the risk of diluting the actual sense of a historical experience of 
colonialism on the sides of both post-colonizers and post-colonized. Why 
make the effort of ‘writing up’ the effects of Scandinavian colonialism, one 
could ask? In the article quoted above, the authors make the argument that 
the postcolonial Danish state refuses to recognize its historical responsibility 
as a colonizing state that to some extent build its dawning modern nation-
state on the backs of hard worked African slaves.60 In the view of this 
argument, it seems contradictory to aim one’s analytical focus, as the 
authors seem to do, anywhere but the colonial state and the government that 
supposedly perpetrated this historical wrongdoing. Instead of a history of 
colonialism that accentuates state delineated empires, Ipsen and Fur calls for 
“a history that traces colonialism beyond colonies to local encounters; a 
history where there were plenty of Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes, but 
where they were not necessarily following command from ‘their’ states” 
that incorporates “the development and movement of ideas, networks, 
groups, and individuals.”61 The authors seem to be writing the colony (or at 
least the colonial state) out of colonialism. 
I am apprehensive of this project. Not because local encounters of ideas, 
networks, groups, and individuals are not important aspects of the colonial 
experience, but because the rationalities and aspirations of the colonial state 
had a great deal to say about the space of possibilities in which these 
concepts circulated and developed. What is there for the Danish government 
to apologize for if the state is exempted from Danish colonialism. An 
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unintended consequence of the research agenda spelled out by Ipsen and Fur 
might be that it will help to sustain the common conception that the 
involvement of the Danish state in colonial projects was limited and benign. 
The analytical perspective of governmentality that I advance in this 
dissertation reasserts the problem of the state in Danish colonialism. It is 
not, however, a return to the administrative history of Vore gamle 
tropekolonier. Rather, it represents an analytical strategy that seeks to 
unfold the activities of governmental actors, programs, and the rationalities 
that informed them. 
Michel Foucault’s analytical approaches have not been applied to any 
considerable degree within the study of Danish colonialism. Søren Rud’s 
work on colonial Greenland serves as an important exception to this rule. As 
such, this dissertation forms part of a contribution to fill this theoretical and 
methodological caveat in Danish colonial historiography. In the following 
section I direct my attention towards Foucault’s conceptualization of power 
in relation to colonial history and particularly the history of Atlantic slavery. 
 
Power and Slavery 
Foucault has been immensely influential in the formulation of postcolonial 
critique of colonial power relations and their persistence into postcolonial 
politics. Despite his influence, Foucault has been an ambivalent figure in the 
canon of postcolonial theory. This seems to have been particularly true 
among historians of Atlantic slavery and of post-emancipation Caribbean 
colonialism, who have been less attracted by Foucault’s conceptual work. In 
the case of my own project, it refers to a Caribbean, colonial society that 
until the middle of the nineteenth century revolved around an entrenched 
practice of slavery; a context where race and property were determining and 
intertwined categories, and the legal and economic privileges of liberty 
distributed accordingly. This difference in social and legal conditions 
require a discussion of Foucault’s place in the study of colonialism in 
general and in particular the study of Atlantic slavery. 
In the text The Subject and Power Foucault claims that the existence and 
exercise of power does not negate or extinguish the existence of freedom. 
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Rather, freedom is a fundamental prerequisite for relations of power. In 
other terms, the exercise of power necessitates a possibility of choice and of 
action, and the capability of power is not contained in the function of 
quelling the possibility of action. Rather, the exercise of power consist in 
structuring “the possible field of action of others.”62 This definition of a 
basic mechanics of power relations that gives privilege to the productive act 
of conducting conduct rather than the repressive act of coercing one’s will 
upon others, runs intuitively counter to the condition of slavery. As Foucault 
also makes clear: “Where the determining factors saturate the whole, there 
is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is 
in chains.” Foucault is referring here to slavery as a philosophical ideal state 
where the possibility of agency, of choice and action, is completely non-
existent. But still, the theoretical conclusion is that power as Foucault 
conceives it is not able to accommodate the determining factors of the 
condition of slavery.  
In a lecture given many years earlier, on 15 January 1975, Foucault 
articulated the analytical relationship between slavery and power somewhat 
differently. In that lecture Foucault laid out a series of outdated conceptions 
of power that were all modeled on anachronistic historical realities and 
therefore incapable of analyzing the contemporary functioning of power. 
Describing the first of four outdated historical models of power, Foucault 
asked rhetorically: “From where is this conception of power borrowed that 
sees power impinging massively from the outside, as it were, with a 
continuous violence that some (always the same) exercise over others (who 
are also always the same)?” And gave the answer: “It comes from the model 
of, or if you like, from the historical reality of, slave society.”63 Again, the 
slave society that Foucault referred to was certainly the ideal type of slavery 
in Roman and Greek antiquity, and not the dispersed practices of chattel 
slavery in early modern and modern European Atlantic empires. Foucault, 
nevertheless, explicitly opposed the conception of power as an extrinsic and 
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continuous violence that originated in the analysis of slave society with his 
own. Did this also mean that he rejected the possibility that his conception 
of power could be applied to an analytics of the power relations of slavery? 
No, not necessarily. But Foucault’s tendency to exclude violent and 
coercive techniques of power from his conception of modern, contemporary 
relations of power, has lead to an analytical skepticism among some 
colonial historians towards the extension of Foucault’s analyses to the 
colonial context.64 
Foucault is very rarely discussed in the literature on slavery and 
colonialism in the New World, so it is difficult to determine the specific 
scholarly reasons for ignoring Foucault. Despite the silence from historians 
of Atlantic slavery on Foucault, I believe it would be reasonable to speculate 
that this absence of Foucault in the study of slavery is mostly due to the 
relativization of elements of ‘intent,’ ‘responsibility,’ and therefore the 
exclusion of the element of ‘culpability’ that Foucault’s conception of 
power relations can be interpreted as promoting. Power in the work of 
Foucault is simply a category that is too open-ended for most scholars 
working with the subject of the history of slavery. The possibility of taking 
on a position that could be viewed as whitewashing the consequences of the 
mass-scale and systematic trafficking, exploitation, and indirect murder of 
African men, women, and children, would be a reasonable argument for 
steering clear of Foucault’s analytical approach to power relations. 
Besides furnishing a theoretical framework for the analysis of discursive 
structures of social control, Foucault also conceptualized modern relations 
of power as a movement away from the juridically centered, often coercive 
techniques of sovereign power towards more subtile, incentivizing, and 
transformative techniques of disciplinary and governmental power. For 
some historians of colonialism, Foucault’s concepts have been immensely 
inspiring and productive, while others have been much more critical. Let us 
begin to address this criticism and the conspicuous absence of Foucault in 
the study of Atlantic slavery and Caribbean colonialism by comparing the 
                                                
 
64 Many studies of colonial punishment and prisons display this skeptical tendency towards 
the scope of Foucault’s analytical approach. See e.g. (Bernault 2007; Paton 2004; Zinoman 
2001) 
 
 
32 
conceptualization of power in more classical theories of power, as found in 
Thomas Hobbes, with Foucault’s. When one compares Foucault’s 
conception of power with Hobbes, a probable explanation for the omitting 
of Foucault by scholars of particularly Atlantic slavery emerges. An 
explanation that is connected with the sense of historical injustice that 
surrounds the tragedy of Atlantic slavery, and the question of culpability 
that has understandably framed contemporary narratives of colonial slavery. 
The sociologist Barry Hindess has traced the contours of a Hobbesian 
conception of power that runs through much of modern political theory. 
This conception of power, Hindess argues, is often considered in terms of “a 
generalized essence of effectiveness” that he locates in the writings of such 
influential political thinkers as Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, and Anthony 
Giddens. Hindess writes that “[t]his view of power as a quantitative and 
mechanical phenomenon which determines the capacity of actors to realize 
their will or to secure their interests has been enormously influential in the 
modern period.”65 The foundation of this conception of power has its origins 
in Thomas Hobbes’ seventeenth century treatise on the constitution and 
function of sovereign power, Leviathan. In this canonical text of political 
theory, Hobbes defines power as the ability or capacity “to obtain some 
future apparent Good.” This capacity is dependent upon certain personal 
qualities such as “extraordinary Strength, Forms, Prudence, Arts, 
Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility,” as well as acquired instruments that will 
increase one’s means of obtaining future goods, such as “Riches, 
Reputation, Friends, and … Good Luck.” Power in this conception is thus 
something that can be possessed by a person, and the level of a person’s 
power reflects his or hers personal faculty as well as external aides that a 
person may have harnessed and made to work in their interest. This basic 
understanding of power as capacity, Hindess finds, is shared by present 
authors such as Michael Mann who claims that “power is the ability to 
pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment.” A similar 
claim is made by Anthony Giddens when he equates “the capability to 
‘make a difference’” with “the exercise [of] some sort of power.” As 
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Hindess notes, “power,” in this conception, “is a condition of human 
agency.” To act is to be in power. 
The idea of power as the condition of agency is, however, complicated 
by the obvious fact that the power to act is a shared and common trait of all 
individuals. Accordingly, the idea of power as capacity needs to be qualified 
as “a quantitative and cumulative phenomenon.” As Hobbes makes clear, 
“because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the 
power of another: power is simply no more, but the excess of the power of 
one above that of another.” Individuals may posses qualities that are 
powerful, but the true measure of power rests in its “transformative 
capacity”, as Giddens asserts. Power is not to be confused with the diverse 
means through which it is exercised. Rather then a set of easily identifiable 
qualities, power, as it is described by Hobbes, Mann, and Giddens, is best 
understood as an “essence of effectiveness” representing different degrees 
of personal capacities. Not only is power the ability to take action, but also 
the capacity to procure one’s favored outcome over that of another’s. Again, 
Hindess finds reiterations of this quantitative conception of power in 
influential theories of political power, including Max Weber’s definition of 
power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will 
even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.”  
From this description of the very influential conception of power as 
quantitative capacity that has more or less persisted in the same form since 
Hobbes’ formulation in the seventeenth century, we can see the attraction 
that this conception of power presents for historians of slavery and colonial 
dominance. As Hindess suggests in regard to the debates over the concept of 
‘community power’ in the 1950s United States, “[t]he great attraction of this 
conception of power as quantitive capacity for so many social scientists is 
that it appears to promise an easy means of identifying who has power and 
who has not.”66 For a field of historical study that has been so shaped by the 
towering presence of the institution of slavery, this conception of power 
becomes an almost reflexive response to the problematic of power relations. 
But it also presents a convenient way of framing a methodological 
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conception of a problem that seems almost common-sensical in its 
obviously asymmetrical distribution of power. When the problem of power 
is framed as a matter of a zero-sum game, the analytical objective becomes 
a matter of identifying the distribution of power between ‘the haves and the 
have nots’. In the context of slavery, the answer to the question of power’s 
distribution is easily identified.  
Beside the problem of power’s distribution, there is also the problem of 
power’s production. No one simply has power (besides common agency); it 
needs to be cumulated and produced in order to be effective. For Hobbes, 
this cumulative phenomenon found its most pertinent manifestation in “[t]he 
Greatest of humane Powers”: “the Power of a Common-wealth,”67 or the 
political concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this respect, is a 
representation of the accumulated power of every subject and it rests on a 
series of popular authorizations, in which each subject consent to confer 
their power to the will of a single sovereign. For the sovereign, then, the 
consent of his subjects produces power for him to wield. Consent is a 
representation of the sovereign’s legitimacy. If a sovereign does not have 
the consent of his subjects, he will have to resort to coercion, and, thus, act 
without legitimacy. This creates a loss of power for the sovereign since he is 
no longer able to apply the capacity of his subjects’ power. The sovereign 
has lost the authorization to apply the power-capacity of the subjects. The 
obvious conclusion in regard to slavery is that it constituted an exercise of 
power based on coercion and therefore without authority. Or perhaps it is 
more fitting to describe the exercise of power in regard to slavery as being 
void of sovereignty. Sovereign power, which is constituted by authority, is 
reserved for political communities of free individuals. Nevertheless, the 
conceptualization of slavery as being void of authority and legitimacy 
provides, again, a convenient strategy of critique that can be reproduced and 
conveyed without ambiguity.    
The Hobbesian conception of power as quantitative and cumulative 
capacity, and the connection between legitimate sovereignty and the consent 
of subjects, have provided a convenient methodology and critique of the 
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problem of power relations within the institution of slavery. Power in the 
context of slavery was extremely asymmetrically distributed, and it was 
wielded with limited consent and unlimited coercion, and therefore 
illegitimately. If we then contrast the Hobbesian conception of power with 
Foucault’s, it will become clear why historians of slavery have, by and 
large, refrained from integrating Foucault’s approach into the analysis of 
power and colonial slavery.  
The first volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality presents a good 
place to start to look at his conceptualization of power. Especially the 
chapter on Method outlines his approach to the study of power relations.  
Foucault framed his conception of power in opposition to what he 
termed a “juridico-discursive” conception of power that privileged the 
mechanism of the law, of prohibition, and the discourse of right, of the 
legitimate and lawful exercise of power. For Foucault, this represented a 
theory of power that could not adequately discern the multiple ways that 
power gained access to the problem of sexuality. The two scepters of 
sovereignty—law and right—had according to Foucault, since the 
eighteenth century, gradually given way to  
…new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by 
technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by 
control, methods that are employed at all levels and in forms that go 
beyond the state and its apparatus.68 
From this recognition, Foucault identified a necessity to reboot the 
analysis of power. His objective was to introduce “…a different grid of 
historical decipherment by starting from a different theory of power…”69 
This alternative conception of power would necessarily have to be 
distinguished from other conceptions of power. Accordingly, Foucault 
clarified what he did not mean when referring to a concept of power:  
By power, I do not mean ‘Power’ as a group of institutions and 
mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. 
By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast 
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to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a 
general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a 
system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire 
social body.70  
With this negative definition, Foucault attempted to disassociate his 
approach to a history of sexuality from previous approaches that had been 
shaped by this conception of power that Foucault wanted to rid 
philosophical and political thinking of: a history of sexuality that assumed 
from the outset that power operated as and through “the sovereignty of the 
state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination… .”71 Put 
differently, Foucault was attempting to challenge the notion of power that 
had prevailed in political thought since Hobbes.72 He continued, then, to 
insist on a different point of departure for a conceptualization of power. 
As part of his rejection of the Hobbesian theory of power, Foucault 
outlined a series of principles for his own conception of power. Of particular 
interest for our present discussion should be mentioned that, firstly, 
Foucault did nod conceive of power as emanating from individual or 
accumulated capacity; there is no unique source, but rather it is immanent in 
the relation in which it is situated. Secondly, power is omnipresent, in the 
sense that it is constantly produced in every relation; it is not contained in 
the enactment of a law or the execution of a punishment. Thirdly, power 
does not represent a coherent structure or institution, but rather “a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society.”73 Fourthly, power is always 
strategic; it is shaped by a series of aims and objectives, but the origin of 
this strategic agency is dispersed and cannot be traced back to a specific 
individual decision—power is anonymous:  
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let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; 
neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state 
apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions 
direct the entire network of power that functions in a society; … the logic 
is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that 
no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have 
formulated them…74 
In the final chapter of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 Foucault 
describes the major transition in the form of power that has taken place in 
modern Western Europe. He describes a movement from the right of 
sovereignty that was formulated as the power over life and death, or rather 
“the right to take life or let live”,75 towards a ‘bio-power’ that is assigned 
with the task of administering life, regulating populations, and disciplining 
bodies. While sovereign power was exercised through “a means of 
deduction”—the sovereign enacted his right of seizure: “of things, time, 
bodies, and ultimately life itself”—the new power over life, still retaining 
the mechanism of deduction, increasingly worked to “incite, reinforce, 
control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on 
generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one 
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.”76 
If the Hobbesian conception of power had provided a convenient and 
easily accessible critique of colonial dominance and the injustices of 
slavery, then Foucault’s counter assumptions about the dynamics of power 
relations presented an altogether more ambiguous picture. To conceive of 
power relations in a subject-matter, like sexuality, being so charged with 
tension, as not constituted by juridical repression and discursive taboos; to 
not view the history of sexuality as a struggle for liberation of a basic 
human instinct from the grip of power structures; to instead argue that 
sexuality was a historical construct, formed by a technology of psychology, 
medical science, and political economy and proliferated through an 
incitement to discourse about sex, rather than being restrained in silence, 
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was controversial in itself. To then transfer such an analysis to the domain 
of colonialism and slavery entails an even greater leap of the imagination. 
If scholars interested in structures of dominance had not been 
sufficiently alienated by Foucault’s analysis of the productive power 
relations of sexuality, they would surely be completely dissuaded of his 
relevance by statements that Foucault would make towards the final years of 
his life regarding the conditions of power.  
One such position that at least indirectly opposes itself to Foucault is the 
often cited conceptualization of the relations of power in slavery as 
centering on the ’social death’ of the slave. The concept of slavery’s social 
death originates with Orlando Patterson’s momentous book from 1982 that 
has been a recurrent point of reference for contemporary scholars of Atlantic 
slavery.77 The conception of power relations that informs Patterson’s book 
is in complete opposition to Foucault’s conception of productive power and 
power without coercion. Patterson, like the majority of social scientists, took 
his cue directly from the intellectual lineage of Hobbes and especially 
Weber when defining his approach to the concept of power in the slave-
master relationship. Referring to Weber’s definition of power as the ability 
to carry out one’s will even against resistance, Patterson maintained that  
[r]elations of inequality or domination, which exist whenever one person 
has more power than another, range on a continuum from those of 
marginal asymmetry to those in which one person is capable of 
exercising, with impunity, total power over another.78  
Along this scale of power’s intensity, Patterson locates slavery at its most 
intense: “Slavery is one of the most extreme forms of the relation of 
domination, approaching the limits of total power from the viewpoint of the 
master, and of total powerlessness from the viewpoint of the slave.”79 The 
distance from Foucault’s conception of a productive power is made very 
clear by this quote. In Patterson’s conception—and by extension that of 
Weber and Hobbes as well—power is basically a degree of domination 
within a social relationship. Relations of power is presented as a zero-sum 
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game in which a finite amount of power, i.e., domination, is distributed 
among different actors. To be in power, then, is to enact dominance. Given 
the substantial impact of Patterson’s book, I find it probable that his 
conceptualization of the slave’s powerlessness as ‘socially dead’ has been a 
contributing factor to the marginalization of Foucauldian approaches to the 
analysis of the power relations of slavery.  
Despite the influential theme of ‘slavery and social death’ several 
themes in the historiography of Atlantic slavery can be treated as 
complementary to some key theoretical conceptions in Foucault’s work. Or 
at least, there is a range of themes in the scholarship on Atlantic slavery and 
emancipation that would be susceptible to the insights and analyses from 
Foucault’s work. I will limit myself to only demonstrating a couple of these 
potential axes of communication between the field of Atlantic history of 
slavery and Foucault’s conceptual corpus. One popular thematic has been 
the concept of ‘planter paternalism.’ Eugene Genovese has been a key 
proponent of this theme in his work on the social history of slave society 
and the intellectual history of the planter class in the southern United States. 
The image of planter paternalism presents an alternative framing of the 
power relation between master and slave from the total power of the masters 
complete domination of his slave. Dominance is certainly not excluded from 
the master-slave relation, when framed as planter paternalism, but it is 
complemented by more ambiguous practices such as ‘care,’ ‘management,’ 
‘training,’ and ‘education.’ Genovese was in his analysis inspired by 
Gramsci’s conception of ‘hegemony.’ However, such aspects of the master-
slave relation would also capture the attention of Foucault-inspired analysts 
in that they accentuate relations of power that are not captured by the 
juridical right of the master to coerce his slave to labor and obtain his 
obedience with threats of physical punishment. Rather, the techniques of 
control that Genovese locates in the hegemonic paternalism of the planter 
class could be categorized, in Foucauldian terms, as aspects of pastoral 
power.80  
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The focus on planter paternalism suggests that the slaveholder’s power 
to utilize his slaves did not uniformly stem from a legal right over property 
but from an economic consideration of household governance, of which 
slaves and their management were a part of. Recent studies by David 
Roediger and Elizabeth Esch trace the roots of modern “scientific 
management” back to the managerial practices of slavery.81 The authors find 
that “racial knowledge” was employed in the development of labor 
management. The connection between the authors’ approach and a 
Foucauldian methodology was recognized by one reviewer: “While 
Roediger and Esch never invoke Foucault, they are doing something quite 
Foucauldian (in the best possible sense) when they discuss ‘the “truths” 
[planters’] own managerial practices were bringing into being.’”82 David 
Brion Davis has made similar comparisons between the “carefully 
structured gang labor” of plantation agriculture and “the assembly lines and 
agribusinesses of the future.”83 
The analytical application of concept such as planter paternalism and the 
‘science’ of slave management opens up the possibility of interaction with 
Foucault’s conceptual corpus. More than a coercion of bodies, slavery can 
be seen as a production of truth, a management of subjectivity, a mechanism 
of discipline, and a conduct of conduct. Concepts of ‘pastoral power’ and 
the political art of government that make up Foucault’s history of 
governmentality, together with the double focus of bio-power—one set of 
mechanisms targeting the disciplining of individual bodies, and another 
targeting the management and regulation of a population—could all add to 
the historical analysis of slavery. Not only does it seem possible to locate 
analytical affinities between Foucault’s theoretical concepts and the history 
of slavery, but also, I would argue, that actively pursuing such a research 
agenda would bring into focus, genealogical connections between the 
techniques of power found in slavery and those that, constituting present 
societies, build on principles of liberty. 
                                                
 
81 (Esch & Roediger, 2009; Roediger & Esch, 2012) 
82 (Baker 2013, p. 537) 
83 (Davis 2006, p. 6) 
 
 
41 
There is an important point to make here about the perceived 
incompatibility of Foucault’s concept of power and the power relations of 
slavery. At the moment when the relationship of master and slave is 
established, it is determined by the level of force that slave owners could 
successfully apply to the bodies of slaves. For the slave, there is no possible 
space of action that power can shape. The constituting moment of the 
master-slave relationship is, in Foucault’s conceptualization of power, not a 
relation of power at all. Rather, it is a moment of perfect force—a scene of 
non-power—since it is deprived of the element of choice. At first sight, 
then, it is understandable that Foucault’s idea of power as productive rather 
than repressive and inducing rather than coercing, seems inept in capturing 
the character of the constitution of slavery. When the analysis moves 
beyond this initial constitutive moment of the master-slave construction, 
however, the power relationship becomes more complicated, and cannot be 
adequately deduced from the zero-sum conception of cumulative power. 
Slavery as a sustained mode of social and economic organization, besides a 
rigorous regime of prohibitions and chastisement, required techniques of 
power that structured a space of action and choice of the enslaved. The 
preference for Hobbes over Foucault in the analytical approach to the power 
relations of slavery has resulted in an underemphasis on the productive 
power mechanisms of slave societies. 
 
Foucault Out of Place? 
Some postcolonial scholars have argued that the application of Foucault’s 
theoretical conceptions outside of the Western, and in most cases 
specifically French, context of Foucault’s own philosophical investigations 
implies a potential methodological problem. One aspect of the postcolonial 
criticism of Foucault refers to the inherent ‘Eurocentrism’ in Foucault’s 
oeuvre. Foucault wrote of historical developments and philosophical 
problems that were specific to Western modernity and thereby neglected the 
non-Western and colonial genealogies of the problems of power and 
subjectivation that he sat out to investigate. Another aspect of criticism is 
aimed at the epistemological effects of indiscriminately applying Foucault’s 
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theories to the colonial and postcolonial context. Dipesh Chakrabarty has 
argued that the simple transposition of a critical arsenal and theoretical 
framework derived from Western philosophers and scholars unto non-
Western objects of study is tantamount to reproducing the temporal 
structure of historicism’s developmental philosophy of history. Western 
theories of societal development, Charkrabarty contends, all more or less 
chants along with the mantra of modernization theory: “first in Europe, then 
elsewhere.”84 By presupposing the immediate translatability of Western 
categories of analysis unto non-Western realities, Chakrabarty argues, 
academic researchers are reproducing, or forming an epistemological 
alliance with, colonialism’s civilizing mission of the past as well as 
reiterating the developmentalist assertion of non-Western backwardness.  
In view of this critique of the application of not only Foucault but 
Western-derived theories of social and economic development in general to 
non-western contexts, a few remarks on my own use of Foucault are in 
order. In the dissertation I refer to Foucault’s work as the theoretical and 
methodological basis of my analyses via two separate movements. Firstly I 
utilize Foucault’s work as an analytical toolbox to pry open the source 
material as well as gain new perspectives on existing interpretations of the 
history of the Danish West Indies. I apply specific analytical terms and 
conceptions to comprise an analytical strategy that to a certain extent could 
be universally applied to any given empirical context (these are the 
‘analytics of governmentality’ that I define in the second chapter). In this 
regard, I show no reservations towards the applicability of Foucault’s 
analyses outside their original context. Secondly, I make references to 
Foucault’s work with a heuristic purpose, in order to spark strains of thought 
that will run as currents through the given analytical section. Here, criticism 
might be raised that the use of Foucault’s writing as a creative catalyst falls 
into the pitfalls of Eurocentrist and historicist assumptions of the 
universality of Western problematics of modernity, secularism, and 
liberalism. But rather than emphasize the failure and lack of non-Western 
societies and cultures, through the normative appliance of ‘Western’ theory 
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that some postcolonial scholars fear, I utilize the creative spark, from 
Foucault’s philosophical criticism of sovereignty, liberalism, enlightenment, 
science, government, etc., to question and problematize historicist 
conceptions of human history as progressing through epochal stages. This 
movement, in itself, also implies a criticism of Foucault’s conception of a 
history of power relations as epochal, which will be elaborated in chapter 
two. So, on one hand, I discard the postcolonial critique of the 
epistemological dominance of Western theory when constructing an 
analytical strategy from Foucault’s work on governmentality. On the other 
hand, I sympathize with the critique of modernization and development 
theory that posits the preeminence of categories of Western modernity over 
the relative ‘insufficiencies’ of non-Western ‘paths to modernity’ by 
emphasizing a continual reconfiguration of the rationalities and techniques 
of power at play in specific historical instances. 
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Chapter Two 
Analytics of Governmentality 
 
 
This chapter extends on the core theoretical contestations of the dissertation 
by engaging more directly with the concept of governmentality. The 
objective is to argue for the existence of an analytics of governmentality that 
cen be deduced from Foucault’s lecture course Security, Territory, 
Population, which he carried out at the Collège de France in 1977-1978. 
The analytics of governmentality can be seen as a reorientation of 
Foucault’s analytical category of “dispositifs” that was essential to his 
general analytics of power that he engaged in throughout the 1970s. The 
purpose of delineating a reorientation of the dispositif that is specific to 
governmentality is to present an analytical strategy to the study of power 
relations that is less concerned with epochal transformations of general 
forms of power and more attentive to the various constructions of multiple 
configurations of practices of power. I argue that the analytics of 
governmentality and the economies of power, which are constituted by the 
configurations of power dispositifs, provides an analytical strategy that is 
more suited to studies of power outside of the liberal West. First, I delineate 
Foucault’s history of governmentality. Then, I proceed to a description of 
the analytical concept of dispositifs, with the purpose of elucidating the 
concept’s analytical function and potential. Finally, the chapter provides a 
structure of the remaining chapters of the dissertation. 
 
The History of Governmentality 
During the last few decades, the concept of governmentality has gathered 
plenty of interest among scholars and students within the humanities and 
social sciences. As such, the concept has been taken in many different 
directions. The still growing number of books that introduces, defines, and 
interprets governmentality in different fields of political, social, cultural, 
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and historical analysis testify to the impact that the concept has enjoyed in 
academic disciplines during the last couple of decades.85 The publication of 
The Foucault Effect (1991), which featured a translation of Foucault’s 
lecture of 1 February 1978 at the Collège de France—referred to now as the 
“Governmentality” lecture—sparked what Bob Jessop has referred to as an 
“Anglo-Foucauldian effect” or ”Anglo-Foucauldian school.”86 Elaborating 
on these first glimpses at Foucault’s thinking on governmentality the Anglo-
Foucauldian school developed into a self sustaining field of 
governmentality-studies. This school of mainly sociologists and political 
scientists have applied the concept of governmentality as an analytical 
strategy in a critique of the contemporary government of “advanced liberal 
democracies.” To a certain extent this sociology of contemporary 
governance developed separately from Foucault’s philosophical engagement 
with “a history of governmentality.” Consequentially, governmentality as a 
theoretical and analytical concept has found a substantially wider usage 
within Anglophone scholarly communities than their Francophone 
counterparts. The subsequent publication of Foucault’s lecture courses of 
1977-78 and 1978-79 in their entirety has expanded the insights into 
Foucault’s further conceptualization of governmentality and refashioned the 
way we think of governmentality and Foucault’s oeuvre in general. 
 As the point of departure, the “Governmentality” lecture, published in 
The Foucault Effect, represented a mere fragment, albeit a very central 
fragment, of a complex thought process where Foucault, throughout his 
lectures at College de France from 77 to 79, was working through his 
conception of power via this neologism, governmentality. Foucault’s 
lectures were works in progress, and presented as such, and the coinage of 
governmentality as the central concept of the lecture series did not appear 
until the fourth lecture of the 78 lecture course, given on 1 February 1978. 
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Foucault’s revelation that the title of that year’s lecture series should not 
have been Security, Territory, Population, and that a more fitting title would 
have been “The History of Governmentality,” signals both a reformulation 
of his project for that year, but also the significance of situating the 
‘governmentality lecture’ in the context of the previous and succeeding 
lectures. The dense exposition of ‘the history of governmentality’ that 
Foucault provides in the fourth lecture is difficult to ascertain in its entirety. 
But more importantly, the rest of the lectures provide elaborations and 
clarifications to ideas and concepts presented in the ‘governmentality 
lecture.’ Thus, in order to understand the more detailed conceptualization of 
governmentality as well as ascertaining the analytical and methodological 
rough workings of governmentality as an analytical concept, it will be 
necessary to explore further the rest of Foucault’s lecture series.  
Rather than readdressing the sociology of ‘governmentality studies,’ this 
chapter directs its attention to the lecture course series of 78 and 79 where 
Foucault introduced and developed the concept of governmentality. These 
series of incredibly rich lectures hold important clues/insights to the overall 
trajectory of Foucault’s philosophical project as well as detailed descriptions 
of methodological tools to the analysis of power. The latter can be seen both 
as methods of analyzing power as well as ‘mechanisms of power’ itself. So, 
Foucault provides a history of mechanisms of power as well as a strategy to 
the analysis of power.  
In the lectures, governmentality emerges and evolves along with 
Foucault’s own evolving thoughts about the project he is undertaking at the 
time of the lectures. The scope of Foucault’s notion of governmentality can 
be narrowed down by considering two characteristics of governmentality. 
Firstly, governmentality referrers to a historical process, when at a certain 
point in history, the conduct of conduct became the raison d’être of the state. 
Secondly, governmentality referrers to a set of practices, or technologies, of 
government that can be configured in different ways. Thinking of 
governmentality as both historical process and historical practices, at the 
same time narrows and widen the scope of analysis of a history of 
governmentality. 
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Governmentality as process prompts us to look for points in time when 
the state emerged as the prime agent of the arts of government and how 
alternative stakeholders of government were subdued in the process. 
Governmentality as practice takes into account that this process can take on 
many different configurations according to the historical context. 
Governmentality is then not limited to its modern, Western, liberal 
formation, but can be configured in different ways.    
Foucault confirms this duality of governmentality in the definition that 
he provides towards the end of the lecture of 1 February 1978. Firstly, “[b]y 
this word ‘governmentality’” Foucault meant  
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit 
very complex, power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as 
its essential technical instrument.87 
This part of his definition refers to the productive practice of 
governmentality, or more precisely, it sets out the general architecture of the 
dispositif of governmentality. I will return to the notion of dispositif and its 
importance as an analytical concept in Foucault’s analytics of power in the 
next section. Secondly, Foucault understood governmentality as a historical 
process. This process was twofold. Firstly, it referred to 
the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the 
West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of 
power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we 
can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series 
of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, 
on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs).88 
Here, Foucault summarizes the historical process by which “government” 
was conceived in the form of pastoral power, that is as a government of men 
outside of political sovereignty. Foucault devotes the following four lectures 
to an outline of the origin and development of pastoral power and the 
pastorate in classical Greek philosophy, through its institutionalization in 
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the early Christian church, and towards its integration with political 
government in the sixteenth century. The second aspect of 
governmentality’s historical process was 
the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of 
justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalized.”89 
This aspect of Foucault’s history of governmentality deals precisely with the 
problem and process of integrating the pastoral conduct of a set of 
individuals with the political exercise of sovereign power in regard to a 
territory. The last five lectures of that year described this process of 
governmentalizing the state.  
The historical juncture of government and sovereignty marks the genesis 
of governmentality as a practice of power, as a new governmental 
rationality that was concerned with the political government of men. The 
primary correlate of this historical juncture was raison d’État, which for 
Foucault embodies this new rationality of political government. With raison 
d’État a new set of knowledges and techniques are developed for making 
the forces of the state intelligible to government. Thereby, we see the birth 
of political arithmetic, or statistics. Simultaneously, two major political 
technologies or dispositifs are developed and deployed to secure, increase, 
and utilize the forces of the state. The first was the “military-diplomatic” 
dispositif, which was directed at the external relationship of the state with 
other states. The object was to secure an “European equilibrium” in the 
competitive order of states. The second was the “police” dispositif, which 
pertained to the internal order of the state. It aimed at regulating the conduct 
of individuals so as to most effectively integrate the activities of individuals 
in the utility of the state. Through the development of police as a kind of 
statistical knowledge and a set of regulative practices, a very important 
concept to Foucault’s history of governmentality is emerges in the 
eighteenth century. This was the concept of population, around and through 
which governmentality from then on sought to govern in order to increase 
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the wealth of the state.90 In the final lecture of Security, Territory, 
Population Foucault describes an important modification of 
governmentality. The lecture describes the intervention of political economy 
in the governmentality of the population. Formed by the population-wealth 
nexus established by police, but positioned in opposition to the exhaustive 
regulations of police, political economy inserted a new rationality in the 
government of populations. Rather than being constituted by an artificially 
engineered order of regulations, the political economy of the french 
Physiocrats held that population and the extraction of wealth from the 
activities of population was in fact best analyzed as a self-regulating natural 
order. Accordingly, the best course of government in regard to a natural 
order of population was to intervene as little as possible. This modification 
of governmentality also represents the beginning of economic reflection in 
governmental rationality. Furthermore, this intervention of a non-
interventionist economic logic inaugurated the movement towards a liberal 
political rationality that applied the model of natural self-regulating order to 
the general dynamic of the population, the social, the economy, and civil 
society. Accordingly, the object of government would be to secure the 
autonomy of natural orders and the necessary circulation of freedom that 
sustains them. 
 
Dispositifs of Governmentality 
How then can the history of governmentality be thought of as an analytical 
strategy? The open-ended character of Foucault’s reading of 
governmentality allows for multidirectional interpretations. There is not one 
correct or appropriate way of doing a ‘governmentality analysis.’ For this 
dissertation, I have chosen to rely on Foucault’s notion of dispositif as an 
analytical framework to my analysis of governmental rationality in the 
Danish West Indies. However, the analytical category of dispositif in 
Foucault’s work is not limited to his treatment of governmentality, but has a 
wider usage in his analyses of power. This section will, however, highlight 
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Foucault’s specific conceptualization of dispositifs in Security, Territory, 
Population as distinctive from the use of the concept in earlier works. This 
dynamic career of dispositif in Foucault’s oeuvre also resonates with the 
work of critical philosophers before and after Foucault, such as Canguilhem, 
Deleuze, and Agamben.91 While a satisfactory consideration of this wider 
resonance is beyond the scope of this chapter, the different characterizations 
and usages by Foucault himself will be provided with the objective of 
carving out an analytical strategy for the dissertation.  
It has been suggested that the line of analysis that is prompted by the 
notion of governmentality induces the researcher to set aside “the dreary 
debate about sovereignty versus discipline” and instead direct the attention 
towards “the analysis and diagnosis of particular problematizations and of 
the strategies used in their regulation.”92 This recognition implies that 
Foucault deployed a particular analytical strategy that was specific to the 
analytics of govenmentaity. It follows, then, the line of commentary on 
Foucault’s authorship that interprets Foucault’s turn to governmentality as a 
methodological departure from his previous work within the frame of 
power-knowledge.93 This departure is seen as consisting of a break with the 
totalizing and epochal characterization of power that Foucault presents in 
Discipline and Punish (1975), History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (1976), and 
Society Must be Defended (1976). With the lecture courses of 1977-78 and 
1978-79, Foucault instead purports, in the words of Collier, “a ‘topological’ 
analysis of power that examines how existing techniques and technologies 
of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse assemblies of 
biopolitical government.”94 The key terms here are “recombined” and 
“diverse.” The descriptions of a grand, coherent architecture of the 
normalizing power of discipline and of a bio-power that intervenes at the 
level of the individual as well as the level of population are displaced by 
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multiple and flexible configurations of security mechanisms that are 
deployed in a tactical manner in relation to specific problematizations.  
This interpretation of Foucault’s methodological shift is formed in 
opposition to a reading that sees a coherent continuity in Foucault’s method. 
In this reading, Foucault’s turn towards political government implies not a 
change of method but simply a new object of study. With biopolitics and 
governmentality, Foucault is interpreted as turning his “micro-physics of 
power”95 towards the macro scale of population and state government.96       
A third approach to the issue of Foucault’s method in relation to 
governmentality sees the sudden appearance of governmentality in the 
fourth lecture of the 77-78 course as indicative of Foucault’s failed attempt 
to satisfactorily develop his notion of “security.”97 The original plan of that 
year’s course was to examine the series of “sovereignty, discipline and 
security” as “a triptych of strategic configurations disrupting the so-called 
essence of the state as sovereign….” But Foucault struggled with explaining 
the specific practices and discourses that disguised the third movement of 
the series towards “security.” Foucault then realizes that he needs to move 
beyond the genealogy of the state to a genealogy of governmentality that 
entails an exploration of ancient technologies of pastoral power: “Security 
will be replaced by research on freedom of circulation and pastoral power, 
ending up with the notion of biopolitics.”98 Here, then, is also an 
interpretation that emphasizes Foucault’s abandonment of the micro-
physical analysis of sovereignty. The abandonment is simply more dramatic 
since it occurs in the middle of an ongoing series of lectures—as a result of 
Foucault’s own shortcomings—and not as a premeditated move following a 
sabbatical year. 
This debate over the character and specificity of Foucault’s 
methodological approach to the concept of governmentality highlights the 
attention to an analytical framework that is connected to Foucault’s 
examination of political government. In the following, I will emphasize the 
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importance of Foucault’s notion of dispositif as an analytical category that 
also frames my approach to the history of governmentality in the Danish 
West Indies.  
Foucault’s usage of the term dispositif as a qualifier for mechanisms of 
power can be traced back to at least the Psychiatric Power lectures of 1973-
74. As an analytical concept the dispositifs of power replaced the “core of 
representation” that had guided the analysis of Madness and Civilization in 
a manner that had accorded a “privileged role” to the “perception of 
madness” and thus limited that analysis to “a history of mentalities.”99 
Dispositifs of power was thus designed to take Foucault’s analysis beyond 
the representational aspects of his notion of discourse. By comparison, the 
dispositif of power would refer to “a productive instance of discursive 
practice” from which certain representations could be produced.100  
This transition of analytical focus from representation towards 
production was also evident in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures where 
Foucault reiterated the centrality of the dispositif to the overall project of his 
authorship: 
The point of all these investigations concerning madness, disease, 
delinquency, sexuality, and what I am talking about now, is to show how 
the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus 
(dispositif) of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that 
which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division between 
true and false.101 
According to Graham Burchell, the translator of the lecture course, there 
are no satisfactory english translations of Foucault’s use of the term 
dispositif “to designate a configuration or arrangement of elements and 
forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, that is both strategic 
and technical.”102 Burchell expressed dissatisfaction with other existing 
renderings  of the term as “‘deployment,’ ‘set up,’ and even, in the case of 
Louis Althusser's use of the same term, ‘dispositive,’” and had himself 
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settled on “apparatus” as the term which best approximated Foucault’s 
dispositif.103 
So what is this dispositif that escapes translation? The common 
dictionary provides two meanings to dispositif: a) “device; system,” and b) 
“operation.”104 This simplistic rendering corresponds well with the 
“technical” and “strategic” properties that Burchell highlighted.      
Foucault himself presents a very broad definition in an interview in 
1977. When asked about the meaning of dispositif and its methodological 
function, Foucault describes three aspects of the dispositif: Firstly, it refers 
to “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid.”105 The specific 
linkage of this multitude of discursive, as well as non-discursive elements in 
a system of relations is what constitutes the dispositif itself. Secondly, 
Foucault turns to his methodology regarding the dispositif. By identifying 
“the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous 
elements,” the different positions and functions of the dispositif are 
attainable. The connections are not static but continually undergo 
modifications and shifts. Thus they can represent explicit programs, silent 
practices, or new fields of rationality. Finally, Foucault means by dispositif 
a sort of formation “which has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a 
dominant strategic function.”106 The dispositif is thus a strategic 
arrangement that emerges from the recognition of a problem to which a 
certain resolution can be reached through a manipulation of the relation of 
forces, the direction of which is dependent on “certain coordinates of 
knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it.”107 Put 
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briefly, the dispositif is activated as “strategies of relations of forces 
supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.”108 
With this preliminary definition, we can proceed to trace Foucault’s 
analytical use of the term in his work as a means of making the analytical 
and methodological potential of the dispositif more concrete.  
There are clear resemblances in the dispositional character that Foucault 
gives to dispositif and his notion of discourse and episteme in The Order of 
Things. The resemblance was recognized by Foucault when the interviewer 
in 1977 makes the connection and asks whether the dispositif represents a 
methodological reformulation or an extension of the episteme of discourse 
to include the non-discursive. Foucault’s response is to emphasize 
continuity, but to do so retrospectively. Dispositif was not an expansion of 
episteme. Rather, episteme constituted a specific instance of dispositif: 
FOUCAULT: In trying to identify an apparatus, I look for the elements 
which participate in a rationality, a given form of co-ordination, except 
that . . . . 
J.-A. MILLER: One shouldn't say rationality, or we would be back with 
the episteme again. 
FOUCAULT: If you like, I would define the episteme retro-spectively as 
the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all 
the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I 
won't say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and, which it is 
possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the 'apparatus' which 
makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what 
may from what may not be characterised as scientific.109 
At this juncture, Foucault thus accentuates the correlation between 
dispositif, which he did not regularly refer to until he began to work 
specifically on the analytics of power in the early 70s, and episteme, which 
for Foucault designated distinct and separated epochs of epistemological 
formation. Does this then mean that dispositif refer to distinct epochal 
formations of relations of power? As seen above there are different 
interpretations of the level of coherency in Foucault’s reading of an epochal 
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succession of dominating forms of power. Regardless of the underlying 
causes, something significant does seem to by happening in Foucault’s 
history of dispositifs in Security, Territory, Population. Up until and 
including The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, Foucault’s overall concern has 
been that of a history of dispositifs in which the dispositif of sovereignty or 
of law has been displaced by dispositifs of discipline or of normalization. 
This displacement movement culminates in Foucault’s introduction of bio-
power in a maneuver that completely relinquishes sovereignty from the 
playing field of power relations. 
If we return to the Psychiatric Power lectures of 73-74, Foucault here 
describes the combative relationship between dispositifs of discipline and 
dispositifs of sovereignty. Foucault tells the story of how the disciplinary 
dispositif during the Middle Ages was “formed as islands” within “the 
period’s general morphology of sovereignty.”110 These islands that existed 
mainly within monastic orders and other religious communities were 
integrated within the greater order of feudal and monarchial sovereignty. 
Gradually, however, the disciplinary dispositif—of work, obedience, self-
control, and hierarchy—developed in opposition to the dispositif of 
sovereignty in the efforts of monastic orders to disengage from the dispositif 
of sovereignty. The reformed monastical orders, such as the Dominicans, 
were in turn deployed by monarchial sovereignty in the political contest 
with feudal power. The disciplinary dispositif becomes an important domain 
of economic, political, and social innovations throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries remains marginal. However, it is during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that “through a sort of progressive 
extension, a sort of general parasitic interference with society,” that “we see 
the constitution of what we could call, but very roughly and schematically, a 
‘disciplinary society’ replacing a society of sovereignty.”111  
This history of dispositifs that depicts a general transition for a “society 
of sovereignty” to a “society of discipline” precipitates Foucault’s analyses 
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of the birth of the prison in Discipline and Punish and the discovery of 
sexuality in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 
In the first three lectures of Security, Territory, Population Foucault sets 
up a different history of dispositifs. One that retains an element of 
succession and of historical progression, but is occurring within a 
reformulated field of relations between the dispositifs. It is in these lectures 
that Foucault attempts to establish the “security dispositif,” which he had 
introduced in the final lecture of Society Must be Defended. Regardless of 
Foucault’s success in this endeavor, the process itself of distinguishing its 
dispositional logic from those of sovereignty and discipline leads Foucault 
to a reformulation of ways in which the dispositifs relate to each other. The 
bipolar relation of sovereignty and discipline was reconfigured as 
“economies of power,” according to which the different dispositifs can be 
configured in numerous ways. This means that dispositifs of sovereignty, of 
discipline, and now of security are not seen as oppositional and 
incompatible categories, belonging to separated historical morphologies of 
power, but rather occupy the same  arsenal of strategic responses to specific 
problematizations that can be configured in different ways, amounting to a 
certain economy of power. The governmentality is, in turn, that which 
shapes and is being shaped by economies of power. 
 
Three Dispositifs 
In the opening lecture of Security, Territory, Population Foucault defines 
the differences between three different prototypes of dispositifs:112 the 
dispositifs of law, discipline, and security. The three dispositifs all have 
distinct modes of functioning. To exemplify their differences, Foucault uses 
the problem of theft to show each dispositif’s programatic reaction.  
Firstly, law deals with theft through the system of the legal code. This 
juridical mechanism inserts the action of stealing in “a binary division 
between permitted and prohibited.”113 Having determined the theft as a 
specific type of prohibited action the legal code then prescribes the type of 
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punishment that corresponds to that specific type of prohibition. This 
concludes the mechanism of the legal dispositif. 
Secondly, discipline is distinct from law in that it takes into account “the 
culprit,” and more specifically, it takes into account the culprit as he exists 
both within and outside of the legal mechanism. Discipline is directed not 
simply at the punishment of the culprit, but at his transformation. To this 
end “a series of adjacent, detective, medical, and psychological techniques 
appear which fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the 
possible transformation of individuals.”114  
Thirdly, security is directed not so much at the individual culprit as to 
the general dynamics of the phenomena of theft. Security attempts to 
determine the probabilities of the occurrence of theft through statistics of 
crime rates and analyses of modifying factors to its occurrence. Security 
then inserts possible reactions to the phenomena of theft in a calculation of 
costs with the purpose of ascertaining the most cost-efficient reaction. On 
the basis of such a utility calculus, security, rather than constructing a binary 
division between the permitted and the prohibited, instead “establishes an 
average considered as optimal on the one, and, on the other, a bandwidth of 
the acceptable that must not be exceeded.”115   
The three dispositifs are thus distinct from one another in their mode of 
comprehending the problem, of ascertaining its constituent parts, and in the 
type and object of the response they prescribe. Put differently, they are 
separated by forms of knowledge and mechanisms of power.   
After having defined the differences between legal, disciplinary, and 
security dispositifs, Foucault goes on to debunk the “historical schema,” that 
he admits to have provided the “bare bones” of, that designates each 
despositif, each mechanism of power, to a specific historical epoch: 
So, there is not a series of successive elements, the apparatus of the new 
causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the 
disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do 
not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced 
juridico-legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex 
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edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are 
perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above 
all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of 
correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, 
and mechanisms of security.116  
Instead of following a sequence of successive epochs of power, Foucault 
makes it clear that he sees the condition of exerting power as dependent of a 
specific correlation between the three different mechanisms of power. So 
instead of disciplinary power’s eclipse of juridico-legal power we have “a 
series of complex edifices” in which the different techniques of each 
mechanism of power exist and are deployed interchangeably. But the 
edifice, the metaphor that Foucault uses to present this new structure of 
correlating power mechanisms, does not signal a complete deconstruction of 
the epochal succession of forms of power. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the word edifice carries the meaning: “A building, usually a 
large and stately building, as a church, palace, temple, or fortress; a fabric, 
structure.”117 It also has a figurative meaning, which refers to a complex 
system or structure, such as “the edifice of capitalism.”118  
Despite the pluralization of power into correlating mechanisms, 
techniques and technologies, the edifice metaphor for describing the 
structure of assemblages around a dominant characteristic, retains a sense of 
the monolithic in Foucault’s conception of power. It does, however, allow 
Foucault to present a pluralistic, proliferating, and productive conception of 
power that is nonetheless distinctively identifiable as an edifice with a 
dominant characteristic that is necessary if any kind of critique is to be 
integrated into his analysis of power. It will not be difficult, then, for 
Foucault to go on to analyze, via this new conceptualization of power, the 
complex edifices of liberalism, as he does in this and the next lecture course. 
The question remains though, if Foucault is absolving his bipolar conception 
of power or adding a third tier to his historical schema of power.   
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As Foucault maneuvers through the first three lectures of 78, he 
reiterates at numerous occasions this movement of deconstructing the 
chronology and composition of power and its forms, techniques, and 
mechanisms, only to subsequently package his argument in neat diagrams 
and binary structures that are easily intelligible for Foucault’s audience. 
Despite the complexity and sophistication of Foucault’s analysis in these 
first three lectures of multiple mechanisms of power that intertwines, are 
made redundant, and reappears again, the audience is left, to its satisfaction 
most likely, with a simple dichotomy:  Sovereignty has as its correlate law 
and justice, which can only conceive “the juridical notion of the subject of 
right,” while government (or security, which are used interchangeably in the 
third lecture) has as its correlate population, which produces “man” in his 
capabilities as “a living being, working individual, and speaking subject… 
.”119  
“There you are, all wrapped up and loose ends tied.” Such is Foucault’s 
concluding sentence in the third lecture. Obviously given with an 
unconcealed hint of irony, but nevertheless Foucault is indeed packaging his 
argument in a structure that is reminiscent of the analysis of the history of 
the disciplinary dispositif in Discipline and Punish. The binary diagram of 
sovereignty-discipline is reenacted, only discipline is substituted with 
government or security, so that the diagram becomes: sovereignty-
government. And in a similar manner, the techniques and mechanisms of 
sovereignty are marginalized and described as archaic in Foucault’s 
account, as opposed to government that represents the new, the modern, the 
movement towards the economy of power of ‘the present.’ Mitchell Dean 
has argued that Foucault’s reconceptualization of relations of power 
following Discipline and Punish can be interpreted as a new tactic in his 
efforts to combat “the shadow of the sovereign.” A tactic that was not 
altogether successful in extinguishing the privileged position of sovereignty. 
In the fourth lecture of that year, Foucault seems to be altering his 
tactics. Rather than attempt to reconstruct the sequence of sovereignty-
discipline-security, Foucault wishes to undertake a history of 
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governmentality about the changing conditions of sovereignty as based on 
sovereign justice towards a new governmental rationality by which the 
condition of sovereignty is dependent upon the ability to govern the state 
and its population. So, Foucault emphasizes a process towards which the 
constitution and practice of political government (and thus political 
sovereignty) is characterized by a preeminence of the dispositif of 
governmentality (as a power that is concerned with the conduct of conduct), 
over dispositifs of discipline and sovereignty. But it is an ambiguous 
preeminence, since the problems and importance of both sovereignty and 
discipline are integral elements of governmentality. Accordingly, “…we 
should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of 
government.”120 Thus, Foucault refutes his earlier theory of the transition 
from a society of sovereignty to a society of discipline. Instead, Foucault 
envisions the relationship as “a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and 
governmental management, which has population as its main target and 
apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.”121 
The shift from a history of dispositifs that follow a chronological 
sequence to a history of dispositifs that as conceived as configurations of 
dispositifs into economies of power has important implications for the 
problem of applying Foucault’s analytical framework beyond the confines 
of Western European history. The historian of colonialism and imperialism 
has often struggled with a Foucauldian chronology of power dispositifs that 
did not correspond to the historical development of political power of 
colonial rule. By turning to the history of governmentality and the 
reformulation of his analytics of dispositifs Foucault provided a much more 
adaptable analytical framework. To a degree he did retained an epistemic 
conceptualization of the movement of power-types, the conception of 
modern configurations of power that he provides with governmentality is a 
much more muddled and “fuzzy”122 version than that provide in his earlier 
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work from Madness and Civilization through Discipline and Punish and The 
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. 
In the chapters that follow I use the basic concept of dispositif to guide 
my reading of governmental rationality in the Danish West Indies. By basic 
I mean that I do not attempt to map all of the elements of the dispositifs to 
describe a coherent movement of governmental rationality from point A to 
point B. Rather, it is exactly the muddled and fuzzy character of political 
power that the dispositifs of Foucault’s governmentality lectures brings out 
that I am interested in. The economy of power that the governmentality of 
Danish colonialism engaged in was by no means a coherent, stabile project. 
It was filled with contradictions, of political and economic interests, of the 
type of knowledge that was deployed, and the objectives of the project.  
By basic, I also mean to say that it is the basic dynamic of the dispositif 
that shapes the diagnostics of my analysis. It is the reciprocal dynamic of 
problematization, response of power, and potential crisis that form the 
backbone of my analytical structure. Thus, the three analytical chapters that 
follow are all structured around specific problematizations and the response 
that they prompt, the type of knowledge and rationality involved in guiding 
the response of power, and the different ways that this relationship of 
problem-response is transformed, disrupted, or leads to unintended 
consequences.  
Slavery itself is thus positioned as the general problematization of the 
third chapter along with a set of subsequent subproblems that were seen as 
following from the general problematic of slavery. These included 
economic efficiency, negative demographic development, and issues of 
social and political insecurity. Similarly, the fourth and fifth chapters takes 
emancipation and freedom as general problematizations that were seen as 
posing a new set of problems, or of redefining the nature of certain 
problematic aspects of colonial society. Chapter four, thus, brings attention 
to the subproblem of disorder and crime following emancipation, and 
examines the development of a prison system as a governmental response. 
Chapter five, then, concludes the analytical chapters by looking at the 
problem of labor post emancipation. Two governmental responses to the 
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problem of labor are examined in the chapter: regulative labor legislation 
and the effort to introduce smallholding among the black labor population. 
This approach mirrors the scalar nature of dispositifs. Foucault describes 
the general dispositifs of sovereignty, discipline, security, and in The Birth 
of Biopolitics governmentality is treated as a general dispositif.123 But he 
also often refer to several ‘lower-level’ dispositifs throughout his analyses. 
Thus, there is the panoptic dispositif, asylum dispositif, military-diplomatic 
dispositif, police dispositif, etc. Foucault’s use of the dispositif as analytical 
category is in that sense very pragmatic. It is used in various settings to 
describe the productive effect of a “regime of truth” and “a set of practices.” 
I take the same liberties of pragmatism in regard to my analyses. 
 
Contents of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation consists of four chapters—three analytical 
chapters and a brief conclusion. Each of the three analytical chapters 
provides a different context for interrogating the strategic configurations of 
governmental power placed against the backdrop of historical conditions 
and political-ideological positions that often constituted themselves in tense 
but also interdependent relationships, such as slavery vis-á-vis social 
security, punishment vis-á-vis emancipation, free markets vis-á-vis labor 
regulation. Such relationships can best be conceived as fluid rather than 
rigid, and the boundaries between despotic rule and liberal governance that 
in principle seem so clear, quickly becomes much more blurred when 
observed in practice. 
Thus, the three analytical chapters are both distinct from one another in 
that they provide separate analyses, but they also overlap and inform one 
another. The aim being to present an image of the multiple configuration of 
relations of power that were produced, suppressed, and reemerged in 
different forms throughout the history of colonial rule in the Danish West 
Indies. The chapters are distinct in the sense that they cover different 
periods  and problematics of the Danish colonial project. 
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Chapter three, Slavery, Security, Population, is dedicated to a 
reinterpretation of colonial government’s management of slavery and the 
problems of security that slavery produced. It analyses the emergence of 
‘the population’ as a governmental category in the colonial government of 
the Danish West Indies as a response to the security risks that slavery 
presented, i.e. risks of social disintegration, economic in-sustainability, and 
dispersed sovereignty. This ‘discovery’ of population was an integral part of 
a movement in the governmentality of colonial authorities from a focus on 
providing ‘safety’ to procuring ‘security.’ The procurement of security did 
not mean abandoning the governmental imperative of guaranteeing safety. 
Rather, constituting slaves as well as masters as ‘population’ was a 
governmental strategy that facilitated a more efficient security of society. 
Chapter four, Punishment, Natures, Race, interrogates the problem of 
punishment, particularly imprisonment, in the contexts of liberal principles 
of progress and social reform and the immediate problems of social control 
in the post-emancipation period. The chapter first describes the emergence 
of a transnational discourse of penitentiary science. I show that this 
penitentiary science was connected to the liberal project of economic and 
social progress. However, the actual implementation of penitentiary 
principles did not necessarily follow a stringent set of systems. Much like 
punishment was individualized in the last third of the nineteenth century, the 
conditions for implementing punishment was also individualized to fit the 
particularities of its social or racial context. Second, the chapter analyses the 
implementation of public imprisonment as the dominant form of punishment 
in the Danish West Indies. I argue that principles of penitentiary 
imprisonment blocked rather than facilitated the implementation of 
disciplinary techniques in the Danish West Indian prison system. The 
project of constituting ‘the emancipated’ as ‘disciplined subjects’ through 
penitentiary imprisonment did not succeed. Instead, the prison system in the 
West Indies cultivated a set of racial categories that retained linkages to the 
period of slavery rather than generating the conditions of freedom for which 
it was intended.  
Chapter five, Market, Community, Progress, explores the post-
emancipatory responses to the problem of labor regulation. It analyses 
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responses to the governmental problematization of freedom, namely the 
problem of wage labor. The chapter considers the many problems that 
emancipation posed to the economic organization of labor in the colony. 
The organization of labor was closely connected to a transformation of the 
subjectivity of laborers that were no longer legally compelled, or physically 
threatened, to work. Without the physical and legal restrictions of slavery, 
laborers now had a choice: they could work for wages, or they could live of 
the fat of the land, or they could roam from employment to employment as 
they pleased, etc.. The challenge, then, that colonial authorities were faced 
with was how to affect laborers decision-making. The economic interest of 
laborers became the ‘point of application’ of governmental strategies. But 
the regulation of laborers’ interest also meant that a certain type of 
economic conduct would have to be induced within the subjectivity of the 
formerly enslaved. In other words, colonial government was concerned with 
the problem of ‘producing freedom.’ This production of freedom and 
cultivation of economic conduct is examined in the chapter in two different 
techniques of government: labor regulations, and the promotion of 
smallholding. Both techniques, however, rested on an ideal of community 
that would facilitate the transformation of laborers’ subjectivities. The 
chapter argues that the governmental rationality of post-emancipation labor 
policy created the foundation for a “crises of governmentality,” where the 
maintenance of a profitable labor market came at the cost of workers rights 
and freedoms. In other words, the governmental calculations of the 
dynamics of security and freedom in the labor market were ‘wrong.’ The 
security of the profit of employers were prioritized, and the freedom of 
workers neglected. This miscalculation at several times erupted in labor 
disturbances, most notably the riots of 1878 where black workers rose in a 
violent revolt against the restrictions that post-emancipation labor policy 
had installed on their freedom to maneuver in the labor market, but also the 
organized strikes that marked the last few years of Danish rule. 
Finally, in chapter 6, I provide a brief conclusion of the general analyses 
and a discussion of the theoretical implications of my conclusions to the 
further study of governmentality and colonial power more generally. 
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Chapter Three 
Slavery, Security, Population 
 
 
Every reasonable man who is beyond the prejudice of color perceives this 
[that colonial slavery must soon end] with the utmost clarity and sees that 
colonial society is, every day, on the brink of inevitable revolution. 
Colonial society has no future. As a result, it lacks the first condition of 
order, of prosperity, and of progress.”124 
 
 
For Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1843, colonial society was a society without a 
future. What he was essentially saying was that colonial society was a 
society without security. Security in the sense of a proper management of 
society’s forces, or rather, of a proper management of the risks to the natural 
ordering of society’s forces. There was no balance to the forces of colonial 
society. In fact, it was “on the brink of inevitable revolution,” the genesis of 
which was as natural as that of the French revolution. The colonists—“one 
of the most exclusive aristocracies that has ever existed in the world”—
125were blinded by the same illusion of power that had led the French 
nobility in 1789 to believe that the old order with their prerogatives and 
privileges could be maintained by means of class repression. And like the 
French nobility, the colonial aristocracy, were fooling themselves. “It is the 
status quo that will be the colonies’ ruin,” Tocqueville assured the reader. 
The insurance of the future of colonial society would come “only from the 
abolition of slavery.”126 
The challenges that Tocqueville envisaged were facing colonial society  
were epitomized by the corrupting features of slavery that represented the 
single most important blockage for colonialism’s civilizing mission. The 
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system of slavery was detrimental to the ‘order,’ ‘prosperity,’ and ‘progress’ 
of colonial society in terms of security, morality, and economy. The 
abolition of slavery, therefore, was an inevitable event and the product of a 
universal history of mankind’s moral progress and continual enlightenment. 
The British abolition of slavery in 1834 was therefore not a historical 
coincidence or fluke, but a defining precursor of what was to follow for 
every civilized nation’s overseas possessions. Abolition of slavery was a 
key event in the historical progression of human civilization—a “product of 
the spirit of the times”127—and to go against it would mean to go against 
history itself. When Tocqueville declared the demise of colonial society in 
1843 he regarded the event of emancipation as a matter of certainty that 
should be embraced with urgency by any reasonable government. 
Emancipation was not a potential outcome, a calculable risk that could be 
postponed, mediated, and avoided. Whether by violent revolution or 
governmental foresight emancipation would come, so why not take the only 
rational course of action and bring about the transformation by means of 
government policy rather than by chaotic revolution.   
A century later, Eric Williams would also argue that abolition was a 
product of the spirit of the times, but to him that spirit was the spirit of 
capitalism.128 As much a story about the universal stages of history as 
Tocqueville’s progression of enlightenment and reason, but framed within 
the laws of economic interests and the historical materialism of Marxist 
theory, Williams argued in his classic study, Capitalism and Slavery, for the 
integral relationship between the inevitable transition to a capitalist mode of 
production and the rise and fall of Atlantic slavery.  
While these two theories of the dynamics behind the end of slavery have 
to a great extend been nuanced by an expansive historiography of slavery 
and Atlantic history, they still provide the basic structures of interpretation 
of the development of slavery; its beginning, its moderation, and its end. 
The question is still being asked whether the development of slavery was 
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determined by economic rationality and the concern for profitability, or 
guided by sentiments of popular ideology, morality, and reason?129 
In this chapter, I pursue a different line of interpretation. The purpose is 
not to answer the question of why slavery in the Danish West Indies was 
introduced, modified, and eventually abolished. Instead, I entertain 
Tocqueville’s analysis that the greatest risk to colonial society was posed by 
the very institution of slavery that also served as its economic foundation. 
Accordingly, the chapter conceives of the phenomenon of slavery as a 
specific problematic of colonial government. Slavery might have been an 
essential element in ensuring the profitability of the plantation economy. It 
was certainly central to the social control of colonial subjects. But slavery 
also presented a series of problems to the objectives of governing a territory 
and its peoples. Slavery constituted a problematic space of dispersed  
sovereignty divided between state and planter; yet the risk of slave uprisings 
made the management of slaves a problem of public order. There were also 
other negative effects connected with the practice of slavery. Political 
economists were arguing for the inefficiency of slave labor. The negative 
demographic development of slave populations were seen as indicative of 
an unnatural social order of slave societies that could also be read in the 
moral debasement of masters as well as slaves. 
In the chapter I suggest that the notions of “police” and, by extension, 
“biopolitics” as presented by Foucault in his history of governmentality can 
provide an alternative framework for analyzing the public problematization 
of slavery in colonial government. I argue that government officials in the 
Danish West Indies came to conceive of slavery as a biopolitical problem 
that should be managed in accordance with a “political technology of 
individuals”130 as reflected in the doctrines of “police” regulation. While the 
public management of slavery’s risks did not necessarily prescribe the full 
                                                
 
129 In its more contemporary conception this debate has been termed the “Williams-
Drescher debate,” reflecting Seymour Drescher’s contention of Williams’ “economic 
decline thesis.” In his book Econocide (1977), Drescher argued that slavery was in fact 
abolished despite of a profitable economy, and abolition thus relied on an effective popular 
movement rather than capitalist reason. See also Dreschers review of the historiographic 
impact of Capitalism and Slavery, (Drescher 2000) 
130 (Foucault 1988) 
 
 
68 
abolition of slavery, it did require a gradual movement towards still greater 
influence of freedom in the life of individual slaves. Elsa Goveia has in her 
influential work on slave laws in the eighteenth century described how “the 
problem of slavery” was addressed by local colonial government as “a 
problem of public order.” She argued that a body of police legislation, 
which governed slaves in regard to the public order, constituted a legal 
“superstructure,” essential to the maintenance of the slave system.131 In 
Goveia's interpretation of police regulation of slave society, the emphasize 
is put on its repressive function. I have no entention of disproving the 
coercive logic of "police" in the context of slavery. However. I would like to 
emphazise an alternative analysis of the political rationality of government 
that allows for a recognition of government's promotion of liberal conduct 
among the enslaved. 
In this chapter I trace different governmental dispositifs that in different 
ways attempted to curtail or otherwise minimize the negative effects of 
slavery. These strategic responses to slavery's risks took on different forms 
of intervention, be it legal and legislative, regulative and educational, or 
social and economic. While historians of the Danish West Indies have 
framed the policy of the Danish colonial government during the period of 
slavery as either a form of failed mercantilism132 or negligent concession to 
planter interests and inability to exort state power,133 I posit the question of 
whether it might be possible to conceptualize the rationality and technique 
of the Danish colonial government in relation to a governmentality of 
‘police’ and a biopolitics of population, and thus as part of the general 
history of governmentality. This perspective highlights the importance of 
population and the changing conception of economy to the rationality of 
colonial governance, rather than evaluating the ideological or economic 
motives of colonial policy makers. 
 
                                                
 
131 More so in the British system of representative government, where “a slave-owning 
ruling class” preceded as legislature, than in the Spanish centralized system of “relatively 
liberal” slave laws. (Goveia 1960/1991, pp. 347-350) 
132 See e.g. (Hall 1992, pp. 19, 21-23, 71) 
133 (Olwig 1987, pp. 388-389) 
 
 
69 
Risks of Slavery 
During the late 1700s and early 1800s the new human and social sciences of 
political economy and demography argued that slavery produced a structure 
that was inhibiting the natural, self-regulating orders of human interaction 
and development. Slavery was corrupting the natural orders of economic 
exchange (Adam Smith’s free market forces) and population development 
(Thomas Malthus’ principles of natural reproduction). Slavery itself was not 
viewed by political economists as constituting a natural order. Nor was it 
concieved as a static structure. Slavery was a man-made inhibitor of what 
was understood as essentially beneficial natural movements of markets and 
populations, and as such could be dismantled by the politicies of men. The 
demand that the human and social sciences were posing to colonial 
government was to tear down the unnatural structures of slavery and replace 
them with institutions that aligned more with the naturalness of population 
and economy. The immediate response of government was not to dismantle 
slavery altogether but instead to alter the way it was managed. The problem 
of slaves’ reproduction for instance—the negative development of which 
was seen as the effect of the slave trade—was mediated by changes in slave 
management and healthcare before steps were taken to eventually end the 
slave trade. Abolitionists argued that by ending the constraints imposed on 
the forces of population by the slave trade, a natural demographic order 
would be reconstituted and population growth would follow as a 
consequence.134 
In the writings of Political economists such as Adam Smith, Thomas 
Malthus, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, and Alexis de Tocqueville, we find an 
identification of the system of slavery as presenting a risk to the security of 
a series of ‘orders’ that were essential to the functioning of governmentality 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These distinct yet intertwined 
human orders were ‘society,’ ‘economy,’ and ‘population.’ In the “rational 
analysis of slavery and freedom” in relation to the security of these human 
orders political economy argued for the efficacy of personal and economic 
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liberty over the corruption of life and economy that slavery entailed. This 
criticism of slavery by political economist was in turn appropriated and 
intensified by abolitionist movements and applied to the specific political 
objective of abolishing first the Atlantic slave trade and eventually slavery 
itself.135 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century political economists and moral 
philosophers promoted the idea that Man was principally a production of his 
environment. The writing of philosophers such as Jean-Jacque Rousseau 
advanced the proposition that “[m]an was not naturally corrupt, but had 
been corrupted by society.”136 The popularization of such concerns towards 
the potentially negative effects of advanced societies made it possible to 
direct a socio-economic critique at the system of slavery. Opponents of 
slavery could argue that the defense of slavery on grounds of Africans' 
inferior morality made them naturally inclined to a life of servitude was 
based on a false premise. The moral and ethical corruption that proponents 
of slavery identified in the slave’s character was not a product of his natural 
inclination, Rousseau’s followers would argue, but rather the result of a life 
spent within the corrupting structure of a slave society. Addressing more 
generally the cause and effect of the character of people and their social 
condition, Montesquieu argued in The Spirit of Laws that “[t]he customs of 
an enslaved people are a part of their servitude, those of a free people are a 
part of their liberty.”137  
Political economists did not view the social corruption of slavery as only 
detrimental to the constitution of black Africans. Black slaves were the 
immediate recipients of the degradations caused by their total subjugation. 
But their masters were equally affected by the social debasement of slavery. 
Alexis de Tocqueville would argue on numerous occasions that the most 
detrimental effect of slavery was the systemic infection of something much 
more fundamental than the character of individuals. The most important 
casualty of slavery's corrupting effect was the fairly novel conception of 
society: "Slavery … introduces idleness into society, and, with idleness, 
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ignorance and pride, luxury and distress. It enervates the powers of the 
mind, and benumbs the activity of man."138 Consequently, slavery could not 
be isolated as simply a fortuitous mechanism for ensuring ample supplies of 
labour. Slavery’s detrimental effects transcended material conditions and 
affected the minds and hearts of every resident of the slave society, slaves 
and masters alike. 
If Rousseau could be mobilized to argue that slavery was corrupting the 
minds and virtues of “the noble savages,” and Tocqueville used to argue that 
slavery was degenerating the very fabric of the social, then the work of 
Adam Smith on the political economy of wealth provided a scientific claim 
that slavery was uneconomic as an organization of labor. In the third book 
of his opus, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
published in 1776, Smith made his evaluation of the economic effects of 
slavery very clear:  
The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the 
work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is 
in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property, can 
have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as 
possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase 
his own maintenance can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and 
not by any interest of his own.139 
By eliminating the possibility of acquiring property, the conditions of 
slavery extinguished the laborer’s interest to work efficiently. The costs 
associated with the loss of efficiency that the removal of workers’ interest in 
production created were so great, Smith argued, that it appeared “from the 
experience of all ages and nations” that despite having to procure the 
expenses of sometimes exorbitant wages, which Smith found it to be the 
case in places such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the work of 
freemen was preferred over that of slaves because in the end “the work done 
by freemen comes cheaper … than that performed by slaves.”140 
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Despite the inherent economic defects of slavery, Smith recognized that 
slave labor could be made more economically feasible through better 
management:  
[A]s the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by 
means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those 
cattle, so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves must 
depend equally upon the good management of those slaves.141 
In regard to the good management of slaves, Smith viewed the French 
planters as far superior to the English. The reason for their superiority was, 
according to Smith, located in the differences between French and English 
systems of government. The French colonies were, like the Danish, part of 
an absolutist monarchy whose bureaucratic state-apparatus could to a 
greater degree legitimately regulate individual planters’ management of 
their slaves. “The law,” Smith argued, “so far as it gives some weak 
protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be 
better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure 
arbitrary than in one where it is altogether free.”142 A similar regulation of 
“the management of the private property of the master” was supposedly not 
possible in a “free country, where the master is perhaps either a member of 
the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he dare not do this but 
with the greatest caution and circumspection.”143 The absolutist nature of 
French sovereignty allowed for a more effective policing of the treatment of 
slaves. 
The tendency towards an allegedly more lenient management of slaves 
in the French colonies provided a more fertile economic environment, 
argued Smith, by establishing a shared interest, held by both master and 
slave, in the efficiency of labor. As the slave comes under the protection “of 
the magistrate” the slave becomes “less contemptible in the eyes of the 
master,” inducing the master to introduce a more gentle management. In 
turn, “the slave” will be rendered  
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not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double 
account, more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free 
servant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his 
master's interest, virtues which frequently belong to free servants, but 
which never can belong to a slave who is treated as slaves commonly are 
in countries where the master is perfectly free and secure.144 
The demarcation between free and slave labor in Adam Smith’s political 
economy was thus not a clear delineation. Rather, the space between free 
and slave was distributed across a gradient spectrum. The properties of the 
labor employed could then be positioned as more or less free or enslaved 
depending on its management. The fact that Smith argues for the 
malleability of the properties of slavery is important. It is equally as 
important that he places the objective of regulating the management of 
slaves upon “the magistrate”—the representative of colonial government. 
The power relations of slavery that would need to be managed was, then, 
not strictly relations of justice or property rights, but also essentially 
relations of economy and the beneficial conduct of masters and slaves. 
To summarize, political economy and enlightenment philosophy 
identified slavery as a risk factor to the security of the more recent domains 
of political government—society and economy. But slavery was also, and 
perhaps primarily, identified by colonial officials as a risk to state 
sovereignty. Slave society and the plantation system provided a duality of 
risk to the security of the colonial state. Firstly, the mass importation of 
African slaves created a continual potential for internal revolution, in case 
of which the massively outnumbered European inhabitants would be forced 
to relinquish their control of the colony. Secondly, the predominantly non-
Danish origins of the colony's European residents, made the colony 
vulnerable to annexation by competing imperial powers. The multinational 
composition of colonial society created an ambivalent distrust towards the 
political allegiance of the planter class.     
If the power structure of slavery had been a simple game of numbers, 
the odds would have been heavily against the white inhabitants. The number 
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of enslaved blacks on St. Croix peaked at 27.351 in 1804, while the freed-
people of color numbered 1.694.145 In 1796 only 2.223 whites inhabited the 
island.146 The huge advantage in numbers that the slaves enjoyed over their 
white masters made the risk of slave retributions a constant cause for 
concern.147 The risk loomed ever present that when opportunity would 
present itself, in times of crises or emergency, the slaves would rise up and 
simply take the property and wealth that their status denied them. Their 
almost impulsive potential to destabilize social and political structures led 
Montesquieu to refer to slaves as the “natural enemies of society.” 
Previously Jean Bodin had summarized the historical experiences of slave 
societies thus: “So many slaves, so many enemies in a man’s house.”148   
Such anxieties were voiced in connection with the immanent invasion of 
the Danish colonies by British forces in 1801. Planters and officials feared 
that slaves would utilize their numerical superiority and take advantage of 
the power vacuum in between British invasion and British occupation.149 
There was also the risk that slaves on the Danish islands would be ‘inspired’ 
by slave riots and insurgencies occurring elsewhere in the region. Most 
notably, the colony’s white inhabitants were terrified by the thought that the 
successful slave revolt in the french colony of St. Domingue in 1791 that 
eventually led to a free Haitian state could encourage a dissatisfied slave 
community, and the increasing number of free people of color, to the extent 
that the calamities of Saint-Domingue would be repeated in the Danish West 
Indies.150  
Besides fearing the unthinkable consequences of a large-scale slave 
revolution, officials increasingly took notice of the everyday incidents of 
slave disobedience and disregard of white authority. The contempt and lack 
of respect, shown by slaves, were interpreted as being encouraged by slaves’ 
successful challenging of colonial society’s social and political status quo in 
other places such as St. Dominique. In 1802, the white inhabitants’ paranoia 
                                                
 
145 (Green-Pedersen 1981, p. 248, table 13.1) 
146 (Hall 1992, p. 5) 
147 (Green-Pedersen 1981, p. 238) 
148 Quoted in(Ghachem 2012, p. 9) 
149 (Hall 1992, p. 28) 
150 (1992, p. 25) 
 
 
75 
was given ample fuel when a letter addressed to Thomas Towers, a freed 
man of color, was found on 14 June. The letter read: 
Brothers all: When freedom at stake, ought free men and slaves to go 
hand in hand. We are ten against one white. In all this time they have 
treated us like dogs; now it was our time to show them we are men like 
they. God created us all, why shouldn't we be every bit as good as they 
and have the same rights. Let us demand our rights and them despite the 
whites. Long live the brave coloured people.151  
The discovery of the letter to Towers, which more than insinuated a call 
for an organized alliance of colored people, both free and enslaved, against 
the white community, coincided with an increase in acts of disobedience 
and abuse, threats, and violence by slaves directed against plantation 
overseers and bookkeepers. The tension culminated with the murder of a 
bookkeeper at the plantation Mt. Misery in May and the burning down of 
cane fields. The frequency of slave resistance made that summer of 1802 
particularly heated.152  
However, the level of tension that the events of the summer of 1802 had 
created also suggest the permanence of an inherently unsafe condition that 
the antagonistic relations of colonial slavery constantly reproduced. The 
risks of slave uprisings were genuine enough—the many instances of 
violent resistance to slavery attest to the willingness and ability of slaves to 
challenge European imperial authority in the New World. Yet, it was the 
persistent presence of the possibility of conspiracies “by the brave colored 
people,” to quote Towers’ letter, and the fermentation of a generel disregard 
of white authority among the enslaved that were at the forefront of whites’ 
anxieties.  
If slave resistance represented one kind of risk to the security of Danish 
sovereignty in the colony, then the political power of a wealthy planter class 
and its multinational composition presented a different but equally 
important risk. The power of the planters established a state of fragmented 
or dispersed sovereignty. The system of large-scale sugar cultivation created 
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a very influential class of planters that owned the majority of the colonial 
territory. Not only did the “planter class,” or the “plantocracy,” have 
ownership over much of the colonial territory, they also counted the vast 
majority of the colonial inhabitants as their property to more or less 
command as they pleased. The efficacy of Danish royal sovereignty was 
therefore dependent on the mediation of the planters. Only through the 
planters’ cooperation could the Danish monarch claim any real control over 
his colonial territory and subjects.  
This first aspect of a fragmented sovereignty was augmented by a 
second aspect, which related to the problem of integrating foreign nationals 
within the Danish crown colony. The majority of Denmark’s West Indian 
possessions were from the outset settled mainly by nationals of other 
European imperial powers. Hall has argued that Danish colonial rule in the 
West Indies, at least until the end of slavery in 1848, constituted “an empire 
without dominion.”153 This political construction was essentially a product 
of the conditions of early Danish colonization in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Because of Denmark’s low population density 
compared to other European imperial powers, such as Britain and the 
Netherlands, not enough Danish manpower was available to settle the 
Danish West Indian colonies with purely Danish nationals. Instead Danish 
authorities opted for a strategy of “colonization by invitation,”154 by which 
foreign Europeans were relied upon to establish and manage the islands’ 
plantations and commercial activities.  
Hall argued that this factor made it difficult to create a common 
constitution of government that both Danish officials and expatriate planters 
could agree upon.155 Not only did it complicate the establishment of a web 
of sovereignty, spanning out from the Danish Monarch and reaching down 
through the administrative layers, it also obfuscated the process towards a 
cultural or national hegemony in the Danish West Indian colonies. This 
presented a potential problem for the Danish colonial administration: How 
would foreign planters react to regulations, decreed by an absolute Danish 
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Monarch, that limited their right to freely trade their produce, buy supplies, 
and indeed manage their slaves as property and investment, if they did not 
consider themselves bound by national loyalty to said Monarch? In other 
words, would foreign planters and merchants consent to the sovereign 
power of the Danish King? Adam Smith’s theory of enlightened despotism 
as the best government of a slave based economy presupposed a shared 
national character that made planters of absolutist states more 
accommodating to the sovereign’s infringement upon their property rights. 
Such a coherent national character, if it ever existed anywhere, was not 
present in the Danish West Indies.  
In Hall’s analysis, this discrepancy was no minor issue in a colonial 
commercial system that was based on mercantilism, which in turn rested on 
the administrative state’s ability to police, i.e. regulate, the commercial 
activities within its territories. In Hall’s interpretation of a multicultural 
commercial and agricultural colonial society that was Danish only by name, 
and not by custom, the colonial administration abandoned classical 
mercantilist principles of monopolized trade in favor of a free port system 
and a heavy dependency on inter-imperial trade. The Danish colonial 
endeavor in the West Indies, Hall proposed, had, in terms of its commercial 
and economic prospects, been nothing short of “a mercantilism manqué.”156 
What Hall seems to ignore in his interpretation is that the free port policy 
and the “invitation” to foreign colonists were essentially policies of 
population growth, which lay at the heart of mercantilist and cameral 
theories of public administration. The wealth of the state was essentially 
brought about through an increase of its population. Hall himself notes that 
the preamble to the ordinance of 4 November 1782 that renewed the free 
port legislation, justified the importance of open ports in attracting 
foreigners whose “presence would increase the population and bring 
beneficial prosperity to the islands.”157 The free port policy and dependency 
on foreign influx of people and goods should not by default be treated as 
failed mercantilism, but could rather be viewed as classic mercantilist 
                                                
 
156 (1992, p. 23) 
157 (1992, p. 23) 
 
 
78 
responses that emphasized the relation between a thriving population and 
economic prosperity.   
Besides making it problematic for the Danish Crown to enact its 
sovereignty in its colonial territories, the influence of foreign communities 
also presented a risk of possible fifth column activity in times of conflict 
with other imperial powers.158 On the eve of the second British occupation 
of the Danish West Indies within the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
Friderich de Bretton was arrested on 13 December 1807 and charged with 
plotting a coup d’état to overthrow the Danish colonial government and 
establish a republic under British protection.159 De Bretton was a member of 
one of the oldest families of European immigrants to the islands, and 
originally hailed from Flanders. His attempt to oust the Danes from the seat 
of power in the colony proved the difficulty of predicting the sources of 
internal insecurity. Who were to say how the large contingency of British 
nationals on St. Croix were to react in future instances of political crises 
involving the British empire? The perception held by Danish colonial 
officials that the enemies of the colony were to by found internally rather 
than externally, thus, did not simply refer to the general risk of slave 
uprisings. It also included the possibility that the many foreign subjects 
residing on the islands would act to subvert Danish sovereignty and 
eventually cause the demise of Danish rule in the West Indies. 
It has been argued that this problematic of dispersed sovereignty made it 
very difficult for the colonial government to carry through the clauses of 
legislation that directly opposed planter interests. In his study on the health 
of the enslaved on St. Croix, Thode Jensen, for example notes, how "the 
Governor General in charge at the time … chose to shelve the [1755 slave] 
law out of consideration for the sensitive relationship between the Danish 
colonial administration and the planters.”160 This argument stresses the 
significant economic and political power of the colony’s planter class. The 
reasoning behind it is that officials did not dare to risk alienating the 
planters to the extent were they would conspire against the danish 
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authorities in the pursuit of their interest, or perhaps simply take their 
business elsewhere. They were after all, as argued by Hall, not bound by 
national loyalty to the Danish crown or state to help facilitate the wealth of 
the Danish colony. They were bound only to their own economic interests, 
and if a British, French, or Dutch government could better fulfill those 
interests, then what would stop the planters from assisting a change of 
sovereignty, turning over the Danish islands to the governments of 
competing imperial powers?  
An alternative interpretation that would do much to supplement the 
theory of the risk of potential planter alienation would call attention to the 
many indications that the mode and venue of government intervention was 
undergoing a shift, or perhaps it would be more fitting to describe it as a 
multiplication. The mode of legal prohibitions were being supplemented by 
a series of techniques that created incentives to behavioral transformations 
rather than simply prohibit certain inexpedient actions. Given the political 
environment of the colony, which indeed was fermented by the relatively 
powerful planter community that in practice limited the sovereignty of the 
Danish crown, it made complete sense for colonial government to attempt to 
implement a governmental strategy that essentially bypassed planters’ legal 
sovereignty over their slaves as constituted by their rights of property. By 
utilizing a mode of government that was exactly not based on the 
mechanisms of sovereign power, i.e. law and right, but instead emphasized 
the security of those phenomena that transcended the power of sovereignty, 
namely the phenomena of population and economy, government officials 
could intervene much more efficiently and with less risk to the political 
stability of the colony. 
The remaining sections of the chapter pursue this interpretation of the 
rationality of colonial government in the Danish West Indies during the time 
of slavery. It does so, firstly, by introducing the philosophy of 
administrative government known as ‘police’ that evolved into a science of 
state from the 1500s to the 1800s. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, ‘police’ flourished as the administrative philosophy and 
regulatory technique par excellence of the European administrative states. 
But it also informed the government of colonies in the Americas. ’Police’ is 
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commonly referred to as the instrument of mercantilism (by regulating the 
rules of trade and commerce and facilitating ‘communication’ between the 
contributors to wealth), but for our purposes, it is its connection with the 
conception of ‘population’ as a technology to integrate individuals in the 
utility of the state that is of importance. Secondly, the chapter goes on to an 
interpretation of the slave laws of the Danish West Indies as an increasingly 
marginalized domain of government intervention. Rather, it was in the form 
of police regulations that the colonial government guided its intervention. 
Importantly, and here we come to the third and last section of the chapter, 
the police intervention were increasingly being directed towards a domain 
of colonial society that was articulated as beyond the legally defined 
property of the master in his slave. Governmental interventions would 
increasingly come in the guise of population policies and campaigns that 
were legitimated by the practical necessity of sustaining a slave population 
solely by ‘natural’ reproduction. This model of government as population 
security functioned as a mechanism to circumvent planter sovereignty and 
gain more intimate access to the conduct of slaves. Simultaneously, it 
sought to ameliorate the other damaging effects of slavery by configuring a 
governmental milieu that would be more accommodating to the natural 
orders of population and economy. Ultimately, such responses to the risks of 
slavery would lead to calculations of the risks and utilities of a general 
emancipation of Danish West Indian slaves that, following British 
emancipation in 1833/34, became a matter of ‘when’ rather than ‘if.’ 
 
Police, Population, and Biopolitics 
Police forms a crucial element in Michel Foucault’s genealogy of 
governmentality. Foucault devoted the final two lectures of the 1978 lecture 
series at College de France to an extensive consideration of ”police” as a 
form of political rationality and technology. He would revisit the police 
concept in the 1979 Tanner Lectures161 at Stanford University and again in a 
lecture given at the University of Vermont in 1982 in connection with a 
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seminar on “Technologies of the Self.”162 The common theme of these 
lectures was the genealogy of governmentality and specifically the 
development of a political rationality and technology that dealt with the 
integration of individuals into the utility of the state in the form of 
population. “Police,” “la police,” and “polizei” becomes the terms that were 
used at different times to describe this rationality and technology of 
government.163   
The conceptual and etymological history of “police” is quite complex 
and dynamic. Its uses and meanings developed over the fifteenth to 
nineteenth centuries, ranging from the specific regulation of cities and 
commercial activity, to the administration of public welfare and health, to 
the suppression of crime and public disorder.164 There is a certain sense of 
intangibility to this idea of police as it was used up until the nineteenth 
century. Yet, the term was applied with great confidence in the political and 
legal treatises of its day. In Foucault’s interpretation, however, use and 
understanding of police serves a quite specific function. Foucault seeks to 
identify, within the conception of police, a political technology for 
integrating the activities of individuals into the mechanisms of the state.165 
The general framework within which this ‘political technology of 
individuals’ developed is raison d’État or reason of state. Reason of state, 
Foucault explains, referred to an art of government. This art of government 
was considered rational on the grounds that it observed and governed in 
accordance with the nature of that which was being governed, that is, the 
nature of the state itself. This principle sat it apart from the Christian 
tradition of government that held that a government was just if it pertained 
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to human, natural, and divine laws.166 It also separated it from the strategic 
exercise of the Prince in expelling his internal and external rivals to his 
territorial acquisitions. The political problem that concerns the prince, 
exemplified in Machiavelli’s writing, is not the problem that concerns the 
reason of state. Rather than strengthening the Prince and his hold over 
territory, reason of state seeks to strengthen the state itself.167 
What then are the implications of this new art of government based on 
the nature of the state and aimed at the strengthening of the state? Foucault 
identifies several important implications. Firstly, the art of government 
according to reason of state requires the application of political knowledge. 
Only by knowing the strength and capacity of the state will it be possible to 
properly govern it. Reason of state thus is connected with the development 
of statistics which provided a concise knowledge of the state’s forces, as 
well as the forces of other states. Secondly, it implies a change in the 
conception of the nature of the state. Rather than perceiving the state as 
several elements between which an equilibrium could be obtained by the 
application of good laws, the state is viewed as a set of forces and strengths, 
the level of which will be determined by the politics of governments. 
Thirdly, the relationship of the individual to the state takes on a new 
appearance. The individual becomes a factor in the strength of the state, and 
thus the individual exist in the view of the state inasmuch as his activities 
and behavior provides either a negative or positive impact on the strength of 
the state. It is in the form of his capacity to live, work, produce, consume, 
and die that the individual becomes pertinent to government.168 
It is in this correlation between the utility of individuals and the utility of 
the state that “police” as a technology of government enters Foucault’s 
analysis. He charts the development of the police concept through the many 
political treatises in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries by 
philosophers, civil officials, and academics who all addressed the relation 
between the problem of the state and the art of government. Foucault ends 
the lecture of 29 March 1978 at the College de France by emphasizing that 
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the main purpose of police was broadly conceptualized as having to ensure 
everything from the elementary being of subjects to the actual well-being of 
subjects; to procure something more than just survival of individuals, a 
surplus production of individuals happiness that ensured the growth of the 
state’s forces.169 
In “The Political Technology of Individuals” Foucault highlights three 
texts as exemplary of the three major forms of conceptualizing the 
technology of police. Firstly, Louis Turquet de Mayenne’s book La 
Monarchie aristo-démocratique (1611) represents a utopian dream of an all-
encompassing police that heads the administration of the state. “The police,” 
insists Turquet, “branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything 
they do or undertake.”170 Secondly, Nicolas Delamare’s Traité de la police 
(1702) exemplifies a systematic appropriation of police principles to the 
administrative practice of the French state. For Delamare, “the police” is a 
state administration that sees “to everything pertaining to men’s happiness” 
as well as “everything regulating society.”171 Thirdly, Foucault singles out 
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi’s book Grundsätze der 
Polizeywissenschaft (1756), which formed a manual for students of 
Polizeiwissenschaft, as exemplifying “police” in the form of an academic 
discipline. As a teacher and practitioner of police science, von Justi draws a 
distinction between the positive and the negative obligations of the state. 
“Polizei” is concerned with the state’s positive task of fostering the life of 
its citizens and increasing the strength of the state. It achieves this “not by 
the law but by a specific, a permanent, and a positive intervention in the 
behavior of individuals.”172 
These three forms of conceptualizing “police”—police as utopia, police 
as administrative practice, and police as academic discipline—while 
seemingly signaling a similar understanding of a categorizing, regulating, 
and interventionist police power, are presented by Foucault as each 
representing a step in the development of the object of this political 
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technology of individuals. Foucault quotes Turquet for stating that “the 
police’s true object is man.”173 According to Foucault, Turquet is referring 
to a very specific conception of man, which is man and things in their 
relationships: 
Men and things are envisioned in this utopia in their relationships. What 
the police are concerned with is men's coexistence in a territory, their 
relationships to property, what they produce, what is exchanged in the 
market, and so on. It also considers how they live, the diseases and 
accidents which can befall them. In a word, what the police see to is a 
live, active, and productive man.174 
For Foucault this idea of man as the object of police signals a shift in the 
relationship between power and individuals. Rather than being conceived as 
juridical subjects in juridical relations of birth and status etc., individuals 
are, in the utopian police of Turquet, viewed in relations of men as living 
beings—working, trading, living. 
In regard to Delamare’s police as administrative practice, Foucault 
argues that the object of police is simultaneously expanded upon and 
systematized to a greater degree. The object of police is no longer merely 
men as living beings, but men as social beings. The police that Delamare 
portrays is concerned with classifying the needs of individuals and 
effectuating the happiness of individuals with the aim of making it a utility 
of the state. Thus, individuals are conceived with all their social relations—
morality, health, conveniences, and pleasures. Society becomes the true 
object of police.175 
Finally, Foucault argues that von Justi’s work adds two important 
innovations to the mechanism and object of police. The first is the 
bracketing off from the obligations of police the state’s juridical and 
military activities: the negative tasks of combating its internal and external 
enemies.  The instruments of police are thus “neither weapons nor laws, 
defense nor interdiction.”176 The second innovation is found in von Justi’s 
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emphasis on the importance of population, and specifically the interrelations 
and interdependence between the population of individuals and the 
environment that is constituted by “all the physical and economical 
elements of the state.”177 This then is how individuals are conceived by von 
Justi’s police, as constituting a population in an environment of the state. 
The population thus becomes the true object of police. As a consequence of 
defining the object of its power in the form of population and the 
mechanism of its power as non-juridical, non-military, but specific, 
permanent, and positive intervention in social processes, Foucault argues 
that the politics of the police necessarily “has to be a biopolitics.”178 
Biopolitics refers precisely to a technology of government that is 
concerned with the management and regulation of the population.179 We see 
then why Foucault is interested in the evolution of this political technology 
of individuals that refers to itself as “police”. The evolving definitions of the 
true object of police—life, society, population—presents a genealogy of the 
biopolitical technology that is so important in Foucault’s conceptualization 
of governmentality, and specifically the governmentality of modern, 
Western states. In this context I would argue that colonial politics should not 
be conceived as marginal to the development of Western governmentality. 
As the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, biopolitics was not a stranger to 
colonial government in the Danish West Indies. 
Having sketched out Foucault's conception of police and its relation to 
the development of a novel biopolitics of population, we can now begin to 
apply this lens to the governmental rationalities and techniques of the 
Danish West Indian slave society. 
 
Laws of Slavery, Regulation of Population 
The first two sections of the chapter argued that, first, slavery constituted an 
imperial paradox in that it served as both the foundation of rule and colonial 
enterprise in the West Indies, while simultaneously presenting the greatest 
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risks to its sustainability. Second, by introducing the notion of “police” as a 
political technology that developed a distinctive mode of biopolitics, the 
sections also presented the thesis that the concept of population became a 
central correlative to the governmentality of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The chapter now begins to bring these theoretical 
claims to bare on the governmentality of the Danish West Indies in the same 
period. The present section will attempt to reinterpret the function of law as 
a political technology in the Danish West Indian slave society. The focus 
will be on the operationalization of law and legal practice as a response to 
the risks of slavery. 
It has been argued by historians of the Danish West Indies that slavery 
was a condition of human domination that was maintained juridically by a 
colonial jurisprudence that generally pertained to the slave as merely a form 
of property.180 According to the laws of slavery, argued Karen Fog Olwig, 
the slave was constituted as property and not as a juridical nor social person. 
The slave might have been integrated in a social hierarchy, but did not exist 
as a social individual. To paraphrase Patterson, the slave was socially 
dead.181 At the same time the colonial legal regime has been analyzed in 
terms of an incoherent and unregulated body of laws. This view is an 
interpretation that highlights “[t]he absence of a cohesive legislation” 
regarding the colony’s slaves.182 Particularly the period following the 
abolition of the transatlantic slave trade (from 1803/06 onwards) has been 
depicted as “a confusing collection of older laws and local ad hoc 
legislation,”183 and “an impenetrable jungle” of published and unpublished 
proclamations, ordinances, decrees, and laws.184   
These interpretations are in need of reevaluation in at least two ways. 
The first pertains to the juridical validity and practical application of the 
Danish West Indian slave codes. The second aspect refers to the laws of the 
Danish West Indies as police legislation. Considering the previous sections’ 
                                                
 
180 (Olsen 2001, p. 25, 1983, pp. 305-307; Olwig 1985, p. 21, 1987, p. 387) 
181 (Olwig 1987, p. 388; Patterson 1982) 
182 (Jensen 2012, p. 133) 
183 (2012, p. 132) 
184 (Olsen 1983, p. 302) 
 
 
87 
emphasis on police as a political technology of integrating living individuals 
in the utility of the state, it might be more analytically fruitful to 
conceptualize the legal regime of the Danish West Indian slave society 
within this governmental framework of police. Such a perspective 
designates a higher degree of rationality and strategy to the perceived 
inconsistency of colonial legal practice, while retaining a skepticism 
towards the actual impact of legislation in the practical lives of slaves and 
masters. 
Two slave codes pertaining to the Danish West Indies were produced in 
the eighteenth century. The first was promulgated by Governor Philip 
Gardelin in 1733, only months before the major slave uprising on St. John. 
The second was prepared in 1755 following the Royal takeover of the 
colonies in that year. The juridical validity of both documents, however, 
remained unsettled in the colonial jurisprudence of the Danish West Indian 
courts. The 1733 code was never approved by metropolitan authorities, 
whereas the 1755 code was not properly proclaimed in the West Indies and 
not publicly published before appearing in a rescript of 18 February 1843.185 
In the final three decades of the eighteenth century several attempts at 
reforming the Danish slave codes were instigated. In 1776, Wilhelm 
Lindemann, a member of the governing council for the Danish West Indies, 
began the task of compiling a comprehensive new slave code. In 1783 a 
Royal commission was appointed with a similar task. Eventually, 
Lindemann’s unfinished work and the commission’s suggestions were 
combined in a draft that included a civil and criminal law for both slaves 
and free people of color. The draft was shelved, however, in the aftermath 
of the events on Saint-Domingue in 1789, and as the decision to abolish the 
transatlantic slave trade moved closer to being realized.186 Despite 
numerous suggestions in 1802, 1817, and 1830 to recommence the 
codification of slave legislation, a comprehensive slave code for the Danish 
West Indies was never compiled.187 
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Phillip Gardelin’s slave regulations of 5 September 1733 has, in the 
historiography of the Danish West Indies, come to epitomize the juridical 
legitimization of the slaveholder’s total power over his slaves as property 
and the “control of the slaves through dehumanization.”188 The 
proclamation did indeed allow for heavy punishments for slaves’ 
encroachment upon the slaveholder’s person and property.189 Articles 1 and 
5 dealt with slave marronage. Severe punishments were prescribed if slaves 
abandoned the plantation for shorter or longer periods, or if anyone assisted 
in or conspired to facilitate the escape of slaves. Pinching with red-hot irons, 
whipping, amputation, and hanging were the punishments that the 
proclamation prescribed for varying degrees of marronage. Articles 2, 3, and 
4 laid out the punishments for slave conspiracies against their masters or 
any other whites. These included branding and amputation, but also rewards 
for informers that helped in exposing the conspirators. Articles 6, 7, 8, and 
15 prohibited against theft and fencing by slaves, including the resale of 
escaped slaves. Articles 9 and 11 regulated slaves’ conduct when in the 
presence of whites, requiring humility and subservience from the slave, and 
prohibiting any type of threatening gesture or attitude towards whites, under 
penalty of torture, amputation, and death. Articles 13 and 14 prohibited 
specifically against the practice of witchcraft by slaves as well as poisoning. 
Articles 12, 16, 17, and 18 regulated the slaves activities and mobility 
outside of the plantation and household, prohibiting against public 
celebrations, gambling, extravagant dress, unapproved sale of provisions or 
livestock by slaves, and exceeding the evening curfew in the towns. 
The 1755 slave regulations did not differ significantly from the 1733 
regulations in terms of the severity of the punishments it prescribed and in 
its attentiveness to the deterrence of subversive activities by the colony’s 
‘domestic enemies’.190 Slaves were not permitted to carry any kind of 
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weapons without the specific approval of their owners. Nor were they 
allowed to congregate in public or sell goods of any kind, particularly sugar-
canes.191 The new slave code, however, did delineate new dimensions of 
slaves’ activities as objects of regulation. Articles 1, 2, and 3 provided 
elaborate provisions for the religious education of slaves. It would be the 
duty of the slaveowners to make religious teaching available to their slaves 
and secure the baptizing of newborn slaves. Anyone who impeded Royal 
subjects, including slaves, in their acceptance and practicing of the 
evangelical faith were to be severely chastised.192 The regulations also 
targeted the moral activities of slaves and slaveholders by regulating the 
character of sexual relations among slaves and between slaves and masters. 
Particularly sexual encounters that resulted in illegitimate children were of 
concern. Article 5 required that the owner of a slave who had conceived an 
illegitimate child with a free man were to be compensated by the child’s 
father. If, however, the father of the illegitimate child was himself the owner 
of the mother to the child, then both mother and child were to be confiscated 
by the Royal treasury. Both forced marriage of slaves and the marriage of 
slaves without the owners consent was deemed illegal. As was polygamy 
and homosexuality among the slaves. The code also prescribed a minimum 
sustenance requirement that the slave-owner was expected to provide for his 
slaves in terms of provisions and clothing.193 
The addition of these new domains of slaves’ activities to the 1755 
regulation are evident of a pertinence, at least at the level of governmental 
rationality, shown to the lives of slaves in the administration of society. And 
not merely a recognition of the importance of slaves lives as a capacity of 
production, but also an identification of an effect of causation between the 
social, commercial, moral, religious, and reproductive lives of slaves and 
the general condition of order and thus of prosperity within the state. 
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As legal genre the slave codes show far greater resemblance with classic 
police laws than with constitutional law. The slave codes did not prescribe 
the constitutional conditions of slavery. Slaves were considered property of 
their owners by virtue of the fact that they could be bought and sold, but on 
what grounds the status of slavery had been bestowed on the slave was not 
addressed. The codes were for the most part not concerned with the 
constitutive status of the slaves (as property, as subhumans, or as legal 
persons). What did present a concern for the slave regulations, the primary 
object of their strategic function, was instead the effect, immediate or 
potential, of the institution of slavery on the social and political order of the 
colony. Despite upholding the status of slaves as that of property the slave 
codes were essentially police regulations that were directed at securing the 
social order of the slave society. By virtue of this function the slave would 
also have to be conceived as social and moral beings, particularly in their 
relations with their owners. More than merely confirming slaves’ status as 
property the law of slavery was beginning to address the slaves as living 
individuals that were susceptible to the dynamics of society and population.  
The codes of 1733 and 1755 differ mostly in the degree of detail in the 
complexity of their intervention, but both laws reflect the same attentiveness 
to a police of colonial order rather than a narrow concern for the sanctity of 
slave-owners property. Particularly the 1755 code that was a reproduction of 
the French Code Noir. Quite possibly due to its origins in the administrative 
apparatus of a French absolutist state, it was comparable, in terms of the 
objects of its regulation, with the theories of the police technology that was 
considered in the previous section. They were comparable to the French and 
German encyclopedias, handbooks, and treatises on police and the 
administration of the state’s internal order that Foucault evoked as 
emblematic of the governmentality of the administrative state of the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. They also compare to the less 
centralized, yet equally interventionist, British police laws that were 
embodied in the efforts of Patrick Colquhoun in the late eighteenth century 
to procure the security of property and commerce through police 
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mechanisms.194 In this regard then, the laws of slave societies did not differ 
substantially from the laws of metropolitan societies, when viewed narrowly 
through the administrative prism of police governmentality. 
Concomitant with the juridical construction of the slave as property 
there existed a political technology, as Foucault terms it, that was entirely 
focused on the existence of the slave, not as a legal object of property, but as 
a social person, as a living subject. The legislation of slave societies was 
indeed constructed as a regulation of the social life of slaves, rather than as a 
custodian of their social death. The Danish slave codes reviewed above 
serves as testimony to this function of social regulation. And as a 
particularly critical class of living subjects—as human property and 
“domestic enemies”—the slaves and their conditions of enslavement would 
have to be subject to rigorous regulation. So, in the laws of slavery, the 
slave existed both as property and as person. As both property and person, 
and indeed a person that against natural desire and reason was the property 
of another man, the activities of slaves were seen as highly precarious to the 
sanctity of public order. The natural inclination of the slave and of any man 
to pursue their freedom made the activities of slaves particularly 
unpredictable. The magistrate Engelbreth Hesselberg, who in 1759 served as 
one of three judges in the case of a failed slave conspiracy, recognized this 
strong natural desire for freedom in the slave-person, and properly for that 
same reason did not hesitate to meet out a series of horrific sentences upon 
the guilty.195 
This fact, of having to sustain a public order that could accommodate the 
ultimate form of subjection of the majority of its inhabitance, made the 
perception of juridical force an absolute necessity within slave societies. 
The need for an effective deterrent against insurrection and insubordination 
made the public order of slavery particularly reliant upon the mechanism of 
police. In response to this need, Elsa Goveia argued, colonial legislatures of 
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the British, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Danish West Indies all produced a 
substantial corpus of police legislation in more or less codified form. These 
distinct bodies of law shared “a remarkably consistent pattern, imposed by 
the function of the law in maintaining the stability of those forms of social 
organization on which rested the whole of the West India colonies during 
the eighteenth century.”196 By the function of a shared object of regulating 
the risks of slave society, the legal government of West Indian colonies 
seemed to coalesce around the political technology of police.  
 The connection between slave laws and the development of “police 
power” has also been accentuated by the legal historian Markus Dubber. 
Dubber argues that the slave laws of the North American colonies served as 
important antecedents to the post revolutionary introduction of codified 
police laws.197 These police laws were greatly influenced by Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which in Dubber’s larger argument 
epitomizes the patriarchal foundation of American government, whereby the 
social order of the state should approximate a well-governed family.198 The 
domestic government of slaves and the pervasive application of police 
practices throughout colonial society is seen by Dubber as a factor that 
familiarized American colonial society with the technology of police, and 
thus made it more susceptive to the introduction of formal police legislation 
and regulation: “Americans of the revolutionary generation thus may well 
have embraced the concept of police because it named, and apparently 
systematized, a wide array of governmental practices with which they were 
intimately familiar.”199 
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We should not, however, overestimate the degree to which the theory of 
police manifested itself in actual regulations of social and commercial order. 
The doctrines of police science and the practices of policing were often far 
apart.200 Even the object par excellence of French police commissioners, the 
grain markets of Paris,201 have been shown to have escaped the disciplining 
regulation that doctrines of police prescribed.202 
There is no reason to believe that police regulation in the colonies was 
particularly more well integrated in the actual policing efforts than was the 
case in the metropoles. Yet, there might be evidence that suggests that the 
ideal of police seemed even more attractive to governors of colonial 
societies. It is possible that the diversified character of colonial societies 
lend themselves perfectly to governors’ desire to impose order and 
regulation. The reason behind the regulation and intervention in commercial 
activities through “police” in eighteenth century France—as maintained by 
Nicolas Delamare, the compiler of the voluminous Traité de la police—was 
to counteract the detrimental behavior of an “avaricious and conniving” 
merchant class, whose “bad motives” obstructed the liberty of others by 
polluting the market place with high prices. If left unregulated the activities 
of merchants could result in scarcity and famine.203 If scarcity represented 
the final event to which police was designed to prevent in early eighteenth 
century France, then the slave insurrection served a similar role in the slave 
societies of the Caribbean colonies. Only through the successful police of 
slavery would the colonial order be sustained. Here it was not conniving 
merchants that would have to be regulated, but the domestic sovereignty of 
slaveholders, who’s natural instinct was to stretch the scope of the power 
they could exert over their slaves. Like the merchants’ chase for profit had 
the potential to instigate the event of scarcity, then the slaveholders graving 
for sovereign power risked igniting a slave uprising. 
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I will return to the problem of slaveholders’ domestic sovereignty in the 
next section, but for now, I would like to quickly recount an example of 
how the police of slavery was carried out. The example exemplifies the 
balancing act of regulating slaveholders without alienating them. In the 
early 1760s, Mercier de la Rivière, considered a key proponent of the 
French Physiocratic doctrine of political economy, who at that time served 
as Intendant of Martinique, pursued a policy of implementing a strict system 
of police. By establishing a police force in the colony and enacting a series 
of police ordinances, Mercier attempted to increase government intervention 
and state control of the regulation of public order. While this included 
setting regulations for the treatment of slaves, Mercier’s intention was most 
likely to secure the integrity of property, rather than to infringe upon it, by 
institutionalizing a “legal despotism” that might limit slave owners’ rights 
but also safeguard the continual existence of chattel slavery. Nevertheless, 
Mercier’s attempts to redistribute authority in Martinique society was met 
with discontent by a planter class that did not appreciate a system of police 
that centralized the power of regulation to the hand of the French king. 
When Mercier returned to France, the land owning elite on Martinique 
reinstated their preferred policing body, the milice or militia, over which 
they were able to exert far more control.204 
 
A Juridicial Dispositif of Slavery? 
In her analysis of the eighteenth century’s West Indian slave laws, Elsa 
Goveia depicts a sequence of transformations in the objects of slave laws 
that are conveniently similar to the sequential movement of the dispositifs of 
governmentality. At least in regard to the Spanish slave laws, the object 
seems to move from an original focus on the juridical constitution of slavery 
towards the disciplining of slaves’ conduct and culminating in an effort to 
secure the welfare of a biopolitical slave population. And in this regard, the 
transformation of slave laws in the eighteenth century mirrors Foucault’s 
conception of the re-inscription of legislation and law in the strategical 
dispositions of governmentality by which law becomes part of governmental 
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interventions in the security of social and economic order rather than 
constituting a domain of justice and rights by which government is itself 
bound and constrained.205 
The 1755 slave code and the succeeding drafts of reformed slave laws, 
commenced in 1776 and 1785 respectively, can be read as a step in this 
sequence qua their implementation of certain rights of slaves and duties of 
masters. The chronology in the case of the 1755 code is, however, 
complicated by the fact that the law was almost an exact reproduction of the 
French Code Noir of 1685.206 It seemed that in order to progress forward the 
compilers of the 1755 code opted to reach backwards into time. 
This is not a trivial rupture to an otherwise fixed path towards a more 
rational and progressive legal regime. There is an element of political 
strategy in the types of legal regulation that were favored by the different 
compilers and put to use by legal practitioners and political actors, which I 
think merits attention.207 The development of the law of slavery was not a 
uniform process of oppression by a homogenous body of power holders. As 
Malick Ghachem has noted: “The law of slavery evolved over the course of 
the colonial period as a result of many different individual interactions and 
contests between administrators, jurists, white planters, free people of color, 
and slaves.”208 
The French Code Noir to a certain extent resembled the Spanish laws of 
slavery that predated the discovery of the New World and, thus, retained a 
Roman law conception of the constitution of slavery that entailed a wider 
understanding of the slave as a person rather than mere property.209 The 
Spanish juridical conception of slavery was originally based on the 
thirteenth century code of laws, referred to as Siete Partidas. In the parts 
pertaining to the laws of slavery, the Siete Partidas conceptualized slavery 
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as a legal agreement between persons. The status of the slave was thus not 
that of property to the master, nor of livestock, but of a juridical person who 
(or his ancestors) had “contrary to natural reason” engaged in an agreement 
to enter into servitude.210 Slavery was thus a relationship of obligation, duty, 
and rights that applied to both master and slave. From this recognition of the 
slave’s juridical personhood and original freedom, a “spirit of … Spanish 
slave laws [emerged], which was relatively liberal….”211 It recognized the 
slaves’ right to protection of “life and limb” as well as their capacity to 
purchase their freedom.212 
The introduction of the Code Noir was, however, not part of a legal 
campaign to secure the rights of the slave as a legal person. Rather, its 
introduction most be read in light of the integration of the French Caribbean 
colonies within the French absolutist state. In other words, the introduction 
of the Code Noir was in part an attempt on the part of French state 
sovereignty to establish a firmer footing in the colonies, while 
simultaneously softening the grip of the planters’ “domestic sovereignty.” 
Slavery was a form of property, and as such, the property of planters was 
beyond the legitimate reach of the absolute sovereign. At the same time, 
slavery was also a form of sovereignty in that it formed part of the planter’s 
“family” or “household” government. The planter enjoyed sovereign powers 
over his slaves in the same manner, he enjoyed sovereign powers over his 
wife and children. As “pockets of sovereignty within the state,” the 
seigniorial powers of planters, if wielded over a sizable body of slave-
subjects, could theoretically undermine/threaten the absolutism of state 
sovereignty. To  early modern theoretics of sovereignty such as Jean Bodin 
the incremental increase of planters’ domestic sovereignty also included a 
potential to destabilize the constitutional fabric of society since the master’s 
unchecked powers would intuitively guide him towards a still more despotic 
form of government, to the point were his slaves would inevitably revolt and 
overturn the social order.213  
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If we accept this interpretation of the Code Noir’s function as in part an 
effort to stabilize the force relations of early modern sovereignty, then the 
strategic orientation of slave laws must be readdressed.214 First, the slave 
codes, like the many supplements and ordinances of police legislation, acts 
first and foremost as a strategic intervention to secure the social order. A 
social order of enforced and regulated order, but still a security of social 
order. Second, the slave code becomes a function of raison d’État. To bring 
order to the systemic risks of slave society by regulating the enclaves of 
sovereignty that the plantocracy presented was indeed part of a management 
of the state. It should not be seen as coincidental that one of the first acts of 
a Danish absolute monarchy that had just acquired the Danish West Indian 
colonies in 1755 was to promote the introduction of an almost complete 
approximation of the Code Noir—the French sovereign Monarch’s 
preferred instrument in the regulation of sovereign power in the colonies. 
The extent to which this was a successful intervention is of course 
debatable. It seems reasonable to argue, in light of the previously mentioned 
questionability of the Danish slave code’s legal validity, that the practical 
operations of the colonial juridical regulation of slavery’s risks was 
conducted as a reciprocal negotiation between representatives of state 
sovereignty, planters’ domestic sovereignty and property rights, and a 
common interest towards the security of the social order. 
Gunvor Simonsen has shown how this tension between planter property, 
state sovereignty, and social order was negotiated in the judicial practice of 
lower court judges in the Danish West Indies. By virtue of being someone 
else’s property, the punishment of transgressing slaves was a privilege 
shared between the slaveowner and the colonial authorities. The power of 
punishment was thus a contested privilege—a domain of colonial politics. 
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The extent of the right to punish one’s slaves was negotiated over time. As 
the conditions of slavery changed, so did judicial practice and punitive 
procedures. In the wake of the abolition of the slave trade, the early 
nineteenth century saw a shift in colonial officers’ self perception of their 
function in colonial society. Gunvor Simonsen has argued that the slave 
laws of the eighteenth century had been designed to ensure the security of 
Euro-Caribbeans, but the new raison d’être of juridical government in the 
nineteenth century would be to ensure the stability of colonial society.215 If 
we reformulate Simonsen’s argument within the Foucauldian terminology 
that informs the theoretical framework of this dissertation, it might be more 
useful to view the transformation of the objectives of juridical government 
as moving from a focus on ensuring the safety of the ruling white 
community towards an emphasis on procuring the security of colonial 
society. 
This new protocol of juridical government was not pursued through 
legislative innovations. Legal officials did not concentrate their efforts on 
drafting new slave laws. Instead, innovation was established via the judicial 
practice of sentencing punishment. The process of sentencing was an 
exercise in calculating the best possible punishment of the convicted based 
upon several factors. When deciding on a sentence, judges would consider 
existing legislation, colonial as well as metropolitan, and assess whether or 
not they could be considered legally applicable to the case at hand. Previous 
precedences as well as Judges’ own personal sentiments of fair and proper 
punishment would also be considered. These juridical and personal 
reflections would in cohesion with the overall governmental objective of 
maintaining social security form the basis for deciding the proper sentence.  
This formation of a juridical practice, the immanence of which was 
inherent in the court proceeding itself, assigned an immense significance to 
the legal assessments of judges and magistrates “in placing the colonial state 
as a regulator of the master-slave relationship.”216 As a governmental 
practice, it also formed an antecedence to the administrative pragmatism 
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that characterized Danish West Indian prison administration in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, as will become visible in chapter four. By 
navigating the legislative space of possible sentences between metropolitan 
and colonial law with the practical objective of ensuring social stability and 
with the belief that specific conditions of colonial society would have to be 
considered, and if necessary take precedence to existing regulations, when 
determining the proper course of action, the judges of the Danish West 
Indian lower courts established a modus operandi of colonial government 
that would be reflected in many areas of policy-making and administration. 
The juridical-governmental practice of adaptation, born out of the social 
problems that slavery posed to colonial government, as we shall see, 
remained instructive in the logic of prison administration. 
The movement in legal practice towards an increasingly more agile and 
contingent use of law and legal adjudication in the service of social order 
provided colonial authorities with a strategic avenue of intervention into the 
relation of slaves and slaveholders without having to erect general laws that 
necessarily would have to address the justice of slavery itself. “Police” 
differed from “justice,” as a mechanism of power, in that police represented 
a management of the moment, an administration of variables. Justice and the 
law, on the other hand, was considered representative of the permanent, an 
etching into stone of universals. Police was concerned with details and 
specificities, while justice was concerned with generalities and absolutes.217 
It could be said, then, that “police” and “population” made for a much more 
efficient economy of power than a government based on principles of justice 
with the accompanying potential to legitimize resistance from both slaves 
and planters.   
In his interpretation of the political legality of slave society, Ghachem 
refers to “the ‘strategic ethics’ of slavery” that were separated from juridical 
principles of human rights and justice, and instead emphasized 
governmental prudence and social stability. By the term “strategic ethics,” 
he understands 
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…a mode of legality that is essentially instrumental or pragmatic in its 
orientation, and a style of criticism that is concerned primarily with the 
stability and efficacy of slavery as opposed to its injustice. A strategic 
ethics is an ethics of prudence: It seeks to avoid reckless conduct that 
threatens the ship of state. Moreover, it embraces “prudent government” 
in the further sense that it is distinct from (although not incompatible 
with) humanitarian concerns. A strategic ethics embodies, first and 
foremost, the seemingly neutral calculation of aggregate social welfare – 
understood in this context to mean the well-being of the plantation order 
– rather than a set of normative commitments to individual human 
rights.218 
This difference in the domain of police (the prudent but strategic 
government of state forces) and justice presents a possible explanation for 
the lack of comprehensive legal codes in the government of the Danish 
West Indies. In a system of slavery, the principle of justice would have to 
give way to the principles of exception and specificity. Rather than 
providing general conditions of justice the government of the slave society 
gave precedence to the specific conditions of each case. Rather than 
providing a permanent “juridical apparatus,” police intervenes through 
instruments of an intermediary character: “the regulation, the ordinance, the 
interdiction, the instruction.”219 The form is of course legal, but police does 
not provide justice, it provides regulation. So, when the Danish historian, 
Poul Olsen, describes the juridical state of the Danish West Indies in the 
1830s as a jungle of legal ordinances and proclamations, he is not describing 
a juridical backwater, but the permanent mobility of (a contested) police 
regulation.220 
We see a resemblance between Simonsen’s analysis of the adjudication 
process in the lower courts of the Danish West Indies and Ghachem’s 
concept of the strategic ethics of slavery. The functioning of Danish colonial 
courts relied heavily on the prudence of judges in interpreting existing 
legislation and sentence according to a policy of social stability. A strategic 
prudence that seems to be mirrored in the governmental ethics of slave 
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society in general—at least if we accept Ghachem’s conceptualization. Both 
the Danish Judges and the French colonial officials were concerned with the 
security of a social order that relied on a multiplicity of orders in a scaled 
structure. The internal order of the colonial state was dependent on the well-
being of public order, which in turn relied upon well-ordered plantations. 
This multiplicity of orders could only be maintained by a certain 
equilibrium of forces and of power relations. If the seigniorial powers of 
slave-owners were not contained, it would disrupt the balance of 
sovereignty in relation to the French monarch, but it would also drive the 
slaves towards acts of resistance, causing public disorder. At the same time, 
the living conditions of slaves were dependent on the prosperity of the 
slaveholder, so if the rights of planters to manage their slaves and 
plantations were limited to the degree were the plantation no longer yielded 
a profit, the conditions of slaves would be impacted negatively—again 
leading towards public disorder.  
This balancing act was discussed in an exchange between Count 
Reventlow and Ernst Schimmelman, who were both leading figures in the 
process that lead to the abolition of the Danish transatlantic slave trade, 
besides being large stockholders in the Schimmelmann family’s plantations 
on St. Croix. In response to Schimmelmann’s plans to improve the treatment 
of slaves on the family’s plantations, Reventlow wrote in a letter on 14 June 
1789 that “[t]he actual happiness of the slaves, their genuine well-being, is 
now determined by the fortune of their masters….” From this fact 
Reventlow concluded that the complete prevention of “those abuses 
intimately linked to the circumstances [of slavery]” and the introduction of 
“general or complete liberty” would in fact be counter-productive to the 
objective of ameliorating the conditions of slaves.221 For Reventlow, the 
maintenance of the equilibrium of forces necessary in sustaining the order of 
slavery outweighed the humanitarian sentiments and Christian duties to 
improve the conditions of slaves to the point of complete liberty.  
This calculation of a strategic equilibrium of forces leads us to consider 
the character of police in the context of the Danish West Indies. The type of 
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police that Foucault associates with the police des grains is a disciplinary 
police. In what sense can it be considered disciplinary? As a general feature 
of its operation, Foucault states that “[d]iscipline concentrates, focuses, and 
encloses. The first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in 
which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and 
without limit.”222 The police of grain, then, is disciplinary by virtue of its 
“centripetal” modality: “It isolates, it concentrates, it encloses, it is 
protectionist, and it focuses essentially on action on the market or on the 
space of the market and what surrounds it.”223 We certainly find this mode 
of operation in regard to the problem of the equilibrium of slavery—most 
notably of course in the identification of the plantation as a privileged space 
of control. The plantation formed the essential entity in the spatial grid of 
social order. The slave laws were specifically directed at enclosing and 
isolating both slaves within the plantation entity as well as regulating the 
movement between points in the grid. The circumscription of space in the 
form of the plantation, and the isolation, concentration, and enclosure of 
slaves within the plantation space were central hallmarks of slavery’s 
regulation.  
Yet, the strategic ethics of slavery suggests that other modes besides the 
centripetal mode of discipline were at play. Having defined the modality of 
the disciplinary police of grains, Foucault, then, contrasts it with the 
“centrifugal” operation of the security dispositifs in regard to the same 
problem:  
New elements are constantly being integrated: production, psychology, 
behavior, the ways of doing things of producers, buyers, consumers, 
importers, and exporters, and the world market. Security therefore 
involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider 
circuits.224 
Disregarding the specific problem of grain, we see that the tendency of the 
security dispositifs to expand rather than enclose the parameters of the 
problematic space, and to introduce new variables in the calculation of the 
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forces involved, resonates with the conception of slavery’s risks and the 
possible responses that this chapter has described thus far. The conditions of 
colonial slave societies, characterized by dispersed pockets of sovereignty, 
necessitated a mode of government that could not regulate through and 
through, but would instead act by organizing and allowing certain forces, 
actions, and interests to develop. This does not mean “that everything is left 
alone,” as Foucault notes, but it does necessitate that “at a certain level” 
otherwise negative developments must be allowed to run their course: 
“allowing prices to rise, allowing scarcity to develop, and letting people go 
hungry so as to prevent something else happening, namely the introduction 
of the general scourge of scarcity.”225 Replace rising prices, hunger, and the 
scourge of scarcity with ill-treatment of slaves, discontentment among 
slaves, and the general catastrophe of slave-rebellion, and the 
complementary dynamics of the two contexts becomes apparent. In this 
sense, the processes that security lets happen are conceived not as good or 
bad but as “inevitable” and “natural,” and as such, their complete regulation 
becomes problematic in itself.  
In his letter to Schimmelmann, Reventlow pushed aside the Christian 
duty to alleviate the suffering of slaves with reference to the constraints of 
reality and the auspiciousness of acting in accordance with that reality. The 
manumission of the Schimmelmann family’s slaves under those specific 
circumstances that existed in that particular moment would only damage the 
larger cause of eventually bringing about the circumstances that would 
support the general emancipation of the slaves.226 This was a type of 
pragmatism or, indeed, strategical ethics that Foucault also recognized in the 
security dispositifs. Unlike the function of law, which prohibits, or 
discipline, which prescribes, security functions by “grasping … the level of 
… effective reality.” Acting on the basis of this reality, and from within it, 
security works “by trying to use it as a support and make it function, make 
its components function in relation to each other.” The task of security is 
then not to prevent the transgression of an imaginary line between the legal 
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and the illegal, or to shape behavior according to a conception of good or 
bad, it is a task of working “within reality, by getting the components of 
reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of 
analyses and specific arrangements.” 
This is how I think we should conceive of the police of slavery and of 
the laws of slavery at the level of governmentality, as sharing core 
techniques with the security dispositifs that Foucault described. The 
program of working from, in, and trough effective reality was reflected in 
legislation and in the process of adjudication. Firstly, laws were never 
compiled into fixed codes, a permanent juridical conception of slavery was 
never established in the Danish West indies. The reasons for this were 
many, but the importance here is that the effect was to retain a flexibility in 
the approach to managing reality’s components. Secondly, the tendency of 
slavery’s laws was to introduce new variables that could effect the 
conception of the components of reality. For instance, the introduction in the 
1755 slave law of slave’s religious, moral, and sexual lives made for 
completely new components that could be arranged, and a new subset of 
conceptions about the dynamics of population and its relation to social 
order. Finally, the reliance upon the adjudication process and on judges 
prudent evaluation in conducting the strategic ethics of slavery on a case by 
case basis speaks volumes about the adherence to reality’s components 
rather than a permanent juridical conception of wright and wrong. 
By accepting the idea of population, government also accepted the 
existence of a ‘natural’ domain within the object of government. Rather than 
being constituted by subjects of rights that could be inflicted with unjust 
laws, the population was made up of subjects of life, of members of the 
human species, of biological beings. The management of biologies is not 
evaluated by its adherence to justice but by its adherence to nature, and the 
mechanisms of its management are thus not juridical, but rather “reflected 
procedures of government within this nature, with the help of it, and with 
regard to it.”227 The correlation of government and population thus 
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presented colonial authorities with a convenient separation of principles of 
justice from the problematics of government. 
 
Slavery's Security 
… essentially, it is about treating as men these sad hordes who until now 
serve as physical instruments for the enrichment of their masters.228 
To accept for a moment that what was taking place in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries in terms of political rationality was a process 
of integrating men as population in the utility of the state, to conceive of 
man’s capacities and risks through the prism of population, is in some ways 
a far cry from the interpretation that scholars such as David Brion Davis has 
proposed, in which the dehumanization and animalization of slaves by their 
masters served as a key mechanism in reproducing and legitimizing the 
slaves’ existence as chattel property.229 The process of thinking slaves as 
population was to emphatically include the slave as a member of the human 
species. Certainly, it did not in any way necessitate an acceptance of slaves’ 
human and civil rights, cf. the previously mentioned “strategic ethics,” but it 
did provide a common framework for making the lives and needs of slaves 
intelligible and for calculating the utility of different techniques to govern 
them. Following the principles of population, the most useful government of 
slaves were increasingly to be found within their desires and choices as they 
were perceived by policy makers. The same was true in regard to regulating 
slaveholders management of their slaves. The power of the law was very 
limited if the planters’ interests did not align with the spirit of the law. 
The central problematic for this new biopolitics of population that was 
entering the center stage of colonial government in the late 1700s was the 
inability of the slave population to reproduce in sufficient numbers. As 
evident from the writings by colonial officials such as P. L. Oxholm, as well 
as the report by the commission to improve the organization of the slave 
trade, the births and deaths of slaves were of great importance to the 
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political economy of the state.230 The Atlantic slave trade was quickly 
identified as the root cause of the disorderly conditions of slave 
demographics. The obvious solution, then, would be to abolish the slave 
trade. However, the specific conditions of its dismantling were not easily 
arrived at. The campaign to improve the conditions of the slave population 
was not simultaneously an attempt to end slavery or to cripple the sugar 
economy in the Danish West Indies. Rather, it was an attempt to preserve it 
and render it more sustainable in the long run. Therefore, there was no 
intention of alienating the planters who depended on slave labor by 
arbitrarily confiscating their property (i.e. their slaves) and severing their 
access to new supplies of labor. In a letter of 18 June 1791 that accompanied 
an initial proposal to abolish the Atlantic slave trade, the Minister of 
Finance, Ernst Schimmelmann, made it clear that he was not at all intended 
on dismantling planter’s private property rights:  
The proposals in my essay nothing which could bring about the 
destruction of private property or the infringement of property rights, for 
the proposals are aimed at protecting private property and at prodding the 
planters to base their own profits on something more secure than a 
temporary use.231 
In similar wording, Oxholm wrote in 1797 that “the colonial system” 
would have to be tolerated as a necessary evil, “the industry and trade” of 
which “millions of people” were dependent upon. Despite being “a disgrace 
to the constitution of Europe” the negative implications “on the wealth of 
entire nations” of a “premature termination” of the West Indian colonial 
system would be to great to bare. The more prudent course of action would 
be to implement “plans of alleviation and mitigating measures.”232 
In order to further develop the connection between the government of 
slavery in the Danish West Indies and Foucault’s security dispositifs, which 
was considered in the previous section, this section will be devoted to an 
examination of the suggestions provided by the commission on the 
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organization of the Danish transatlantic slave trade. The commission report 
and the general effort to abolish the transatlantic slave trade was formulated 
as a wide-spectered response to the risks of slavery. As such, the principles 
of the commission’s suggestions can be used to reflect the rationality of 
government that was promoted by the Danish colonial and metropolitan 
government at the time. As will be shown shortly, the act to abolish the 
Danish transatlantic slave trade, decreed on 16 March 1792 by King 
Christian VII, reflected a coupling of the problem of slavery’s equilibrium 
with biopolitical regulation. 
The abolition of the Danish transatlantic slave trade is one of the more 
well-studied events in the history of the Danish West Indies.233 On 5 August 
1791 a Commission for Improving the Organization of the Slave Trade in 
the West Indian Islands and the Coast of Guinea was appointed. The 
commission took five months to produce its report, which was delivered on 
28 December 1791.234 As a result of the commission’s report an Act to 
Abolish the Danish slave trade was degreed on 16 March 1792. The act did 
not include an immediate ban on the importation of slaves into the Danish 
colonies. Instead, a ten-year grace period was implemented during which 
the importation of slaves was to be intensified to procure a sufficient 
amount of slaves for the system of sugar cultivation to sustain itself. Thus, 
the paradoxical technique to end the Atlantic slave trade was to escalate the 
slave trade. The logic behind this peculiar mechanism is what we will 
examine presently. 
Already in Schimmelmann’s initial proposal to abolish the Atlantic slave 
trade, the content of which was to a large degree reproduced in the 
commission’s report, a causal link was identified between the ongoing 
importation of slaves from Africa and the “unnatural” demographic 
development of the slave population:  
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The principal reason for the unnatural decrease of the slave population 
and for the constant need to import new slaves from Africa is to be found 
in the treatment and condition of the slaves in the West Indies. If their 
treatment … should ever be based on the principle of promoting the 
natural increase of the slave population, if the treatment and condition of 
the slaves were consequently improved and regulated, the time would 
come when the legislator could dictate as a law something that would 
already be a reality as a consequence of the measures which the legislator 
had earlier adopted and promoted.235 
We see here that Schimmelmann identified a double causality within the 
population-slave trade relationship: The ill-treatment of slaves, and whence 
the decrease of the slave population, was only made possible because of the 
possibility of replenishing the slave population by importing new slaves 
from Africa. Similarly, the slave trade was only sustained by planters’ need 
to replace their ill-treated slaves. Therefore, the key to instating the 
conditions of a “natural” increase in the slave population laid with the 
abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Likewise, a successful abolition was 
dependent upon a “naturally” increasing slave population. This reciprocal 
causality represented the basic assumption behind the commission’s 
suggestions. It also becomes evident that the true object and purpose of the 
proposal and the work of the commission was not the abolition of the slave 
trade in itself. Rather, abolishing the slave trade was part of a response to 
the dangers that the current organization of slavery was posing to 
population. Population, or rather the constitution of the natural order of 
population, was the actual object.   
In their analysis of the condition of the slave population the commission 
employed statistical data on birth and mortality rates in Europe and the West 
Indies, which were collected from state-owned plantations as well as those 
belonging to the Schimmelmann family trust.236 It reached the conclusion 
that the death rate among slaves on St. Croix was not abnormally high, but 
birth rates were considerably lower than in Europe.237 The commission was 
confident that the higher mortality rates could easily be lowered “by means 
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of some suitable arrangements.”238 The low birth rates was perceived as a 
more complicated matter. Three main causes were identified. First, the 
physical hardship of field labor had given planters a preference for male 
slaves whose physical strength made them better suited for the task, causing 
a disproportionate excess of male over female slaves. Second, the 
uncertainties of slaves’ living conditions—fear of death, disease, and 
separation—discouraged slaves from marrying and starting families. Third, 
insufficient care was provided by planters to child and mother prior and 
after birth.239 It was evident, then, that the “unnaturalness” of the slave 
population was a consequence of the conditions of slavery, and specifically 
of a system of slavery where there was no incentive for the slaveholder to 
improve the conditions of his slaves.  
How, then, was the problem of the slave population to be solved? The 
solution could not be found in the complete emancipation of the slaves. 
Emancipation would require  
a level of knowledge and morality which, among the Negro slaves, 
cannot be assumed to exist at the present time. The education of the 
slaves must precede their emancipation, for otherwise their own well-
being and the well-being of their masters will be jeopardized.240  
Nor would an immediate ban on the importation of slaves in itself form a 
solution to the problem. Under existing conditions, planters would not be 
able to sustain the sugar cultivation without regular supplies of slaves. 
Instead, the solution would have to involve the establishment of a situation 
by which the import of slaves would no longer be required:  
If it were possible to place the slaves who are presently in the islands, or 
who would be present there after the passage of a certain number of 
years, in a condition that would enable them—as other peoples living 
under civilized conditions—not only to maintain their population but to 
increase it, all new importations would become unnecessary and would 
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cease spontaneously…. The careful examination of this possibility has 
had to be one of the principal objects of our investigation.241 
With Foucault’s security dispositifs in mind, this conception of the 
mechanism involved in the solution to the problem of the slave trade, and by 
extension the slave population, is quit telling. The commission was 
essentially proposing a method of arranging things so that the problem 
would cancel itself out by establishing a condition whereby the slave trade 
became unnecessary and ceased spontaneously. To reach the point of 
spontaneous nullification, regulation and legislation would be necessary, but 
the actual response to the problem of the slave trade could not be a simple 
prohibition, or a strict obligation, it would have to be an arrangement that 
worked from within the effective reality of the problem itself. Abolition of 
the slave trade could not be a singular event, but had to be an extended 
process leading towards an auspicious condition.  
To achieve that condition, the commission did not advocate for a ban on 
the slave trade. Rather, it suggested the unrestricted importation of slaves 
during a ten-year period leading up to the date when the ban on the 
transatlantic slave trade would take effect. Thereby, planters would be 
allowed to furnish themselves with as many slaves as would be necessary to 
sustain their sugar cultivation and a self-sustaining slave population.242 The 
self-interests of planters would dictate that they took full advantage of the 
grace period leading up to the ban. However, the commission thought it 
prudent to introduce certain incentive inducing mechanisms in order to 
direct planters’ import of slaves in accordance with the needs of a self-
sustaining slave population. The objective was to incite planters to import as 
many slaves as possible and to increase the ratio of female to male slaves. 
Therefore, to maximize the total amount of imported slaves, the commission 
suggested that the state provide loans to planters who had the need but not 
the funds to import slaves.243 To create incentives for planters to import 
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female slaves, the commission suggested reducing the head-tax levied on 
female slaves.244 
The mechanism of incentivizing planters’ cooperation became essential 
to the success of the commission’s plan to improve slaves’ conditions. 
Simply prohibiting the slave trade and ill-treatment of slaves would only 
lead to resistance from the planters. The establishment of a law would in 
itself mean nothing if it did not correspond with the willingness of planters 
to act in accordance with the law. Therefore, the alterations would have to 
come about by activating planters’ self-interests. The benefits to the planters 
of a system of slavery that relied on a self-sufficient “native” slave 
population would have to be made clear. The commission argued that 
improvements in slaves’ living conditions, brought on by incentives that the 
abolition of the slave trade created, would make for a more agreeable slave 
population, and as such form a security measure against the risk of slave 
uprisings: 
When the external circumstances of the slave’s existence are softened; 
when, at least for a start, the slave’s marriage and his entire domestic life 
are protected; when the slave is given universal permission and 
opportunity to acquire smoothing of his own; when the prospect is 
thereby opened to him of some day obtaining freedom for himself or his 
children; then all of those things will provide so many bonds that the 
slave’s inclination to tear himself away from his situation will be resisted. 
The more he has to lose, the less willing he will be to risk rebellion.245 
To instill the hope of freedom and of self-sustainability in the mind of the 
slave would provide a much more effective means of security against the 
rebellion event that so many planters feared. The commission’s suggestion 
was, then, an alternative to the repressive regime of violent punishment that 
the planters would otherwise resort to when their authority was threatened. 
And from the commission’s perspective, the hope of freedom was a much 
more effective technology than the dread of the whip. 
Abolishing the importation of slaves also decreased the risk of rebellion 
by limiting the introduction of African slaves who had no connection to the 
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West Indies other than it being the destination of their passage and the space 
of their enslavement. Naturally, the commission argued, newly imported 
slaves would have a greater inclination to “attempt a desperate rising than 
those slaves born in the West Indies, living in a family unit which they value 
highly, and acquainted with no better living conditions from their own 
experience.”246 The more the slave had to live for the less likely it would be 
that he would be willing to risk that life for the uncertain fate of 
insubordination and rebellion.  
Religious instruction was presented by the commission as an important 
element of this strategy of security. “In order to liberate the slaves from this 
lack of morality and to accustom them to a regular and proper life,”247 the 
commission suggested that the islands be divided into districts, which each 
harbored a number of slave congregations where teachings would be 
conducted by the Moravian Brethren. The Moravians were already 
established on the Danish islands and the principles of their doctrine was 
perceived as well suited to the effort of making the slaves feel contentment 
with their circumstances:  
The indifference towards all earthly tribulations, the constant references 
to a better situation in the future and to the purity of the heart which the 
Moravians inculcate in the slaves are direct moral precepts. The slaves 
are led to feel less dissatisfied with their fate and thereby adjust better to 
the course of their lives.248 
The accumulated effect, then, of the commissions plan to reinstate the 
natural order of the slave population through the abolition of the Atlantic 
slave trade and the improvement of the conditions of slavery, was presented 
as a much more efficient police of slave society than the power of planters’ 
domestic sovereignty. The security of the slave population that the 
commission was promoting would also be “a security of life” for the white 
community “based on love and trust, which is incomparably more 
productive than controlling the slaves only by force.”249 
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Biopolitics and the Problematics of Slavery  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, it has become common practice 
among historians to argue that the liberal modifications of governmentality 
in the colonies either did not take place or were dislocated by the racial 
ideologies of colonial governments that were not able to recognize 
indigenous subjects’ potential for self-government. By virtue of their 
perceived racial deficits, colonized peoples could not be governed with 
liberal governmental techniques. This chapter has shown that such a 
demarcation, at least in regard to the government of slavery in the Danish 
West Indies, will have to be qualified. Instead of distinguishing between 
liberal and despotic techniques of government, the chapter has attempted to 
loosely ascertain the character and function of the dispositifs at play in the 
government of slavery. Specifically the dispositifs of security have been 
accentuated. For Foucault, dispositifs of security were crucial to the 
execution of liberal governmentality. However, when liberalism is 
defined—as it was by Foucault—as a technology of power, and not 
fundamentally a political ideology, the problem of colonial liberalism 
becomes less a discussion of universal freedoms and more a question of 
particular governmental techniques. Here is how Foucault explains 
liberalism as a technology of power: 
The idea of a government of men that would think first of all and 
fundamentally of the nature of things and no longer of man’s evil nature, 
the idea of an administration of things that would think before all else of 
men’s freedom, of what they want to do, of what they have an interest in 
doing, and of what they think about doing, are all correlative elements. A 
physics of power, or a power thought of as physical action in the element 
of nature, and a power thought of as regulation that can only be carried 
out through and by reliance on the freedom of each, is, I think, something 
absolutely fundamental.250 
The chapter has aptly shown that this physics of power that relied on the 
interests, desires, and choices of men did indeed develop in the theoretical 
government of slave society in the Danish West Indies.  
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The image that the chapter presents of colonial government in the 
Danish West Indies is one in which security is a pivotal object. Security in 
several meanings of the term. Of course, the immediately necessary security 
of the colonial territory against possible invaders, against competing 
imperial states, are of great importance to colonial government. Just as 
important is the internal security against the colonized, the dangers of revolt 
by slave populations that formed a constant risk for the survival of the 
colonial state. But perhaps the most valued object of colonial security was 
the security of economic and mercantile activity that in most colonial 
settings was the primary purpose of the colonial endeavor itself. The object 
of colonial government and the legitimacy of the colonial state was 
therefore hinged upon its ability to establish and maintain a sense, an 
assurance, of the existence, of both safety from eminent perils against 
territory and colonizers as well as the endurance of a productive economic 
milieu in which to generate wealth. Colonialism’s security was, then, 
closely tied up with raison d’État. The perseverance and prosperity of the 
state was the main concern of colonial policy. 
What, then, is of great historical interest is the process by which these 
different aspects of a government of security becomes invested in each other 
in new and different ways in the colonial context and particularly the 
context of slavery. The process by which colonial subjects become the 
object of both security against external dangers and part of colonial social 
security. The fact that the regulation and management of colonial subjects 
and populations became essential to the government of state security as well 
as social and economic security is a significant development in the general 
history of governmentality. This chapter has shown that the concept of 
population in the context of slavery combined aspects of social, economic, 
and political problematizations, and that the responses to these problematics 
of government cannot be characterized as strictly juridical, disciplinary, or 
governmental. However, as a consequence of the political constitution of 
plantation colonies, which necessitated a certain “strategical ethics” in the 
consideration of colonial policies, colonial government refrained from a 
detailed regulation of power relations within the confines of slaveholder’s 
domestic sovereignty and rights of property. Instead, we see a strategy of 
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government that relies more on mechanisms of self-interests and the 
physical movements within a domain of reality whose constituent parts 
could be rearranged. This is certainly not the same as saying that the Danish 
West Indian slave society was developing into a liberal society in the sense 
that we might think of it today, but is an argument for the increasing 
application of liberal techniques of government in the management of slave 
society. Not with the intended purpose of increasing civil liberties—that was 
simply one, limited effect—but rather of constructing a more effective 
security of social, economical, and political order. To close off the chapter 
and to once again highlight the correlation between security and population 
I would like to briefly recount the policy towards the government of slaves 
and the increasing population of free people of color in the period between 
the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in 1803 and general emancipation in 
1848. 
The policy towards slavery in the 1820s, 30s, and 40s, was greatly 
influenced by the political tactics of Peter von Scholten (1784-1854). Von 
Scholten was Governor-General from 1827 to 1848, but had held different 
public offices on St. Thomas since 1816.251 Von Scholten is also probably 
the colonial character that is best known by the present day Danish public. 
The figure of von Scholten was portrayed in a 1987 film about his political 
and personal life during the final years of slavery. His popular legacy as the 
governor that ended slavery has assured von Scholten a great deal of 
positive exposure in the public memory of Danish colonialism in the West 
Indies. Historians have had differing views on the stringency of von 
Scholten’s policy towards slavery. To some, von Scholten’s intentions were 
always to bring about the end of slavery, but in a gradual and planned 
manner that assured that individual slaves as well as colonial society in 
general were “prepared” for full emancipation.252 Others have portrayed von 
Scholten’s policy as more contingent upon external developments such as 
slavery’s abolition in the British colonies and public pressure in the 
metropole. According to this line of interpretation, von Scholten’s ambition 
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was to create the framework for a “better” system of slavery, rather than to 
dismantle it all together. Whether idealist or pragmatist, the reforms that von 
Scholten’s government introduced in regard to the conditions of slaves were 
by and large drawn with a similar pen to that which wrote the report by the 
commission on the slave trade in 1792. One that sought to actively rearrange 
the relations of power so that less was determined by the domestic 
sovereignty of slaveholders, and more resided with the choices of 
individuals and the planned campaigns by centralized government.  
The framework of von Scholten’s policy of reform can be ascertained  
early on from his 1827 report on “the constitution of the West Indian 
colonies,” which contained suggestions for changes in the organization of 
the military and police and the rules for trade and commerce, as well as the 
legal position of the colony’s free people of color and the conditions and 
rights of the enslaved population. The document is basically a short treatise 
on the administration of the colonial state, with different arrangements for 
securing the external and internal order. It was also, in practice, von 
Scholten’s job application for the vacant position as Governor-General of 
the Danish West Indies. The report was written specifically with the purpose 
of promoting his candidacy for the office, and was addressed directly to 
King Frederich VI. In his introduction to the newly published version of the 
document, the historian Poul Olsen refers to von Scholten’s address as an 
example of “strategic planning.”253 Despite having the appearance of a 
declaration of intent, many of von Scholten’s plans were actually brought to 
fruition in one form or another during his twenty-one year tenure as 
Governor-General.254  
In regard to the legal rights of the free people of color, von Scholten 
argued in his address that the issue had been made increasingly pertinent by 
the recognition of Haiti as an independent state by France in 1825. This 
development made it a certainty rather than a possibility in the minds of free 
Afro-Caribbeans that they could achieve legal status as citizens. Preparing 
for this certainty by gradually providing such rights and duties could only be 
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considered prudent. To achieve this transition, von Scholten suggested 
incorporating a military system of rank, dividing the free-colored into 
classes according to their present social status, with accompanying rights 
and privileges, through which they could advance depending on their 
“conduct, competence, or standing.”255 The gradual modification that this 
arrangement would provide, would be beneficial to the stated purpose of an 
amicable equalization of the differences in the civil rights of whites and 
free-coloreds by giving the impression of a voluntary and natural transition, 
von Scholten maintained. It would leave the free-colored with the 
perception that the transition was caused not by forced circumstances but 
from the voluntary recognition by the white community of the worth of the 
free-colored as citizens and from “a kindness they [the free-colored] would 
oblige with fidelity, with affection and devotion.”256 Leveling the 
differences of civil rights between whites and free people of color was 
expected to help strengthen the bond between the two communities, through 
a sense of gratitude, but also by establishing a sphere of common interests, 
according to which both parties would find it beneficial to retain the binary 
division in the colony’s force relation between free and slave.  
A similar logic had been put forward during earlier discussions over the 
civil rights of free people of color. In 1817, a commission of metropolitan 
legal scholars produced a report on the issue of free people of color’s civil 
rights and to which extent they should be equal to those of Europeans. The 
commission had been established with the purpose of ascertaining the 
legitimacy of the demands for legal equality that a delegation of free people 
of color from the Danish West Indies had brought forward in a petition to 
the King in 1816. The commission was divided on the interpretation of the 
juridical basis for their recommendations, but essentially agreed that the 
differential legal status of free people of color did not go against the existing 
legislation for the government of the colony. And in general, the free people 
of color already enjoyed de facto equality under the present legal conditions. 
Legal inequalities were for the most part a matter of formality rather than 
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substance. The commission did, however, recommend a reorganization of 
the legislation pertaining to slaves and free people of color so that it 
reflected more accurately the current conditions of the colony. 
In reaction to the commission’s recommendation, Minister of Justice, F. 
J. Kaas, made it clear that he viewed the issue as not merely a juridical 
problem of equal civil rights, but necessarily a problem of state security and 
public order. Free people of color already enjoyed a numerical superiority in 
the colony: The number of free men of color (2984) outnumbered the 
number of white males (2594). The idea that the free-colored community 
could be kept in subordination to the white community indefinitely through 
sheer “physical and moral power” seemed illusory to Minister Kaas. 
Instead, Kaas thought it imperative that the interests of free people of color 
and of whites would be closer aligned so that free Afro-Caribbeans would 
not take advantage of their numerical superiority and topple the current 
regime of white privilege.  
Justice as much as statecraft demands precautionary measures with the 
objective of bringing the free colored and the whites closer together, as 
well as distancing them from the negroes, so that their interest becomes 
inseparable from that of the whites, and are placed in opposition to the 
inclination and aspiration of the negroes towards the acquisition of 
dominion.257 
Much like von Scholten a decade later, Kaas argued for constructing an 
alliance of the free by granting free Afro-Caribbeans considerable equality 
while still retaining certain differences between the races. 
In 1831 von Scholten announced that King Frederik VI had approved his 
plan to reorganize the civil status of the colony’s free inhabitants of color 
that he had presented to the King the previous year, and that the King had 
given him a mandate to implement the plan’s measures into law.258 Similar 
to his 1826 report, von Scholten proposed to divide the free colored 
inhabitants into two “divisions,” the first division being further divided into 
three “classes.” The plan suggested that it was possible to advance through 
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this hierarchy, through a strategically appropriate procreation and 
improvement of conduct, to a point when free persons of color would 
transgress the boundary of color and be registered as “white inhabitants”: 
Where free persons of color, of both sexes assimilate in color to the 
whites, and they otherwise, by a cultivated mind and good conduct render 
themselves deserving to stand, according to their rank and station in life, 
on an equal footing with the white inhabitants, all the difference, which 
the color now causes ought to cease. The right of deciding hereon, must 
be left with the Governor General, who also will direct the names of such 
persons to be struck off the protocols for the registry of the free colored 
population, and to be entered, as white inhabitants, in the congregation to 
which they belong.259 
It was clear that the issue of equality for free Afro-Caribbeans was not 
solely a matter of legal rights. The increasing number of emancipated 
inhabitants proposed a problematic of social security. The free colored 
inhabitants constituted a problematic social group whose conduct would 
have to be checked. The hypothetical risk of conspiracies between enslaved  
and freed people of color presented one reason for their regulation. But 
another more definite problem was the issue of occupation. Once freedom 
had been granted, it was not at all certain that said freedom would be 
administrated in a responsible and productive manner. Von Scholten’s plan, 
which presented itself as a step towards racial equality among the colony’s 
free inhabitants, was for all intended purposes a police measure to regulate a 
dynamic and unpredictable social group that constituted a risk to social 
order. 
In regard to the majority of the population who were still enslaved, von 
Scholten followed a policy of amelioration in terms of slaves’ conditions 
and an increased intervention of government in the health of slaves. Niklas 
Thode Jensen has shown that government authorities became increasingly 
involved in the regulation of the health of slaves in the period after the 
abolition of Atlantic slave trade.260 This development signals that the 
calculated effects of ending the slave trade had not come to pass in the 
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manner that government authorities had expected. Removing the possibility 
of exporting new slaves had not lead to a corresponding investment by 
slave-holders in establishing better conditions, in terms of health and 
provisions, for their slaves, allowing for the natural processes of population 
towards an increase of its numbers. Accordingly, government authorities 
began introducing counter-acting measures, such as prescribing minimum 
standards for slaves’ rations, which Jensen claims that authorities were able 
to uphold a relatively high degree.261 In a similar manner, a system of 
vaccination was also introduced in this period. The primary object of the 
new system was the slave population. The Landfysikus was put in charge of 
facilitating the vaccination of every slave on the islands. Individual slaves 
were instructed to present themselves at specific locations at a given time 
where they would be vaccinated and subsequently examined by the 
Landfysikus. Several sanctions were put in place to persuade as many 
planters as possible to cooperate with the authorities and secure their slaves’ 
participation in the vaccination program.262 Finally, the medical field of 
obstetrics became another avenue of government intervention towards 
improving the conditions of the slave population. It was geared towards 
improving slaves’ reproductive capacity and minimize the high level of 
child mortality that was devastating the demographic constitution of the 
slave population. Compared to the vaccination campaigns and the 
maintenance of minimum rations, the campaign to introduce a corps of 
trained midwives to the repository of medical practitioners in the colony’s 
plantations relied more on the planters’ self-interests for its implementation. 
The prospective midwives were to be found among the existing slaves on 
the plantation, and the cost of their training was to be covered by the 
plantation proprietor. The success of the midwife program was thus reliant 
on planters’ evaluation of the program’s prospects to the economy of their 
plantations.263     
Theses campaigns for the health of slaves aimed to promote a certain 
standard of slave management. They also expanded the scope of 
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consequences if that norm was not adhered to. No longer was it simply the 
physical mobility of slaves that were threatened by planters’ excessive 
punishments and mistreatment. What was now at stake was the health of 
slaves. A concept that applied itself to something more than the sufferings 
of individuals. ‘Health’ as a governmental concept was considered a 
correlate of ‘population’ and as such fell under the responsibility and 
authority of state officials. It provided incentive and legitimacy for 
governmental intervention in planters’ management of their chattel slaves. 
In terms of governmental principles the security of population trumped the 
inviolability of property rights. 
The conservation of population was, however, simultaneously a 
conservation of production. Louis Rothe, a magistrate in the West Indian 
High Court, affirmed the causal relationship between population and 
production in a report on the conditions of population in the Danish West 
Indies in 1847. At that time, it had become evident that emancipation in the 
Danish colonies was inevitable, and on 28 July 1847 it was made public that  
slavery would be gradually dismantled over a period of twelve years.264 The 
objective of Rothe’s report was to account for the projected consequences of 
emancipation on the conditions of production for the Danish West Indies 
based on an evaluation of the outcome of emancipation in the British 
colonies. His immediate conclusion was that the process of emancipation in 
the British colonies had shown a direct causal relation between the size of 
the population, relative to the cultivable and inhabitable area of a colony, 
and the subsequent level of production. An increase of the population was 
equal to an increase in production.265 Thus, every measure that would 
contribute to the increase of the colonies population would be beneficial to 
the colonial economy. The campaigns for the health of the slaves and von 
Scholten’s ameliorating reforms was, thus, mentioned by Rothe as 
exemplary governmental initiatives in regard to preserving the long-term 
productive capabilities of the colony. 
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Many of von Scholten’s reforms had not, however, been directly 
targeted the health of the population as much as it targeted the subjectivity 
of the enslaved and freed population of color. In a series of ordinances and 
resolutions in the 1830s and 1840s, the conditions of slaves and the 
regulation of those conditions were given considerable alterations. In 1830, 
the ability of slaves, under specific circumstances, to give testimony in a 
court of law was officially recognized.266 In 1834 and again in 1840, slaves’ 
right to personal property was recognized.267 The ordinance of 1 May 1840 
also confirmed the right of slaves to purchase their freedom as well as the 
freedom of their children. In 1843, it was declared that slaves were to be 
exempt from work on Saturdays. The same decree also increased the 
colonial government’s authority to oversee and regulate owners treatment of 
their slaves in general and particularly in regard to the punishment of 
slaves.268 This expansion of the freedom of slaves was extended by the 
resolution of 27 July 1847, wherein King Christian VIII declared that all 
children born by slaves would from that day on be considered free. The 
resolution thus represented the culmination of von Scholten’s project of 
adjusting the enslaved population to a condition of freedom, which could be 
said to have been inaugurated by the substitution of the term “slave” in 
official correspondence and records with the term “unfree [ufri]” in 1840. A 
similar change of nomenclature had been suggested by von Scholten as 
early as 1827 in his account of the constitution of the West Indian colonies, 
in which he argued for the substitution of “slave” with either “field negro” 
or “house negro.”269 Theses terms, von Scholten assumed, did not carry the 
same demeaning connotation that “slave” supposedly did. Furthermore, he 
foresaw that by applying a more “lenient” term, the treatment of slaves 
would become correspondingly more “kind.”270  
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Von Scholten’s reorganization of the conditions of slavery, thus, 
expressed a paradoxical approach, in that it seemed to attempt to appropriate 
for the condition of slavery the properties of freedom. The truths about the 
natural orders of economy and population that were made apparent by the 
science of political economy, to a certain degree, rendered slavery untenable 
as a governmental strategy. That is not to say that the Atlantic slave trade 
was abolished simply because Adam Smith proclaimed that slave labor was 
uneconomic, or that Thomas Malthus made comments about the unnatural 
conditions of population, which were caused by the slave trade. The point is 
rather to argue that as the bond between the social and human sciences of 
economy, demography, and medicine and the art of government grew 
increasingly stronger during the second half of the eighteenth century, any 
governmental strategy, colonial or metropolitan, was obliged to give 
consideration not only to the 'traditional' tools of governmental regulation, 
i.e. laws and ordinances, but increasingly turn to techniques and 
mechanisms prescribed by the political economists. To a certain degree, this 
required an intensification of government's regulation of slaves' daily lives. 
It meant making the more intimate aspects of slaves' lives accessible to 
government, and thereby limiting the absolute sovereignty of slave-owners 
over their property. Simultaneously, the policy suggestions of political 
economists relied on the increased autonomy of the governed. The key to an 
economic society and a productive population was the property of oneself 
and the freedom to choose how to make the most of ones life and labor. The 
level of actual choice in the lives of individual slaves would have to be 
increased if the colony was to be governed in the most economic manner. 
Naturally, such a policy would undermine the structure of slavery that rested 
on the absolute subjugation of slaves to their masters, leading eventually to 
the general emancipation of the colony's slaves. But this outcome seems 
perfectly reasonable if one accepts the premise that the principle problem 
facing colonial governmentality was indeed slavery itself. 
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Chapter Four 
Punishment, Natures, Race 
 
 
So you can see that within a single historical reality you may very well 
find two entirely different types of rationality and political calculation.271 
 
 
In 1866, the seventeen-year-old African-Caribbean field laborer, Joseph 
Henry Dennis, was carried across the Atlantic on the ship, Johan 
Brodersen.272 He was being transported from St. Croix to Copenhagen to 
serve a nine year sentence of correctional labor [forbedringshusarbeide] in 
Christianshavn prison. Colonial authorities considered Dennis “despite his 
youth, a particularly corrupted individual”273 and an “incorrigible thief.”274 
Since arriving on St. Croix from Barbados in 1859 he had been convicted a 
total of eight times. Three times for illegal termination of labor and five 
times for counts of theft. When he received his ninth and final conviction, 
he was already serving a sentence of three years correctional labor on St. 
Croix.275 Because of his criminal record, Dennis faced deportation upon 
completion of his prison sentence.276 Dennis’ ninth conviction and 
subsequent transportation followed a series of thefts that he had committed 
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after escaping incarceration on St. Croix. Dennis’ repeated escapes as well 
as the now substantial length of his sentence (the remainder of the three 
years plus the additional six years) had convinced the colonial authorities 
that it was necessary for Dennis to be transport to Denmark and imprisoned 
there.277 
There were additional reasons, though, for transporting Dennis. Colonial 
authorities viewed his criminal behavior as a product of the West Indian 
environment. If he was allowed to return to the circumstances that produced 
his delinquency, the authorities surmised, Dennis would forever constitute a 
considerable danger to society.278 If, however, Dennis were imprisoned in a 
penitentiary facility in Denmark “where care could be given to his education 
and beneficial influence,” and upon his release “could be placed in 
conditions, very different to West Indian,” colonial authorities expected that 
Dennis could still amount to a “good and productive person.”279  
As Dennis served his sentence in Christianshavn prison, the facility’s 
personnel seemed to share the same aspirations for Dennis’ potential for 
improvement that colonial authorities had shown. Particularly the prison 
chaplain, Vilhelm Munck, had observed great improvement in Dennis’ 
behavior, but only when confined to isolation. At their first encounter in 
1868 Dennis had presented himself to the prison chaplain as bared of any 
education and moral concept. However, the six months of solitary 
confinement, which initiated every sentence of correctional labor at that 
time, had “produced some degree of calmness in the mind” of “this 
delinquent and ignorant negro.” According to the prison chaplain, isolation 
had made Dennis “much more docile than before,” and he had been able to 
teach him some reading, writing, and math. But as soon as Dennis was 
reintroduced into the prison’s communal work regime where he could not 
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undergo the same regular instruction, the chaplain had observed, “his feisty 
temper and vindictive nature” would return to him. The prison chaplain was 
convinced that only the rigorous and regular instruction that the ‘separate 
system’ of imprisonment could provide would produce positive results for 
Dennis’ improvement. Accordingly, in 1870, the director of Christianshavn 
Prison and the prison chaplain requested that Dennis be transferred to 
Vridsløselille penitentiary.280 Vridsløselille had been constructed in 1859 
and was modeled on the ‘Pennsylvania system’ or ‘separate system’ of 
cellular isolation complete with a panoptic architecture.281 West Indian 
convicts were not usually referred to institutions of such rigorous 
penitentiary treatment. 
Dennis was not sent to Vridsløselille. Instead he was transferred to 
Viborg prison with the rest of Christianhavn’s male inmates when that 
prison was converted to an all female institution in 1870. On the request of 
the prison inspector and chaplain at Viborg, Dennis was later pardoned. 
Since Dennis had been born on Barbados he was considered a British 
subject and was subsequently transferred to England where he arrived in 
Hull in April 1872. According to chaplain Munck’s memoirs, Dennis spent 
the next twenty-four years in and out of prisons and mental institutions in 
Britain and Denmark until was provided passage to St. Croix in 1896 
through the aid of Munck.282 
The circumstances of Joseph Dennis’ incarceration suggests that a whole 
range of punitive logics were being activated in regard to the problem of 
crime in post-emancipation Danish West India. The biography of Joseph 
Henry Dennis’ imprisonment sketches out the contours of a punitive regime 
and logic in the Danish West Indies that is unlike existing depictions of 
colonial systems of punishment. And it unsettles the way we often think of 
punitive strategies and rationalities in colonial contexts. It does so by 
simultaneously affirming and dismantling that which could be considered 
specifically colonial about Dennis’ imprisonment. The colonial milieu was 
                                                
 
280 Central Government Archives, The Central Directorate for the Colonies, Prisons and 
prison system 1848-1905, 912, A.F. Krieger to the Ministry of Finance, 13 September 1870 
281 (Smith 2003, pp. 16-27) 
282 (Munck 1972, pp. 139-149) 
 
 
127 
diagnosed as the root cause of Dennis’ inability to fulfill his otherwise 
promising potential and relieving him of that influence would result in his 
moral improvement. Due to the punitive hierarchy of the Danish imperial 
state, the colonial delinquent found himself transferred to a Danish 
penitentiary, embedded in a disciplinary apparatus with an intensity beyond 
what colonial penal structures could assemble. The case, thus, illustrates the 
blurred boundaries between colonial and metropolitan punitive space that 
existed in at least some registers of punitive and juridical discourse and 
practice regarding West Indian criminals. It highlights the deficiencies of 
presupposing the dichotomy of colony and metropole as separate objects of 
analysis. 
Dennis’ case also displays the limited capability of Danish West Indian 
prisons to maintain a contained punitive space. Prison labor was often 
carried out outside the prison walls, renovating town streets and buildings, 
maintaining roads, and other public work. The fact that much of the 
convicts’ time was spent outside the confines of the prison itself, meant that 
opportunities for escape were plenty. Similarly, rehabilitative aspirations 
were difficult to realize in the Danish West Indian Jails. As the colonial 
authorities had made clear in their motivations for transferring Dennis, the 
possibility of his reform seemed nonexistent if he was to remain on St. 
Croix. Only the more sophisticated treatment of Dennis in prisons in 
Denmark could potentially facilitate his rebirth as a productive and morally 
adept individual. 
Dennis’ experience of imprisonment certainly was not representative of 
the average offender’s encounter with the colonial punitive system. The 
majority of the colony’s prisoners passed through one of the smaller jails 
and lock-ups while serving short-term sentences (a few weeks to a few 
months) for smaller offenses of public disorderliness, vagrancy, etc. 
Nevertheless, the transfer of West Indian convicts to Denmark remained a 
peculiarly persistent practice when taking into consideration the general 
opposition against its continuation shown by colonial and metropolitan 
authorities alike. From 1840 to 1860 twenty-four prisoners had been 
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transferred to Danish prisons.283 The West Indian prisoner Cristian Thomas, 
also known as Blackback, was imprisoned a total of three times in Denmark. 
First in 1839 for one year, then again in 1844 for five years, and finally in 
1852 on a sentence of eight years of hard labor [tugthusarbejde], during 
which he was transferred back to the West Indies in 1854 due to health 
issues. As a result of his three convictions, Christian Thomas had traversed 
approximately 45.600 kilometers as part of his imprisonment.284 
Many years later, in 1903, a report was completed by a commission that 
had been appointed to give general recommendations to the balancing of 
colonial budgets as well as improving the general conditions of governance, 
society, industry, and commerce in the Danish West Indies. The report’s 
comments on the system of imprisonment on the Islands was a stark contrast 
to the fragmented experience of Joseph Henry Dennis. The commission-
report applauded that as a general rule the transfer of West Indian prisoners 
to Denmark had by then been terminated. They then went on to state that 
“[s]erving of [prison] sentences in the Danish West Indian Islands is to be 
considered efficient, in accordance with the tropical climate there, and 
lastly, advantageous to the general public … .”285 Consequently, the 
commission members did not have any further suggestions for improving 
the conditions of imprisonment in the Danish West Indies. Despite the 
claims of the 1903 commission-report, the transfer of prisoners to Denmark 
was not completely discontinued. In a communication to the members of a 
similar commission in 1916, the director of Horsens Prison in Denmark 
could report that three West Indian convicts were serving life sentences in 
Horsens. All of them had received their verdicts by West Indian courts after 
1902.286 So while the frequency of transfers declined towards the end of the 
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nineteenth century, the West Indian inmates were imprisoned in Denmark 
until the very end of Danish colonial rule in the West Indies. 
The system of imprisonment in the West Indies was very different from 
what Joseph Henry Dennis had been subjected to during his time in 
Denmark. The convicts were put to use in a verity of ways, inside as well as 
outside of the prison. The majority worked on repairs, maintenance, and 
cleaning of public streets, roads, grounds, facilities, and buildings. Some 
were engaged with grass cutting, planting, and cultivating public grounds, 
and still some attended to the renovation and digging of pauper’s graves. 
Those convicts that for reasons of age or health, or were considered a risk to 
the public, were not able to work outside the prison were put to work in 
different ways in their cells, such as carpenter work and coir picking. The 
commission remarked that up until then there had been plenty of work for 
the prisoners and there was no reason to assume that the future would prove 
any different. The application of convict labour had the benefit of reducing 
the costs of the prison system and public expenditure in general.287 When 
the commission report referred to the advantages that the West Indian prison 
system afforded “the general public,” it seems likely that it was referring to 
the savings to the public budget that the labor of the inmates produced. It 
was the ‘free’ and available work force rather than the rehabilitated 
delinquent that was proving beneficial to the public. 
The divide between these two conceptualizations of the purpose and 
function of imprisonment—from the reform of Dennis in 1866 to the public 
labor of inmates in 1903—is considerable. Yet they both articulate a 
response to the problem of crime in the colony and speak to a contemporary 
conception of the colonial condition. The transportation of Dennis was 
carried out with the stated purpose of excluding him from Danish West 
Indian society, thereby configuring the punitive regime to separate the 
criminal from the colonial milieu that was considered to be the cause of his 
criminal behavior. But it was done so with a persistent penitentiary ethos of 
the criminal’s rehabilitation. The colonial authorities’ transfer of Dennis to 
Prisons in Denmark, thus, coupled a strategy of exclusion with the 
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disciplinary techniques of rehabilitation and inclusion. Contrasting Dennis’ 
penitentiary transportation, by which the colonial subject became inscribed 
in a metropolitan reformatory mechanism, we find the strategy of adaptation 
that the commission report reflects. By ‘adaptation’ I am referring to a penal 
policy that seeks to adapt the prison system to the perceived circumstances 
of colonial society in terms of particular character of its average prison 
population, its climate, and its social-economic conditions. Here we find a 
system of imprisonment that constructed the inmate as a object of public 
economy rather than a subject of disciplinary rehabilitation. It conformed 
penal practice to particularly colonial conditions rather than intervene and 
adjust the conditions of criminality itself. 
The transfer of Joseph Henry Dennis and the commission-report’s 
affirmation of the appropriateness of local imprisonment provides a brief 
archeological analysis of the discontinuities of punishment in the Danish 
West Indies during the second half of the nineteenth century. The analysis 
depicts the many rationalities at play in the management of punishment in 
regard to criminality in the colonial context. Dennis’ exclusion-treatment 
and the commission’s insistence on public labor reflects the diversified 
economy of power and the overlapping dispositifs that emanated from the 
problem of crime and the potential of punishment in the governance of the 
Danish West Indies. Yet the two events also reflect a shared consideration 
for the ‘order’ of the colonial milieu. They both represent strategies to act 
upon the colonial social and economic order, and attempts to ascertain the 
‘proper’ or ‘natural’ conditions of punishment in regard to the colonial 
order. The question of how this conceptualization of “the proper conditions” 
of colonial imprisonment in the Danish West Indies was constructed and 
activated is what this chapter seeks to illuminate.  
As an initial observation, at least two interpretations of the shift in the 
policy of punishment can be considered. Firstly, there is the explanation that 
lends itself to the combined influence of racist sentiments and science as 
well as the budgetary limitations of the colonial state. These factors are 
often usual suspects when the causality of the deficiencies and 
maliciousness of colonial policies is examined. And for good reason that is. 
Studies of colonial prison systems in different colonial contexts have shown 
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that race and insufficient funds were indeed important factors in shaping 
colonial prisons in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.288 There is no 
reason to assume that the same was not the case in the Danish West Indies. 
These are factors that could be said to be internal conditions of the colonial 
situation. A second interpretation, however, that calls attention to external 
developments in the area of penology and penal policy at an international 
scale could also be of importance. Several studies have concluded that the 
formation of penological science and penitentiary principles, like other areas 
of social reform in the nineteenth century, was an inherently transnational 
process.289 Yet, the correlation between this international agenda of prison 
reform and the development of colonial punishment remains unstudied. 
While the direct management of imprisonment was driven by prison 
administrators, and concrete penal policies were determined by government 
officials, the overall guidelines, principles, and rationality of imprisonment 
was forged within an international community of penological experts. It is 
necessary to consider the development of a general discourse of penitentiary 
science in order to understand the emergence of the colonial prison as a 
distinct field of governance beyond the immediate factors of limited budgets 
and racial assumptions.  
In this chapter, I would like to consider the possible cross-fertilization 
between these two interpretations. I will not be able to determine any exact 
causality, but the chapter will show how the techniques of colonial 
government both reflected and rejected the ideal of social improvement in 
regard to the purpose of imprisonment in the case of West Indian convicts, 
thus establishing a constant ambiguity of governmentality. 
In doing so, the chapter begins by framing the ethos of penitentiary 
punishment and highlighting its transnational character. It then focuses on 
elements of the penitentiary discourse that address the problematic of 
applying penitentiary principles to a variety of contexts. Finally, the chapter 
focuses in on the specific case of prisons and punishment in the Danish 
West Indies.  
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Networks of Prison Science 
Throughout the nineteenth century, social scientists, liberal reformers, and 
government administrators were engaged in an ongoing exploration of the 
problems and potentials of the penitentiary prison. The prison represented a 
powerful technique to prevent crime and reform criminals, vagrants, idlers, 
and delinquents.290 As such, the penitentiary and its corollary technology of 
discipline reflected what Foucault termed a redistribution of “the economy 
of punishment.”291 This development was not limited to Europe and North 
America, but influenced state formation and social policies across the 
globe.292 
The 'prison problem' or 'prison potential' was indeed impossible to 
ignore by any government aspiring to govern its population according to the 
conventions of liberal government that was gaining dominance within an 
increasing international community of 'modern' states. To ignore the prison 
question was to ignore the potential of societal progress and prosperity. This 
was especially pertinent for colonial governments, faced with the self-
imposed task of cultivating the potentials of foreign populations whose 
susceptibility to influences of progress, culture, and civilization, they 
viewed as impaired or obscured by racially determined traits and centuries 
of despotic rule.293 
The movement of penal reform from the 1760s onward294 was 
characteristically transnational. One of the earliest attempts to bring 
attention to the conditions of jails and workhouses, and formulate that 
problem as a reflection of a society’s state of civilization, enlightenment, 
and legitimacy was the work of British reformer John Howard.295 His 
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criticism was based on a sojourn through the states of Europe, visiting as 
many jails, lock-ups, and workhouses as possible. His review of Europe’s 
facilities of incarceration was disparaging to say the least.296 Howard’s 
efforts were part of a general spirit of reform and humanism and it found a 
receptive audience in the public opinion of Europe’s emerging civil 
societies. Howard and his peers were the practitioners of the political 
philosophies of authors such as Beccaria and Bentham that re-articulated the 
economy of punishment in accordance with the principle of utility at the end 
of the eighteenth century.297 During the nineteenth century, the role of 
prisons as correctional institutions of criminal behavior would be heavily 
discussed and prioritized by European, North American, and all other 
governments that sought a claim to civilization, modernity, and humanism. 
The processes of legislative and organizational reform that followed 
Howard’s efforts also took on a transnational approach. In France, 
legislators wanting to compile a basis of experiences upon which to decide 
on the organization of a national prison system, contracted Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont in 1831 to conduct a study of the 
new penitentiary systems in the United States. Out of this assignment 
Tocqueville and Beaumont authored the now famous work On the 
Penitentiary System in the United States, and Its Application in France298. 
The process helped spark Tocqueville’s interests for American society, 
which later lead him to produce his enormously influential works on 
democracy in the United States. Also in 1831, British authorities dispatched 
William Crawford on a similar mission.299 They were followed by Canadian 
and German representatives in 1834.300 From 1841 to 1842, the members of 
a commission tasked by the Danish King to consider the most advantageous 
form of organizing the Danish prison system likewise traveled to the United 
States to study the many prison systems of European and North American 
states.301 Following the investigations of the Danish commission, the 
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deliberations and debates on penal reform culminated with the building of 
two new correctional facilities based on the two competing North American 
penitentiary systems. Vridsløselille Penitentiary, build in 1859, was based 
on the ‘Philadelphia system,’ or seperate system, that relied upon rigorous 
isolation, surveillance, and religious influence to successfully reform the 
delinquents that were sent there. Horsens Prison, which was inaugurated in 
1853, on the other hand, was designed according to the ‘Auburn system,’ or 
associate system, which prioritized the influence of coordinated hard labour 
over isolation, but still emphasized the separation of prisoners in single cells 
at night as well as religious and educational elements.302 The processes of 
national prison reforms, thus, had clearly been transnational in their 
accumulation of knowledge and previous experiences. 
The transnational practice of prison reform became the basis of a new 
discipline of prison science that developed during the nineteenth century in 
correlation with the political and juridical projects of penal reform. This was 
a science of principles and methods to reform and rehabilitate the criminal 
offender.303 Its theories were based on a process of continual 
experimentation; the prison constituted a controlled environment where 
experiments in reformation of offenders could be conducted without 
interference of external effects. Of course, the analogy between prison and 
laboratory was false and the human experiment of criminal rehabilitation 
never yielded consistent results. Indeed, the continual ‘failure’ of the 
prison’s intended purpose of eliminating criminality became the most 
important dynamic in the constant epistemological evolution of prison 
knowledge. As Patricia O’brien has remarked: “The new punishment was 
not a monument but a process.”304 The science of the prison was only made 
more pertinent by the intangibility of its object. 
The historian Martina Henze divides this long formulation of a prison 
science into three stages. Beginning with an ’informal’ “discursive phase” 
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were a circle of philanthropists such as John Howard would visit various 
prisons and correspond about their findings; followed by a “network-phase” 
that saw the development of more formal transnational networks of 
specialists with corresponding journals and hand-books on prisons; 
culminating in the “congress-phase,” establishing itself as a semi-official 
organization centered on large-scale international conferences.305 A series of 
international penitentiary congresses that convened a total of eleven times 
between 1872 and 1935 and the establishment of an international 
commission on prisons at the penitentiary congress of 1872 in London 
embodied this development. The congress in London embraced the format 
that the discipline of prison science was shaped and disseminated as a 
consultative and comparative exchange of models and systems, experiments 
and techniques. The penitentiary science “saw itself as an entirely practice-
based discipline”306 that operated on the basis of experience and 
observation. 
The total number of participants for the first congress in 1872 was 
estimated to be no less than 400, comprising twenty different nationalities. 
Some delegates were representing their national governments, while others 
were representing state governments in the case of the North American 
representatives or colonial governments in the case of representatives from 
India and Australia. There were also delegates from national committees, 
prison societies, specific reformatory and penitentiary institutions, and 
university departments.307 As a whole, this mass of delegates, brought 
together at the congress, in the wording of the report, constituted 
a reunion of specialists—men and women largely devoted to prison-
work, whether in the investigation of the principles of penitentiary 
science or in their practical application and embodying, representatively, 
the knowledge, experience, and wisdom of the world on the subjects to 
which its labors were dedicated.308  
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The purpose of their meeting was to advance penitentiary practice, as Enoch 
Wines recorded in his report: “[a]ll will go back to their respective fields, to 
work with greater earnestness and higher hope from the strength and 
courage received from such communion.”309 
For the organizers, this format of large-scale international congresses 
provide an essential catalyst for the potential of social progress that 
penitentiary prison systems entailed. To illustrate this, as well as the 
correlation between international penitentiary reform, cultivation of 
‘civilization,’ and material wealth, it is worth here to quote the french jurist, 
penal reform advocate, and Inspecteur Général des Prisons from 1830 to 
1865, Charles Lucas. Prior to the meeting of the first International 
Penitentiary Congress in 1872, Lucas gave a paper before the French 
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. In the talk, Lucas said of 
international congresses that 
[t]hey are the necessary consequence of the two laws of the sociability 
and perfectibility of man, which, at the present advanced stage of our 
civilization, demand the international exchange of ideas to promote the 
moral progress of humanity, as they do that of material products to 
advance the public wealth. Such congresses serve to show the condition 
of different nations as regards their intellectual development, in the same 
manner as industrial exhibitions show the comparative results of their 
economic development.310   
In this quote, Lucas pointed out the practical connection between promoting 
moral progress and advancing public wealth. The two registers of 
governmental purpose were inseparable, and the practice that facilitated 
both was the international exchange of ideas. 
The format of the congress was precisely built around the concept of 
exchange and consultation. The proceedings of the congress would follow 
three distinct formats of presentation and exchange. Firstly, the different 
representatives reported on the state of the prison system in the country they 
represented. Secondly, the delegates at the congress deliberated and 
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discussed the array of questions and issues that had been raised. And thirdly, 
delegates would give a range of papers on specific penitentiary topics. The 
productions of the congresses—the papers, deliberations, and reports by 
individual representatives—were formulated as consensual positions and 
recommendations of the congress as a collective body of experts in 
conclusions of the official reports. As such, the published deliberations of 
the international prison congresses can be taken to be reflective of a set of 
common considerations that were shared and discussed by the 
representatives of the many attending states, and were formulated to at least 
give a perception of a coherent program of penitentiary practice. Wines 
described in his report the gathering and exchange of the vast amount of 
information on the world’s different prison systems as unprecedented and 
one of the most important results of the congress. It was expected that the 
deliberations of the congress would have a tangible effect on the 
penitentiary efforts of different governments:  
The vast fund of precious information thus accumulated will be diffused, 
through the agency of the congress, to the utmost limits of civilization. It 
is to be presumed that the official delegates will all make reports to the 
governments by which they were commissioned, all of which reports 
will, no doubt, be published among the archives of the governments to 
which they are made, and will thus not only be circulated among the 
people of all civilized countries, but will come under the special notice of 
the makers and executors of the laws of those countries.311 
The purpose of the exchange of ideas and experiences was, thus, to 
streamline penitentiary practice. Following the conclusion of each congress 
a report of the proceedings was published, either as an independent 
publication or via the congresses’ official journal, Acts de Congrès 
Pénitentiaires Internationaux, that included sections on suggestions and 
recommendations. The function of the congresses was not just to provide a 
forum of exchange, but to render into authoritative principles the many local 
practices of prison managers. The international congresses were, then, sites 
of evaluation and scientific authorization to the extent that through the 
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medium of exchange the congress deliberations either verified or refuted 
practices of prison management as being in accordance with the principles 
of penitentiary punishment. Since the principles that formed the basis for the 
evaluation of specific prison practices were themselves the product of the 
congresses’ deliberations, the validity of principles was continually 
negotiated and questioned. The production of the congresses unfolded as a 
chase for universal applicability that was fueled by a continuous 
amalgamation of practical exceptions. Thus, the function of the congress 
was not merely to evaluate different prison practices, but to innovate and 
foster the development of new and improved systems of punishment. 
 
World Markets, Global Reform 
The activities of nineteenth-century social reformers were also 
representative of a general tendency of liberalism to expand its domain of 
intervention to include the international scale. In The Birth of Biopolitics 
lectures Foucault discussed how the discovery of world markets reoriented 
the conceptions of economy and society, its structure, boundaries, and 
dynamics. In terms of economic rationality, Foucault drew attention to the 
emergence of the idea of European progress as opposed to the idea of 
European equilibrium. This idea that emerged within the economic thought 
of the physiocrats and Adam Smith put an end to the conception of 
European economic relations as a zero sum game with a finite amount of 
wealth and replaced it with a potential for continual growth. The newfound 
possibilities of infinite wealth and progress was only accessible through the 
conception of a global market, however, which Europe would have to 
engage, structure, and appropriate. The idea of European progress through 
global markets was thereby accompanied by “a new form of political 
calculation on an international scale.”312 Foucault found examples of this 
new governmental rationality, which applied itself to a global scale, in the 
history of maritime law and the tactics of eighteenth-century projects for 
peace and international organization.313 This conception of “the position of 
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Europe as a region of unlimited economic development in relation to a 
world market” was for Foucault one of the fundamental features of 
liberalism.314 
Despite the distinctly economic vocabulary of this feature of liberalism 
that Foucault identifies, it is of importance to our present objective of 
determining the role of penitentiary science in the calculation of penal 
government in the Danish West Indies. The implications of liberalism’s 
discovery of the potentially unlimited progress that is imbedded within 
Europe’s relation to a world market, reaches beyond its immediate 
economic and political connotations. With the emergence of the idea of a 
world market, and the opening up of the ‘economic game’ unto the world 
market, the position of Europe becomes clearly differentiated from the rest 
of the world. Europe holds a privileged position in this relation: “[T]here 
will be Europe on one side, with Europeans as the players, and then the 
world on the other, which will be the stake. The game is in Europe, but the 
stake is the world.”315 
Following the discovery of world markets, the mechanisms of security 
that served as inducements of economic conduct and preservation of the 
market’s natural order would turn their attention to the global scale. The 
many liberal reform projects, of which penal reform had a prominent 
position, were examples of the globally oriented security mechanisms that 
organized themselves according to this new economic and political 
rationality of European progress through the cultivation of world markets. 
Rather than rigidly organizing themselves in accordance with the structures 
of European states, liberal penal reform projects were from the outset 
international and global in scope, or at least regarded the organizational 
form and the efficacy of their projects as unrestricted by the borders of 
territorial states. 
Also as the conception of the boundaries of markets expanded to take in 
a global scale, the scope of social reform followed suit. Liberal reformers 
were rarely narrowly national in defining the scope of their interventions. 
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There was, for instance, a close connection between liberal policies of social 
progress, abolitionist movements, and penal reform. Several key advocates 
of abolition were directly involved in political and administrative work to 
reform the prison systems of European states. The British Member of 
Parliament and leading abolitionist Thomas Fowell Buxton, for instance, 
began his career as social reformer as an active proponent of prison 
reform.316 In Denmark, the liberal politician, political economist, editor, and 
publicist, C. N. David, was an avid advocator of slave emancipation and 
promoter of abolitionist writing. Together with N. F. S. Grundtvig and the 
French reverend, Jean.Antoine Raffard, he founded a Danish anti-slavery 
society in 1839 as a satellite organization for the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society.317 David also chaired the commission to reform the Danish 
prison service in the 1840s318 and served as Super-Inspector of Prisons 
[Overinspektør for Fængselsvæsenet] from 1849 to 1859.319 David has been 
identified as part of “the elite of an epistemic community avant la lettre” of 
“transnational experts” that met frequently at congresses across Europe and 
the United States to engage in “social questions.”320 Similarly, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, whose work On the Penitentiary System in the United States 
influenced prison reform across Europe, became actively engaged with the 
question of French colonization in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, and 
wrote a series of articles for the French journal La Siecle in favor of slave 
emancipation in France’s overseas colonies.321 
Promoting slave emancipation and penitentiary punishment were 
seemingly part and parcel of a general strategy of social improvement and 
progress that acted as a correlative to the globally expanding markets.  
 
Natural Punishment 
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Until now we have focused on the processes trough which an expansion  
took place of the geographical scale to which the penitentiary technique 
could be applied. This movement took place as a correlative to the 
expansion of markets to the global scale. We now turn to another movement 
within penitentiary discourse. Concomitant with the geographical expansion 
of the penitentiary, a exploration was carried out of systems of 
punishment—of prison discipline, rather—that worked in accordance with 
nature, i.e. reflected and applied itself through the natural processes of 
society and economy. The exchanges of the International Penitentiary 
Congress held in London in 1872 points us in the direction of this 
exploration of natural punishment. The congress resulted in a lengthy report 
written by Enoch Wines, an American priest, educator, and expert on prison 
reform, who had also chaired the organization of the congress. The report’s 
conclusion included a list of principles, of which one in particular is telling 
of the movement of penitentiary science away from static systems of 
imprisonment towards a dynamic conception of a range of penitentiary 
practices. §11 of the report’s conclusion held that “[a] system of prison 
discipline, to be really reformatory, must work with nature rather than 
against it.”322 How did the report conceive of the natural element with which 
prison discipline would have to work? It referred to two conditions of 
‘natural order.’ One was the ‘natural’ sociability of men, and the other was 
the ‘natural’ flow of economic exchange. 
The principle of natural punishment was formulated in direct opposition 
to the systems of imprisonment that, according to the congress-report 
worked against human nature by imposing carceral structures that repressed 
the natural inclinations and urges of men. ‘The separate system’ and ‘the 
silent system,’ represented “the most perfect form of coercion ever 
devised.”323 Both relied on strict isolation. These systems of bodily 
separation and absolute silence did not work towards the rehabilitation of 
criminals because they coerced prisoners into hard labor. Labor could only 
be considered rehabilitative if conducted voluntarily and willfully: “It is 
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free, and, still more, emulative or competitive labor that is earnest, 
ingenious, skillful, and productive.”324 Furthermore, systems of isolation 
repressed the natural inclination of men to socialize, and was, thus, viewed 
as running counter to human nature. Crime was “essentially and intensely” 
anti-social, the report emphasized, and could thus only be countered with 
treatment that induced social behavior.325 
The Auburn model of imprisonment also rested on the premise of 
sociability, but only relative to the complete isolation of the Philadelphia 
model. Both systems made use of separation and silence as primary 
techniques of reform, but under the Auburn system prisoners would work in 
common work-halls, though refrain from any communication with other 
prisoners. The theory behind the Auburn system was to arrange the prison as 
a duplication of society, in order to re-socialize the inmate. The Auburn 
system modeled the prison to the ideal workshop, and thus sought to install 
a perfect hierarchical system of communication.326 The workshop-
sociability was, however, not the form of sociability that Wines’ report 
aspired to encourage. Natural sociability was not born out of the workshop, 
which represented more a utopia of coercion than a reflection of social 
order.  
Besides sociability and voluntariness, to work with nature in prison 
discipline, meant the installation of another ‘natural’ element of human 
society as the central regulation mechanism. This element was ‘the market’ 
and economic exchange. To illustrate the importance of this principle, 
Wines’ report referred to “Maconochie’s great experiment in prison 
discipline on Norfolk Island.”327 Alexander Maconochie’s (1787-1860) so 
called ‘mark system’ of prison discipline inspired many proponents of the 
subsequent ‘progressive systems,’ in which inmates progressed through 
multiple stages of imprisonment. The progressive system was applied in 
many prisons in the second half of the nineteenth century, and was 
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introduced as the default system in all Danish penitentiaries in 1873.328 
Prison administrators such as Enoch Wines himself, Theodore Dwight and 
Zebulon Brockway, who were instrumental in introducing a range of new 
penitentiary institutions in the United States in the 1860s and 1870s, were 
also influenced by Maconochie’s ‘experiment.’ Similarly, ‘the mark system’ 
inspired Walter Crofton’s ‘Irish system’ as well as the ‘Borstal system,’ 
developed in youth reformatories in England.329 
Maconochie developed his ideas behind the ‘mark system’ in the late 
1830s during his time in Van Diemen’s Land (now Tasmania). He was 
given the opportunity to put the system’s principles into practice when 
serving as Superintendent of the penal colony on Norfolk Island, located in 
the Pacific Ocean between Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia, 
between 1840 and 1844.330 He published extensively on issues of prison 
reform and convict management in general, and on his marks system of 
prison discipline in particular, both prior, during, and after his tenure at 
Norfolk Island.331 
Maconochie’s system rested on a belief in the ability of ‘the economy’ 
to shape the conduct of subjects. This ability existed because of a correlation 
between the nature of the economy and the nature of men. If the prisoners 
were governed by nothing else than the natural laws of economy, then the 
prisoners would automatically act in accordance with their natural felicity 
for sociability and providence. 
All economies rely on currencies to exchange goods and the currency in 
use at Norfolk Island consisted of ‘marks.’ Sentences were not measured as 
periods of time but as a series of tasks. For each completed task the 
prisoners would receive a corresponding amount of marks in wages. The 
marks that prisoners earned could be exchanged for a shortening of their 
sentence. It was, however, not just the progression of the prisoners’ path 
towards release that was regulated by this economy of marks. Practically 
everything within the penal colony was subject to the monetary regime of 
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marks. Marks were needed to ‘purchase’ everything from food and bedding 
to education, and also to pay ‘fines,’ which stood in for corporal disciplinary 
punishment in the colony.  
The prisoners’ earnings could thus be made to work towards a range of 
desirable returns. It could be invested in the immediate improvement of 
their living conditions in the colony, a speedier release, or the acquirement 
of new skills. The system confronted the prisoner with a game of rational 
choice within an ideal economic milieu, a closed circuit with no 
externalities to disrupt the natural flows of economic exchange. The 
objective was to replicate the mechanisms of life outside prison, but in a 
controlled environment, and while still retaining the hardships of 
punishment to sooth the public’s sense of justice.332 
The Mark System gave prisoners a stake in the achievement of their own 
liberty. Similar to the accumulation of personal wealth outside of prison, the 
time of release could be brought forward by the industry of the prisoner. If, 
firstly, the prisoner pertained the will to labor, and, secondly, displayed the 
prudence to save up marks by living frugally, prisoners could literally ‘earn’ 
their freedom. The prisoners accumulation of marks and their investment of 
them, thus represented a ‘true’ reflection of their providence. The conditions 
of the system made it impossible for prisoners not to exalt some degree of 
providence, thereby increasing the chance of rehabilitation. And this was to 
be achieved without coercion or force. Rehabilitation was achieved, simply 
by the installation of an ‘apparatus,’ as Maconochie himself referred to it, 
that induced and fostered the natural urges and instincts of men. 
Here is how Wines described the effect of Maconochie’s system in his 
report: 
He [Maconochie] sought to make all his arrangements such that the 
prisoners would experience, through them, just such and so much of good 
or evil as naturally flowed from their conduct—a principle which he 
rightly declares to be the only true one.333  
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How could Maconochie know that his principle was true? Because the 
mechanism that evaluated and distributed the flow of prisoners’ conduct 
was the natural forces of ‘the market.’ The market served as the site of 
veridiction for Maconochie’s economy of punishment as it did for liberal 
governmentality in general.334 Wines made this affinity between the 
penitentiary and liberalism clear when his report defined the principal 
techniques of power that should be aspired to in public punishment: 
When the lesson not to go too fast, to give a large scope to free agency, to 
let temptation assume all its customary forms, to regulate little but 
encourage much, is sufficiently learned, complete success may be hoped 
for in what should ever be the great aim of public punishment, the 
reformation of the fallen.335 
It becomes evident here that even within the principles of imprisonment that 
have to rest on the fundamental premise of the deprivation of liberty, we 
find ingrained in its mode of power the maxims of liberal governmentality: 
“give a large scope to free agency;” “regulate little but encourage much.” 
With this reading of the report of the International Penitentiary Congress 
of 1872, it is evident that at the highest authority of penitentiary science, the 
affiliation with a liberal governmentality was not limited to a shared ethos 
of human, social, and economic progress. It is often assumed that this shared 
liberal ethos was partitioned into separate spaces of power: a penal space of 
discipline, surveillance, and coercion, and a civic space of government, 
freedom, and markets. With the congress of 1872, and its allegiance to the 
principles of Maconochie’s Mark system, we see a coupling of the problem 
of punishment with the mode of power of liberal governmentality’s ‘civil’ 
techniques of government.  
The ideal prison, according to Wines’ report, was not the perfect 
machine of discipline and surveillance that fixates and molds the delinquent 
subjectivity through separation, silence, and continuous labor. Rather, the 
ideal prison was a controlled replica of the natural conditions of life in 
freedom. The report did not presuppose the delinquent’s ‘unnatural’ 
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adhesion to crime, rather it installed the idea of men’s ‘natural’ persuasion 
towards sociability and market exchange as the singular mechanism of 
criminal rehabilitation. The basic principle of imprisonment was not 
deprivation of liberty, but intensification of freedom. 
The objective here is not to argue that the specifics of Maconochie’s 
system bore any resemblance with the principles of prison administration by 
which Danish West Indian prisons were governed, or that Wines’ emphasis 
on elements of sociability in penal systems were reproduced in the Danish 
West Indies. What is important, however, and what I want to draw attention 
to, is that at the most authoritative level of penological knowledge, with 
which prison administrators in Denmark were engaged with, a principle of 
naturalism resided. A principle that argued that the natural inclinations to 
socialize and exchange should form the basis of rehabilitative punishments. 
But what, then, did this principle mean if applied in contexts were the 
natural inclinations of offenders were interpreted differently? An analysis of 
Wines’ writings on colonial prisons will show that his appraisal of 
liberalism in convict management was not so much based on a fundamental 
belief in the freedom of social and economic conduct as to a rule of nature. 
Coercive prison discipline could be acceptable if it approximated the 
naturalness of prisoners conduct and the surrounding society. Just as the 
penological and criminological practice developed in the direction of an 
individualization of punishment, the general schematics of penitentiary 
science individualized the management of imprisonment. 
 
One Principle, Many Systems 
Michel Foucault and David Garland have both argued that individualization 
played an essential part in modern punishment.336. For Foucault the power-
knowledge nexus of the human sciences and the prison engineered the 
prisoner as an individual with a specific record that reflected his past deeds 
as well as his future potential. Rather than acting upon an already existing, 
and corrupted, individual, the power-knowledge of the modern prison 
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created the conditions of the specifically delinquent individuality; it made 
real that which did not exist by posing a question of truth (who are you?) 
rather than a question of justice (what have you done?). Garland’s argument 
is similar to, yet different from, Foucault’s. With Foucault, the 
individualization is general, in the sense that every person subjected to the 
power-knowledge regime of criminal justice is subject to the process of 
individualization. The process of individualization was more or less 
codified.337 In contrast, Garland’s argument of individualization in 
punishment refers to the adaptation of the punishment to the specific 
character of the offender. It is thus the form of the punishment that is 
‘individualized,’ molded to fit the criminal. This process can, however, only 
be made possible through an analysis of the criminal’s individuality, and, 
thus, depend on the type of individualization to which Foucault referred  
The process of individualization was also evident in the efforts of 
international prison reform, but here the subjects were not individual 
offenders, but individual nations, populations, and races that each required 
particular approaches to the project of prison reform. Following this line of 
thought about the individualization of punishment, I want to draw attention 
to the process by which the universal principles of penitentiary reform was 
adorned with a measure of particularity when it came to the practical 
application of its principles in different contexts such as the colonial. This 
was a tension between the universal and the particular that was a persistent 
aspect of the international discourse of prison reform. In a curious reversal, 
the practical experiences that fueled the formulation of general principles at 
the international penitentiary congresses were also the very factors that 
impeded their implementation. To come to terms with the fact that prison 
practice was perhaps to heterogeneous and unpredictable to reduce to static 
rules and regulations, the congress devised a clear division between 
‘principles’ and ’systems’ in their penitentiary theory. In his report, Wines 
summed up the distinction between principles and systems with the 
following maxim: “Systems are human; principles divine. The former have 
their origin in the wisdom of man, which may err; the latter, in the wisdom 
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of God, which is unerring.”338 Representing divine power, principles 
possessed their own infallible agency; they were beyond the control and will 
of men, and accordingly all delegates could agree to them. Principles were 
“roots, essences, powers, without which there is neither life nor energy in 
any organization, physical or moral.”339 In contrast to the divinity of 
principles, systems represented a distinctly profane power. If principles 
were the spirit of the penitentiary, then systems were its body, its technical 
apparatus, “methods and processes” that turned principle into practice. But 
as such, systems could take on many different guises and were therefore 
constantly contentious subjects. They were flexible, “temporary and 
perishable,” imperfect, and adaptable: “Systems may change, do change, 
must change, with the climate, soil, territorial extent, manners, customs, 
institutions, traditions, prejudices of different countries.”340 This division 
between principles and systems made the penitentiary power of punishment 
exceptionally broad in its technical scope of application. As the above 
quotes make clear, mid and late nineteenth century penologists were driven 
by the belief that higher universal, even, and especially, divine principles of 
correction and reform of criminals could be obtained and put into practice in 
locally adapted penal systems. 
In 1880, a year after he had suddenly died, Enoch Wines’ monumental 
work on The State of Prisons and of Child-saving Institutions in the 
Civilized World was published. This volume provides a useful example of 
the dynamic between principle and system in international penitentiary 
discourse. It was comprised of eight books covering the general history of 
prison reform (book one); the state of prisons in the United States (book 
two); Great Britain and her dependencies (book three), divided into sections 
on ’home countries,’ ’colonial possessions,’ and ’East Indian empire;’ 
continental Europe (book four); Mexico and Central America (book five); 
South America (book six); ’other countries’ (book seven), containing non-
colonized, non-Western states, i.e. China, Japan, Siam, Morocco, Liberia, 
Persia, and Hawaii; and finally ’miscellaneous points’ (book eight) with 
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conclusions and recommendations. The book was the material manifestation 
of Wines’ determinacy to bring together “a vast repository of facts”341 on 
prison information and facilitate an exchange that would help prevent crime 
and rehabilitate the criminal—the same ethos that pervaded his reports from 
the international prison congresses. 
In The State of Prisons Wines sought to create a truly global cartography 
of the world’s punitive landscape. His cartographic ambitions extended to 
the smallest patches of prison administration on the punitive map of the 
world. Such was Wines’ eagerness to record prisons in their many forms 
that even the more minuscule colonial territories, such as the British colony 
of Natal in south-east Africa, were invited to report on the state of their 
prisons.342 At the core of Wine’s geography of punishment was a practice of 
scaling. Wines scaled the geographical unit of his punitive globe according 
to levels of ‘civilization’ that his mapping of penal practices reflected. 
The State of Prisons provides us with a cross section of the evaluation of 
local prison systems from the viewpoint of prison reform experts at the late 
nineteenth century. It cannot, however, be considered a reliable source on 
actual prison conditions, and it will not be used as such. Rather, the work’s 
material hints at the overall attitude towards the role of prisons in different 
localities, and for the purpose of this chapter special notice will be given to 
the evaluation of colonial prison systems. 
Wines’ descriptions of the prisons of the British colonies gives the 
impression of a very diverse set of penal contexts. Within the Caribbean 
region alone Wines reported huge discrepancies between the different 
colonies. At one end of the scale, the central prisons of Jamaica and 
Barbados, penitentiary principles had been implemented with the use of 
both the cellular system, especially in Barbados,343 and the associated 
system. The disciplinary measures were intended as both deterrent and 
reformatory, and progressive systems of privileges for good behavior and 
degradation for bad behavior were in use to manage the incentives of 
inmates. Separation of different classes of prisoners was also reported as 
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relatively successful. At the other end of the scale, smaller islands like St. 
Vincent were portrayed very differently. St. Vincent contained only one 
prison that showed no ambition of reforming criminals. A similar 
description was given of the British Virgin Islands were the “one small 
prison” was found to be lacking in many areas: “lax discipline, no sewerage, 
no separation, labor to light, hours of sleep excessive, and dietary too high.” 
Despite these deficiencies the prison was judged to be “as good as the 
circumstances of the colony will allow.”344 
This latter evaluation of the potentials of prisons in the context of 
limited resources in a colony like the British Virgin Islands hints at Wines’ 
qualitative assessment of local prison systems. It was not a question of 
specific systems or techniques of prevention or reform but rather the 
fulfillment of potentials that was important. Of course, application of proven 
penitentiary systems were applauded and recommended, but there was also 
recognition of problems with lacking resources and sympathy for alternative 
techniques. For example, Wines recounts a story about a reoffending and 
incorrigible prisoner at the jail in the Virgin Islands. Regular disciplinary 
measures, “such as shot-drill, solitary confinement, flogging, etc.,” had 
failed to deter the prisoner from his reckless conduct. This changed when 
his jailers came up with a novel method of making the prisoner carry a large 
stone, weighing seventy pounds, from one end of the prison yard to the 
other and back again, “and so on indefinitely.” According to Wines, the 
method was a success, and the prisoner, after his release, moved to St. 
Thomas and worked as a porter. “[A] position,” Wines remarked, “for 
which he ought certainly to be well qualified, after his experience at the 
Virgin Islands!”345 
Interestingly, Wines did not succinctly dismiss the Virgin Islands jailers’ 
‘ingenuity’ as counterproductive to the correctional idea or in any way 
excessive. Instead he emphasized the efficacy of the method and simply 
rationalized its implementation: 
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The story is suggestive; but perhaps the additional suggestion may be 
ventured, that a stone of lighter weight might serve the purpose just as 
well. It is a punishment that could hardly be applied in the original form 
to every prisoner. In this case ’deterrence deterred,’ which is more than 
can be said of it in many others.346 
In this instance, there was no qualitative difference between working the 
treadmill, carrying a stone from one end of a courtyard to the other, or any 
other kind of repetitive work as a disciplinary technique, as long as it was 
effective in deterring and reforming the prisoner. In fact, Wines seemed to 
be applauding the jailer’s ingenuity in adapting his disciplinary technique to 
the specific character of offender that he was confronted with. 
In Jamaica, another culturally adapted innovation in crime prevention 
caught the attention of Wines. The inspector-general of the more resourceful 
Jamaican prison system, H. B. Shaw, had discovered an effective preventive 
measure against women offenders. The female crime rate had reportedly 
dropped by seventy per cent since the issuing of an order in 1864, which 
stated “that the hair of women-prisoners should be cut close.” The success 
of this “novel” but “highly efficacious” method was considered to be found 
in the fact that “[t]here is nothing a negress prizes so much as her hair.”347  
Wines also referred positively to other colonial innovations in the 
management of imprisonment. For example, the use of the most promising 
inmates as wardens in Indian prisons. According to Wines, the appointment 
of inmates as wardens “teaches self-respect and self-control, and few 
prisoners who have held such offices have relapsed into crime.”348 Despite 
its unorthodoxy compared to recognized procedures of prison 
administration, Wines generally welcomed such innovations as long as the 
efficacy in terms of the rehabilitation of criminals could be proven. There 
were indeed many human systems for procuring divine principles. 
As the geographical boundaries of penitentiary reform expanded to 
encompass an increasingly growing number of societies, of not just 
European and North American origin, but from around the world, the 
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taxonomic web of prison knowledge and techniques expanded accordingly. 
To incorporate the growing constellation of possible prison scenarios, 
special considerations would apply to the organization and administration of 
prisons with particular concerns in regard to prisoner employment, funds for 
construction and management, and special concerns for the prison 
population (i.e. gender, age, and race). 
Wines representations of colonial systems and procedures of punishment 
indicate that the question that was increasingly being put to criminal 
offenders in the late nineteenth-century—“who are you?”—was being posed 
somewhat differently to offenders in the colonial world. Rather then an 
individualization that separates the criminals as a group from other groups 
in society, or an individualization that separates one offender from another 
offender, we see a kind of global individualization by which the non-
civilized ‘nations’ were separated from the civilized. The consequence of 
this global individualization in terms of penological rationality was that 
alternative procedures and methods were accepted if proven effective. The 
answer to the question of “who are you” was not answered on the basis of 
an examination of the individual offender’s past and present constitution of 
physical and mental health. Rather it was answered on the basis of common 
conceptions of the nature and character of the population to which the 
offender was determined to belong.  
So, we see in Wines’ writing an appreciation of practical observations 
about cultural particularities and habits and the integration of these 
observations in local penal practices. Diana Paton describes this erasure of 
internal distinctions within the colonial population as an effect of the project 
of rehabilitative imprisonment in Jamaica that was distinct from its effects 
in the British metropole: “In Britain, comparisons were made between 
different groups within the population; in Jamaica, the criminal was made to 
stand in for the population as a whole.”349 A similar kind of erasure of 
difference can be observed within the discourses and policies of 
imprisonment in the Danish West Indies. In the next sections, I show how a 
practical cognizance of racial particularity and colonial specificity was 
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imbedded in the representation of the character and capacities of inmates by 
shifting the focus of analysis to the particular context of the Danish West 
Indies. 
 
Punishment Between Slavery and Emancipation 
From having established the international agenda of penological reform we 
now return to the particular context of punishment in the Danish West 
Indies. This was indeed an issue that was very present in the concerns of 
colonial officials in the years following the general emancipation of the 
enslaved population in the Danish West Indies in 1848. The insurrection 
that had forced Governor-General von Scholten to proclaim the freedom of 
every inhabitant of the Danish territories had, in the eyes of colonial 
authorities, pushed the majority of the islands' population into a state of 
culture and civilization for which they were not prepared (cf. chapter five). 
The central objective confronting the Danish West Indian government, then, 
was to 'elevate' the formerly enslaved to a level of 'culture' and 'civilization' 
that would provide them with the proper preconditions necessary for 
maneuvering the unpredictable circumstances of a life in freedom. In other 
words, the production of freedom350 was of the outmost importance to 
colonial governance in the post-emancipation period.  
Because agricultural production was now dependent on the availability 
of wage labor, the sustainability of the colonial economy rested on 
successfully instilling the formerly enslaved with industrious virtues. At the 
same time, it was paramount that the social order and discipline that 
emancipation had disturbed would be reestablished. One instrument to 
which government officials could turn their attention was the prison with its 
disciplinary techniques that promised to attune those emancipated 
individuals that chose to administer their liberty by idling and thieving to 
the responsibilities of freedom. 
This was not entirely an issue that had its origins in the general 
emancipation in 1848. The number of manumissions and thus the volume of 
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free people of color had grown steadily, especially since emancipation in the 
British colonies and as a result of von Scholten’s reforms that followed. As 
part of the efforts to regulate the free colored inhabitants, and also to 
standardize and centralize the punishment of slaves, a prison was built on 
St. Croix at Richmond in the 1830s.351 Undeniably at a small scale, the 
Danish West Indies were nonetheless taking part in the general shift towards 
imprisonment as the preferred technique of punishment that characterized 
the first half of the nineteenth century.352 In relation to the rest of the Danish 
Kingdom, the prison at Richmond was somewhat of a forerunner in terms of 
capacity and functionality. Purpose built prisons were a rare occurrence in 
Denmark prior to the reforms to its penal system and infrastructure in the 
1850s, 60s, and 70s.353 
Diana Paton has described this general turn towards imprisonment in 
Caribbean post-emancipation societies, and remarks that this development 
was not linked specifically to slave emancipation but in fact part of a much 
wider movement of penal reform and penological exchange across the 
Atlantic and beyond. In the context of emancipation, however, the question 
of imprisonment as a penal technique, revolved around an “imaginative 
reconstruction of post-slavery society” where the rehabilitative prison 
environment could be used to learn “former slaves … to behave 
appropriately to their 'station' as workers, as men and women, and as 
Christians.”354 With emancipation the axis of colonial punitive politics had 
completed its reconfiguration from a juridical game of authority between 
state officials and slave-owners towards a governmental calculation of the 
balancing between freedom and security. The objective of government was 
no longer limited to securing stability and preserving equilibrium, though 
certainly economic stability preserved its governmental urgency. The ethos 
of social progress, in one form or another, could not be excluded from the 
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calculation of government in the post-emancipation colony. And the 
function of prisons as part of the governmental calculation would have to be 
reframed. But, as will become clear, the articulation of the proper purpose of 
prisons in the colony was a stuttering process, always impeded by the 
oscillating character of colonial governmentality, emphasizing social 
progress and ‘native cultivation’ in one instance, while prioritizing fiscal 
austerity or racial discrimination in another. 
The institution of slavery undoubtedly impacted the organization and 
procedure of punishment in the colony. As shown in the previous chapter, 
the privileges of slave-holders to punish their slaves were a central object of 
the state regulation through the more or less effective attempts at legislation. 
The power to punish was recognized by state authorities as the ultimate sign 
of control and therefore a right that was not easily delegated.  
One aspect of judicial practice that was not up for negotiation was that 
the activities of slaves were regulated by a separate legal regime. Several 
categories of prohibitions existed solely because of the conditions of 
slavery. The acts of running away or raising a hand against one’s owner or 
any white person were crimes that could only be committed by black slaves. 
Furthermore, as a general rule, those crimes that could be committed by 
both free and slave, such as theft, bared a far harsher punishment for the 
slave offender than if a free white person had committed the act.355  
Similarly the conditions of slavery also determined the possible forms of 
punishment that were deemed reasonable and effective. For instance, until 
1840, it was assumed in Danish West Indian case law that slaves could not 
be awarded fines as punishment since they had no right to property.356 For 
example, an instruction of 30 December 1774 to the garrison commanders 
of the royal forts in the Danish West Indies exempted slaves from the 
obligation of the instigator to reimburse the cost of engaging additional 
officers in the restoration of public order, since “slaves cannot present any 
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other form of payment than the body.”357 Accordingly, if any slave was 
convicted of a crime that required the punishment of a fine, it would be 
converted to a flogging sentence.358 The same principle was applied in 
regard to punishments of imprisonment or forced labor. As a function of 
being enslaved, the slave had no freedom to be deprived of and did not 
retain any ownership of his or hers labor. Furthermore, imprisonment of 
slaves was the equivalent of confiscating the property of the slaveowner’s 
property and as such was seen as a legally highly problematic punishment in 
that it inflicted not only the offending slave but the owner as well. There is 
no indication that suggests any tendency among slaveholders to voluntarily 
send their slaves to receive public punishments by colonial authorities 
unless the laws specifically demanded such procedure. 
The criminal law of slaves was laid down in the myriad of police 
ordinances and the few compilations of slave laws that were discussed in the 
previous chapter. If an offense was not covered by colonial ordinances and 
proclamations, slaves were subject to the same legislation as the colony’s 
free inhabitants. In regard to criminal offenses that would in most cases 
mean the increasingly antiquated Danske Lov [Danish Code] of 1683. Much  
of the colonial criminal law was reformed by the extension of A. S. Ørsted’s 
four so called “systematic” criminal laws in 1833, 1840, and 1841, which 
provided new sentences for crimes of violence, theft, robbery, fraud, 
perjury, handling of stolen goods, and arson, among others.359 This reform 
still left a range of offenses that were not included in the new criminal laws 
to be subject to sentences with reference to earlier colonial law or the 
Danish Code. As a result, Danish West Indian criminal law spanned a range 
of possible sentences, from minor corporal punishments administered by the 
police-master, to the spectacular and elaborated death sentences, and of 
course transportation to Denmark when longer sentences of imprisonment 
were required. 
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As an example, sentences taken from the “record of unfree persons” that 
had been tried at the Royal West Indian High Court in the year 1843 
demonstrate the range of punishments that were available to the Danish 
West Indian criminal justice system. Just two trials against “unfree persons” 
had gone through the High Court that year. The reason for this was that 
most smaller offenses committed by the enslaved were tried at the police 
and Lower Court and subsequently punished with corporal punishments 
and/or confinement at the plantation estates, as records of offenses and the 
inflicted punishments from the 1830s and 1840s show.360 Many offenses 
such as insubordination or simple negligence were dealt with by the 
plantations own justice system. The entry for 17 September 1830 in the 
police report for the plantation North Star on St. Croix depicts the 
punishment of “Martin,” who was penalized for  
[coming] to the Field without his Hoe & and for defying anybody to 
chastise him for it &c.” For this transgression, Martin received “24 
[lashes] of Tammerin [sic] Rod & comitted [sic] him durring [sic] Height 
of Noon to Confinement for 4 Days.361 
The first trial at the High Court involved Adel and Bob alias Robert, 
both enslaved and belonging to the plantation Mount Stewart on St. Croix. 
They were convicted of having poisoned another slave on their plantation 
and sentenced to be decapitated and have their heads put on stakes.362 It was 
quite common for these kinds of elaborate death sentences to be mitigated to 
some form of non-capital punishment.363 The amelioration was achieved 
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either by intervention from the governor general or from a royal pardon 
after the verdict had gone through the appeal process.364 In Adel and Bob’s 
case, however, the trial record states that the sentence had been executed on 
20 January 1844.365 The other trial that year was against Sara Susanna of the 
plantation Mandal on St. Thomas. She had been found guilty of arson and 
was sentenced to 10 years of labor in Copenhagen’s tugthus. In Sara’s case, 
the record states that she had indeed been transported to Denmark to serve 
out her sentence.366 
The two sentences are extraordinary in their own right: a horrific 
execution and a peculiar reversal of the common imperial penal practice of 
convict transportation from the metropole’s overcrowded prisons out to the 
colonies. Depending on the category of offense, the discrepancies between 
the severity of the crime and the intensity of the punishment could vary 
substantially. This was a problem of colonial jurisprudence that remained 
unsolved throughout Danish colonial rule. A new comprehensive criminal 
code was promulgated in Denmark in 1866 but was never extended to the 
West Indian colony despite being considered at several occasions and 
against the wishes of the colonial government.367 As a consequence judges 
at every level of the West Indian and Danish court system were obliged to 
continue to adjudicate in accordance with legislation that were considered 
antiquated in comparison with the standards of modern jurisprudence. Poul 
Olsen mentions how King Frederik VIII, after having confirmed the 
pardoning of eleven West Indian offenders at a single meeting of the state 
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council in 1906, urged that the discrepancies between the Danish and West 
Indian criminal laws would be mitigated.368 
Besides the King’s request for a reform of the West Indian criminal law, 
criticism was also raised from other sides in the early twentieth century. The 
issue of legislation in general, but specifically regarding criminal law and 
punishment, in the Danish West Indies, increasingly became an object of 
criticism towards the final years of Danish rule in the West Indies. In 1903, 
the report of the commission on the general conditions in the Danish West 
Indies criticized the lag of legal innovation in the colony. “The stagnation in 
the creation of new legislation regarding public life,” the report argued, 
“forms a counterpart to the lack of cooperation and hence continual idleness 
that is to be found in private civil life.”369  
Danish legal experts were also voicing their criticism of the 
discrepancies between criminal law in the Danish metropole and its colonial 
possessions in the West Indies. In 1915, Danish supreme court judge, R. S. 
Gram, wrote a short piece in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen [Weekly Journal of 
Judicial Administration]. In it, he condemned the judicial conditions of the 
criminal law of the Danish West Indies. In Gram’s opinion, the entire 
organization of the Danish West Indian criminal law was in need of serious 
discussion and revision.370 Olaf Haack, judge in the Danish criminal court 
and president of the eastern division of the Danish high court, took up 
Gram’s plea the following year. In an article in Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Strafferet [the Nordic Journal of Criminal Law], Haack described the 
disjuncture of Danish West Indian criminal law by providing examples of 
the disproportionate sentences that judges were obliged to give according to 
the legal statutes in effect on the Islands. It seemed “perfectly barbaric” to 
Haack, when, as had been the case in 1902, the highest judicial institution in 
Denmark was forced to sentence “a negro” to be burned at the stake for 
committing “crimen bestialitatis.” By comparison, the Danish penal code of 
1866 required only a minimum of eight months correctional labor for the 
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same offense.371 The fact that such sentences were reduced through royal 
pardon, did not in Haack’s opinion amend the detrimental effects of a 
distorted criminal legislation on the general constitution of colonial society. 
Besides the moral strain endured by offenders when faced with the 
possibility of being burnt alive or decapitated, Haack argued that legal 
authority itself was also at risk of being undermined if antiquated sentences 
continued to be given with the knowledge that they would never be carried 
out.372 What Haack’s objections were referring to was the importance of a 
well functioning penal and judicial system for the moral state of a 
population as well as the legitimacy of governmental authority. In Haack’s 
opinion both were being undermined in the Danish West Indies by a system 
of justice that was not attuned to the level of civilization that its government 
was asserting. 
It could be said then that the Danish West Indian authorities were ill-
prepared for the administration of crime and punishment in a free society. 
Nevertheless, with the abolition of slavery in 1848 the colony’s entire 
population was at once subject to a uniform criminal legislation, adding 
substantially to the mass of potential offenders subject to prison sentences 
and making the issue of a capable prison infrastructure increasingly 
pertinent. In 1850 the Danish Ministry of Justice and Super-Inspectorate of 
Prisons expressed concern over the unpredictable effects of the general 
emancipation on the rate of crime, and specifically on the expected rise of 
offenders that would now receive a prison sentence rather than flogging.373  
The Danish authorities assumed that the number of slaves that had been 
sentenced to public labor had been kept artificially low by the slave-owners’ 
interest in retaining the slaves’ labor for their plantations rather than 
handing them over to the legal authorities for prosecution and sentencing. 
Only four of the male prisoners that had been sentenced to public labor in 
the previous ten years had been slaves. All of the three female prisoners, 
however, had been slaves, but they had been convicted of arson, which was 
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such a serious offense, authorities in Denmark opined, that from the 
planters’ perspective the punishment and thereby removal from the 
plantation was unavoidable as well as preferable. With the removal of such 
artificial constraints, the future crime and conviction rates were highly 
unpredictable, the legal authorities in Denmark reasoned.374 According to 
the Super-Inspectorate of Prisons, twenty-four individuals had been 
sentenced to public labor (and thereby transported to Denmark) during the 
preceding ten years (1840-1850).375 But it was deemed uncertain if those 
rates would continue in the years to come, due to the unpredictable 
consequences of the general emancipation in 1848.376 
General emancipation in the British West Indian colonies had provided 
an impetus for establishing new prison institutions there. The plan to reform 
Jamaica’s prisons, for instance, included the construction of a general 
penitentiary in Kingston designed to accommodate the heralded “separate 
system” or “Philadelphia system” that represented the apex of penological 
principles of criminal reform at that time.377 Louis Rothe, a magistrate in the 
West Indian High Court, when reporting on the British post-emancipation 
policies in Antigua in 1846, likewise described the reorganization of the 
island’s prison system. The government in that colony had erected a new 
prison building capable of housing 200 inmates, and had introduced new 
regulations for the administration of prisons.378 The construction of the 
prison at Richmond on St. Croix fitted with fifty-two cells379 represented the 
Danish colonial authorities’ efforts to preempt the expected need for 
imprisonment facilities. 
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The Danish colonial authorities did more than make preparations for the 
projected growth in the inmate population. It took steps to actively increase 
the potential volume of offenders that could serve long-term sentences in 
West Indian prisons. In 1836, a Royal rescript had granted the Governor-
General authority to allow convicts sentenced to less than one year of 
imprisonment with labor to serve their sentence in the West Indies.380 In 
1848 that authority was extended to include prisoners sentenced to less than 
two years of imprisonment with labour.381 All convicts sentenced to more 
than two years imprisonment, however, were to be transported to prisons in 
Denmark to serve out their sentence there, as had been the case with 
aforementioned Sara Susanna. All of the seven public incarceration facilities 
in the Danish West Indies were classed as local prisons or jails [arresthuse] 
that were designed for temporary detention of remand prisoners and short 
term convicts, not longterm imprisonment. Nevertheless, In 1849 the Danish 
West Indian Government requested that the regulations for transporting 
convicts to Denmark should be changed so that “absolutely all criminals 
born in West India should serve their sentence there instead of being 
transported [to Denmark] even if they be sentenced to more than two years 
of public labor.”382 
The Ministry of Justice, however, was reluctant to allow the colonial 
government to take full charge of prison administration. It was concerned 
that a local prison system would not be sufficiently equipped to take proper 
care of its inmates and to conduct the administration of prisons in 
accordance with the Danish regulations for the management of local prisons. 
Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice regularly requested descriptions of the 
state of the West Indian prison facilities that housed the colony’s criminals. 
In response to the Danish West Indian government’s request to alter the 
present regulations, the Ministry of Justice expressed doubts as to whether 
the capacity of the prisons in the Danish West Indies would sufficiently 
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accommodate the quantity of prisoners that would otherwise have been 
transported to Denmark.383  
The Ministry was also skeptical towards local authorities’ ability to take 
the necessary precautions in regard to the tropical climate and what they 
viewed as the particular requirements of the black race. These precautionary 
measures included a strict separation of the different classes of prisoners and 
the enforcement of the principle that two or more prisoners should not be 
confined in a single cell.384 Nor were they convinced by the information 
they had received from the West Indian government that the colonial prisons 
were managed and constructed in such a way that could facilitate the 
necessary treatment of more hardened criminals, as well as procure the type 
of labor that penitentiary punishment required. In short, the Ministry of 
Justice deemed it highly uncertain that the existing conditions of 
imprisonment in the colony could compel “the proper function [den 
tilbørlige virksomhed]” of public labor sentences—i.e. the rehabilitation of 
criminals.385 The first few years following emancipation did indeed show a 
spike in the average number of inmates. The prison at Richmond went from 
an average of thirty inmates in 1849 to an average of fifty inmates in 
1850.386 On the basis of this growth in the prison population, the Ministry of 
Justice remained concerned with the possibility of overcrowded prisons, 
especially if all longterm prisoners were to serve out their sentence in the 
Danish West Indies.387 
In 1860, Super-Inspector of Prisons in Denmark, Frederik Bruun, gave 
his expert advise on how to best organize the prison system in the Danish 
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West Indies. His recommendations did not differ substantially from 
recommendations made to any other prison system in need of reform at that 
time. Bruun strongly recommended a strict separation of inmates into three 
different classes: One for those sentenced to public labour (a longterm 
correctional sentence carried out either communally or in isolation); one for 
those sentenced to forced labour (a short-term sentence with no correctional 
purpose); and one for prisoners in custody awaiting trial and remand 
prisoners. To achieve this, and to procure the proper conditions of 
imprisonment for each class, it would be necessary to erect a new 
penitentiary build specifically to accommodate the first class of inmates. 
Bruun’s plan proposed a facility with the capacity to hold eighty inmates in 
three separate wings: One wing capable of housing forty inmates according 
to the solitary principles of the ‘Philadelphia system;’ a second wing to 
accommodate twenty inmates in accordance with the communal labor 
principles of ‘the Auburn system;’ and a third wing with capacity to hold 
twenty female inmates. Proper employment should be procured for all 
inmates. They should all wear the same uniform, and follow a strict dietary 
regime and fixed daily routine. Religious education should be offered to all 
inmates. The already existing prison facilities were judged sufficient to 
accommodate the second and third classes of inmates, given the completion 
of the new penitentiary.388 
Bruun’s ambitious proposal to rearrange the organization of the West 
Indian prisons did not differ substantially from the general schematics of the 
penitentiary reform of the Danish prison system, which he was overseeing at 
the time. The only alterations that he proposed to the general system of the 
penitentiary were in regard to the forms of labor that inmates could benefit 
from. In general, he envisioned an implementation of a system of discipline, 
surveillance, and reform trough labor and religious instruction that pervaded 
penological theory at the time. The structure of Bruun’s recommendations 
on the reform of prisons in the Danish West Indies likewise paralleled those 
of British reform recommendations in the 1830s and 1840s in Jamaica and 
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the rest of their Caribbean colonies, following emancipation, relying on 
similar principles of penalty: separation, isolation, standardization, and 
labor.389 Had Bruun’s recommendations been followed it would quite 
possibly have meant an end to the transportation of West Indian convicts to 
Denmark, as the proposed penitentiary would have mirrored in principle the 
system of imprisonment found in Denmark’s ‘state penitentiaries,’ where 
longer sentences of ‘public labour’ were carried out. 
Thus, Bruun’s recommendations represent the penitentiary dispositif of 
the mid-nineteenth century in its most general form. The expertise that 
Bruun expounded was a generalized form of knowledge in the sense that its 
principles were seemingly applicable to any circumstances. Bruun did 
criticize the transportation of offenders to Denmark with reference to the 
“irregularities in the intended order, discipline, and uniformity of our 
penitentiaries” that the introduction of inmates with “many peculiar 
features” gave rise to.390 Yet, the few alterations to the general principles 
that Bruun and his colleagues at the Ministry of Justice suggested did not 
take into account these “peculiar features.” The suggested alterations were 
mostly of a practical nature. The tropical climate made it more advisable to 
construct larger and better ventilated cells. The local circumstances should 
determine the specific type of labor that the inmates should and could 
perform.  
Only when pushed by the colonial authorities’ claim that black inmates 
were well accustomed to small and less ventilated spaces and could thus 
inhabit the existing cells without any health risks, did officials in Denmark 
resort to ethnographic knowledge. The West Indian government argued that 
the volume of 2000 cubic feet per cell, which the Danish regulation of 
municipal prisons from 1846 prescribed, was not comparable to the limited 
requirements of the West Indian inmate’s physiognomy, and therefore did 
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not pose a risk to the inmates’ health. The ministry of justice, in concurrence 
with the super-inspector of prisons, rejected the West Indian government’s 
argument with reference to “reports on American penitentiaries,” in which 
the proscribed volume was held to be the standard in regard to “negro-
inmates,” as well as experiences with West Indian inmates in Danish 
Prisons.391 In general, however, ethnographical knowledge about the 
particular character of the black race did not seem to play into the 
recommendations of penitentiary experts and administrators in Denmark, in 
the mid-nineteenth century, when articulating the ideal scenarios of prison 
reform in the West Indies. It was treated as a given that the recently 
emancipated Afro-Caribbean offenders should receive the same type of 
penitentiary treatment as their partners in crime in Denmark. 
The optimism towards the universality of penitentiary principles that 
Bruun’s report was indicative of, was a reflection of the particular context of 
the project of prison reform in Denmark. It represented an adherence to 
uniformity that to a certain extent becomes indispensable when emerged in 
the ethos of reform, the purpose of which was to eliminate local divergences 
from a fixed, centralized norm. Within the next couple of decades, however, 
the ethos of uniformity would be replaced by a practice of individualization. 
This was true in regard to the specific conditions of imprisonment of the 
individual offender in the metropolitan criminal system—punishment 
became individualized. But it was also true in regard to a recognition of the 
particularities of different societies and subsequent contexts for 
imprisonment, which informed completely different approaches to and 
mechanisms for the limitation of crime. So, the individualization of 
punishment was complemented and even made possible by a discovery of a 
natural order of the prison itself and its constitution. But importantly, this 
was a nature that did not require universality or uniformity in punishment. 
Instead, it mandated particularity, adaptability, and individualization. 
 
Diet, Uniformity, and Race 
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The deliberations surrounding the issue of transportation of West Indian 
offenders to Denmark were not only discussions of the proper conditions of 
imprisonment, they were ultimately also discourses on the nature of the 
black race and its natural inclinations and physiognomical capacities. It was 
in other terms an installation of a truth of race that increasingly came to 
determine the organization of imprisonment in the Danish West Indies. 
Both metropolitan and colonial authorities viewed the transportation of 
convicts to Danish penal institutions as having several disadvantages. In a 
report to the West Indian Government in 1848, the Royal Colonial Council 
on St. Thomas voiced their concerns on the subject. Financially, the costs of 
sending prisoners across the Atlantic to serve out their sentence were 
substantial. Morally, the association with greater and more dangerous 
criminals in the Danish penal institutions was thought to have a corrupting 
effect on the character of West Indian convicts. The preventive effects of 
imprisonment were also diminished as it was thought to be common 
knowledge among “the ignorant class” that being incarcerated in Denmark 
mitigated the severity of the punishment compared to West Indian jails. This 
belief among the West Indian public was blamed by members of the Royal 
Council of St. Thomas on the stories of convicts returning from prisons in 
Denmark that told of acts of mercy, kindness, and alleviation from 
punishments. The Royal Council added that the returning convicts were 
regarded with the same kind of esteem, by their peers, as under different 
circumstances would be shown “a widely travelled man that has tried 
himself in this world.”392 
A similar concern was shown fifty-one years later in 1899 by Stener 
Grundtvig, who at that time was governor of prisons in Copenhagen. He 
stated that  
the West Indian prisoners [serving in Horsens Penitentiary] are 
mentioned as especially eager to learn; they are instructed in English, 
Danish, writing, and arithmetic, so that it is no wonder that upon 
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returning they are regarded by their peers as learned folk and Horsens as 
a kind of university.393 
Instead of praising the ‘cultivation’ of West Indian Prisoners that 
imprisonment in Denmark provided, both the members of St. Thomas Royal 
Council in 1848 and Grundtvig in 1899 were more concerned with the 
negative effects that the perception of the West Indian prisoners’ 
‘improvement’ by their peers could have on the deterrent effect of 
imprisonment in the local community. As such, imprisonment in Denmark 
was viewed as a breech of the principle of less eligibility that was 
considered essential to the deterrent effect of imprisonment: that the living 
conditions of inmates should not exceed the living conditions of the lowest 
classes of the society in question.394 Also, the character of the prisoners’ 
‘cultivation’ during their imprisonment was not deemed to be appropriate to 
their function in society upon their return. The sugar-producing economy 
had no use for a rural laborer with a mindset of a cosmopolitan, or, as 
Governor P. Hansen reported in 1850, a field laborer that was unable to 
work because he had grown accustomed to wearing socks and shoes.395 In 
other words, the conditions of imprisonment was conceived as producing a 
discrepancy between the objective of inmates’ rehabilitation and their 
proper function and natural station within the colonial society that they 
would eventually return to. 
Simultaneously, imprisonment in Denmark was also seen as inflicting an 
unjust disparity in the punishment of the transported convict. Besides the 
inconvenience and additional time that transportation itself added to the 
sentence, imprisonment in Denmark constituted a considerable risk factor to 
the convicts’ health. Two of the four convicts that had been transferred to 
Denmark in the years 1848 and 1849 had died shortly after their 
imprisonment.396 Similarly, out of the twenty convicts that had been 
transported during the 1850s, more than thirty percent had perished in 
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Danish prisons.397 The strains of imprisonment in the “rough climate” of 
Denmark, Professor of Law, J. Nellemann, wrote in 1882, “could be the 
cause of [the West Indian convict’s] premature death,” and that simply on 
grounds of “common humanitarian considerations” transportation could not 
be justified.398 Similarly, Grundtvig referred to “the many previous 
experiences” of West Indian convicts that “despite precautionary measures 
had not been able to endure the stay in Horsens Prison,” and were thus 
returned to the West Indies.399 
The perceived negative effects of having West Indian offenders serve 
their prison sentence in Danish prisons, thus, reflected and clarified the 
specificities of the Afro-Caribbean offender. The attentiveness towards the 
health risks that West Indian offenders sustained through imprisonment in 
Denmark solidified a common conception about the physiognomic 
limitations of the Afro-Caribbean anatomy in general. The complaints over 
transported offenders that returned with a changed subjectivity that was 
unfitting for the social class that they were supposed to represent, reaffirmed 
conceptions of Afro-Caribbeans as a static population with no potential for 
progress. It was not merely the traits of a delinquent class of the West Indian 
population that was being recalled in these discourses, it was the nature of  
the West Indian population as a whole that was portrayed. 
This process of formulating a practical knowledge about the nature of  
West Indian offenders, and thus the West Indian population, can also be 
ascertained from within more mundane aspects of prison management in the 
Danish West Indies. For example, the issue of prisoner diets show the 
significance of a common knowledge of the West Indian population in the 
practical management of prisons in the Danish West Indies. It also suggests 
that colonial prison reform in terms of administrative standardization 
developed as an appropriation of already existing governmental practices 
into a legislative format. The legal apparatus that was designed as 
                                                
 
397 Central Government Archives, The Central Directorate for the Colonies, Prisons and 
prison system, 911, No 535, Frederik Bruun to the Ministry of Justice, 8 May 1860 
398 West Indian Local Archives, West Indian Government, Subject files 1755-1917, 
3.81.14, J. Nellemann to the Ministry of Finance, 30 October 1882 
399 (Grundtvig 1899, p. 67) 
 
 
170 
curtailment of individual managers’ autonomous administration was 
eventually shaped to accommodate the influence of the prison managers’ 
common knowledge of colonial society. 
The regulation of prison diets was concerned with the threshold of the 
principle of less eligibility. The contents of the diet had to be composed in a 
way that the quality and volume of provisions provided inmates during their 
imprisonment did not exceed their normal diet outside of prison.400 This 
concern was based on older assumptions about the Afro-Caribbean’s 
nutritional needs. As police master Rosenstand explained in a 
communication to the St. Thomas Burgher Council, the diet regulations 
reflected an anachronistic remnant of slavery, and was thus reflective of the 
former divergence between master and slave. The diet of prisoners in the 
second class (i.e. those of color), Rosenstand explained, had originally been 
designed to resemble the average provisions that planters had provided their 
enslaved laborers. Rosenstand regarded the diet regulations as outdated and 
no longer representative of the average prisoner’s diet. In Rosenstand’s 
opinion, this was both due to the fact that plantation laborers were no longer 
given provisions in the same manner as during slavery, and that the majority 
of prisoners came from urban areas, not rural, and therefore their diets were 
composed very differently.401 Rosenstand suggested to remedy this 
disproportionate diet composition by absolving the diet regulations for 
second class prisoners, so that all prisoners would be provisioned according 
to the diet regulations for first class prisoners.402 In their reply, the members 
of St. Thomas Burgher Council agreed with Rosenstand that an alteration 
was needed in the diet regulations, but they did not see the utility in 
removing the distinction between the two classes altogether.  
[R]eference ought to be had,” the council members insisted, “to the mode 
of living of these people who constitute the 2de class, who, when 
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imprisoned ought certainly not to fare better than they generally do when 
at liberty.403 
This overt designation of prisoners into separate dietary classes was not 
a common feature of official diet regulations. In theory at least, legislation 
and administrative practice did not differentiate on the basis of color. But 
the recognition of the differences in social and economic preconditions of 
inmates did retain its influence on the practical management of prisoners’ 
diet. In correspondence regarding issues of prison fare, officials often 
explained how an inmate’s provisions could be altered either from medical 
reasons, on the recommendation of a physician, or on grounds of the 
inmate’s “position in society” prior to his incarceration.404 In that sense, the 
management of prisoner diets resembled the autonomous juridical practice 
of sentencing, referred to in the previous chapter, that emerged in the early 
nineteenth century, in that the ‘successful’ composition of prison diets relied 
on the prison manager’s knowledge of colonial social conditions. 
It was not until the promulgation of the Prison Regulations for the 
Danish West Indian Islands in 1906 that a somewhat uniform diet for all 
prisoners in the Danish West Indies was introduced, and even then a 
difference between the prisoners’ diets on St. Croix and St. Thomas was 
retained. The difference in diets was retained on the grounds of the different 
‘life-modes’ of the two islands’ populations. In his proposal to the general 
framework of the new prison regulations, Governor Jürs predicted that the 
uniform regulation of all the colony’s jails and prisons would be possible in 
all but one area. In regard to prisoners provisions, he thought it best to let 
consideration for “many years of customary practice and the respective 
populations’ different daily way of living” govern that the difference in 
prisoners’ diet on St. Croix and St. Thomas should be retained in the new 
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regulations.405 In a later communication Jürs specified what he was alluding 
to: “Government assumed,” he wrote “that humaneness forbid the 
introduction of St. Croix provisioning on St. Thomas,” and that Government 
had not found sufficient reason to alter the provisioning on St. Croix, which 
“is fairly coherent with the general way of living of the working-class 
population.”406 The prison diet on St. Thomas was more varied and the 
prisoners were served warm meals. According to Landphysicus Mortensen, 
this difference in diet was explained by the interaction that the lower classes 
on St. Thomas had with more heterogeneous populations. They had 
supposedly become accustomed to greater variation in their diet.407 
A similar conception regarding prison inventory was eventually adopted 
in the Danish West Indian prison regulation of 1906, in which it stated that 
“[s]hould the Prison Director consider that a prisoner's special relations (his 
social position, former habits of life and the like) furnish a reason for 
allowing him the use of a bed with a mattress, sheets and a quilt, he may 
permit their use.”408 While the regulation’s wording refers to “social 
position” as determinate of possibly favorable treatment, the drafting 
process reveal the undercurrent of racial assumption-making that such 
regulations reflected. In regard to the drafting of prison regulations, 
however, the genesis of assumptions about the function of race in Danish 
West Indian prisons—and by extension, colonial society at large—was, in 
terms of governmental practice, metropolitan in origins. When the Super-
Inspectorate of Prisons in Denmark received the draft version of the prison 
regulations for review in 1904, its comments to the draft’s provisions were 
not as race-neutral as the final formulation. The draft suggested “a wooden 
plank bed or a table and a bench” as required bedding for inmates. To which 
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the Super-Inspectorate suggestively noted in the draft document’s margin: 
“A [proper] bed, at least for the whites?”409 And commenting on the draft’s 
suggestion that prisoners on St. Croix would be served the same fare for 
lunch and dinner, the margin notes read that St. Cruxian prisoners should be 
allowed a warm meal for dinner as was the case on St. Thomas—“the white 
[prisoners] at any rate.”410 These comments were given by Super-Inspector 
of Prisons, K. Goos, a Danish state-official serving as the head administrator 
of the Danish prison service. His recommendations, then, reflect a 
metropolitan assumption of colonial race relations, presupposing the 
favorable treatment of whites as self-evident in colonial policy-making. 
In addition to annotating the draft document itself, Goos provided an 
elaborate commentary on the proposed regulations and the general project 
of colonial prison reform. The overarching message in Goos’s review was 
the principle of uniformity. Uniformity in the treatment of inmates in the 
colonial prisons; uniformity between the regulation and management of 
prisons in the colony and the metropole. It would be difficult to say if the 
latter objective was achievable, Goos admitted, when “climatic and cultural 
differences” were taken into consideration.411 Goos, however, also 
proclaimed the necessity of separation and isolation. Here he referred to 
“the great governing principles of treatment of prisoners in our time,” the 
valency of which was “independent of geographical location and 
nationality.”412 These principles dictated the strict separation of male and 
female prisoners, and the isolation of remand prisoners and convicts from 
one another, the purpose being that remand prisoners would not suffer 
excessive inconveniences beyond their detention. For the convict, isolation 
was necessary to secure a treatment that sought to “regain him for society,” 
the achievement of which demanded “a regulated work-regime, school and 
church attendance, classification, and progression.”413 To Goos’s regret, 
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these principles were not being adhered to in the current management of 
Danish West Indian prisons, and neither would they be unless substantial 
alterations were made in regard to prison architecture. New prison buildings 
were needed if modern penitentiary principles were to be effectuated in the 
colonial prison system. Goos viewed the prospect of new prison facilities 
being constructed as highly unlikely given the colonial government’s 
financial difficulties.414 
Goos, thus, was an avid proponent and supporter of penitentiary 
principles: uniformity, classification, and discipline. Yet, he made 
comments to the regulation draft, with the confidence of self-evidentiary 
truths, clearly presupposing the differential treatment of white and black 
inmates in the colonial prison. At the same time, he questioned the 
expediency of having different provisioning for prisoners on St. Thomas and 
St. Croix with reference to the principle of uniformity in prisoner treatment. 
For this expert of penitentiary science, consideration for racial differences in 
colonial prison management superseded the concern for penitentiary 
principles of uniformity. 
Even before the West Indian Government was given the opportunity to 
consider the Super-Inspectorate’s review and suggestions to the draft, 
another official made his own comment in the margin of a summary of the 
draft deliberations including Goos’s review. The comment reflects the range 
of metropolitan assumptions about the influence of race in colonial 
government and how it should be regulated. It simply read: “The principle 
should be: no worse conditions for coloreds [kulørte] than for whites.”415 
The West Indian Government and its officials concurred with this principle. 
The new Governor, Nordlien, instructed the Police-masters that when 
revising the draft of prison regulations with regard to the comments from 
the ministries and the Super-Inspector of Prisons, it would not be advisable 
to include provisions that discriminated against prisoners on account of their 
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color.416 Upon returning the revised draft, Police-masters Baumann, 
Segelcke, and Zeilian upheld the Governor’s request by avoiding any racial 
discrimination. As officers of the colonial government, the Governor and his 
Policemasters were very careful of even giving the impression that racial 
discrimination was a guiding principle in its policy-making process, as to 
not arouse indignation.417 
Surely, racial assumptions also influenced colonial officials 
management of prisons in general and prisoners diet in particular. But 
unlike the assumptions about race given by Super-Inspector Goos, the 
responses to his recommendations by colonial officials show that their 
assumptions were grounded in a self-attained knowledge about colonial 
society and its inhabitants. This was a practical knowledge that had 
accumulated through years of ‘experience’ and even ethnographic studies, 
giving their assumptions a veneer of evidential—perhaps even scientific—
knowledge. In response to the Super-Inspectorate of Prisons’ objections to 
the volume and variation of the prison fare in St. Croix, the Landphysicus in 
Christiansted, Kalmer, responded by invoking the authority of his 
ethnographic capital. Kalmer could understand how the composition of 
prisoners’ diet might seem inadequate from the perspective of prison 
authorities in Denmark. But with his expertise and deep knowledge of 
native habits and lifestyle, based on twenty-six years of experience as 
physicus and prison doctor, made Kalmer confident that the prisoner diet 
was very reasonable and reflective of actual conditions of life in the colony.  
Kalmer’s assessment was not just based on his own experience, he 
emphasized. As evidence he cited an ethnographical study of the dietary 
habits of the “average negro laborer”418 that the Landphysicate had carried 
out in 1883. For their study, the Landphysicate had arranged the assistance 
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of “some of the more intelligent Negros (drivers and artisans)”419 to select 
and question informants. The information gathered from the interviews, 
which Kalmer reproduced in detail, had shown that the laborers’ average 
meal was served cold and consisted of either bread, fungi, corn porridge, or 
salted fish. It was not uncommon for laborers to have the same meal for 
both lunch and dinner. Sometimes they would pick some fresh fruit, and one 
informant reported that he occasionally treated himself to a fried fish on 
Sunday evenings.420 
The point that Kalmer was making was that the prison fare corresponded 
quit accurately to the average diet of the colony’s laboring class. 
Furthermore, Kalmer evoked the often voiced concern with the principle of 
less eligibility by asserting that it could not be the intention to facilitate a 
higher standard of living for the prison inmate than for the free laborer. As it 
were already, Kalmer insisted, the laboring classes did not associate 
imprisonment with neither moral debasement nor physical discomfort. The 
possible addition of warm meals and more varied prison fare, could, in 
Kalmer’s opinion, potentially eliminate the already limited deterrent effect 
of imprisonment.421 In case of illness the prison doctor could grant an 
alteration to the daily diet, Kalmer explained, or in exceptional cases where 
the regular diet actually made the prisoner sick “(for example with 
Whites),” Kalmer added in parenthesis.422 
The Police-masters in Christiansted and Frederiksted agreed with 
Kalmer on his comments. They reasoned that the degree of punishment 
would be disproportionate to the purpose of the punishment and cause 
relatively more pain than otherwise intended when individuals of higher 
social status were forced to live on diets that were designed to approximate 
the diet of rural laborers.423 The punishment would be to lenient, the Police-
masters thought, if the diet were to be improved. They concluded with 
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regret that the lower classes of the rural and urban population, from which 
the vast majority of prisoners belonged to, did not fear imprisonment nor 
viewed it as dishonoring.424 
 
Limits of the Colonial Prison 
In 1906, prison regulations specifically for prisons in the Danish West 
Indies were issued. These were the first regulations for Danish West Indian 
prisons to be issued since the rules concerning the use and government of 
the St. Croix prison at Richmond had been issued in 1837. Prison managers 
in the West Indies had consulted those regulations as well as related 
regulations used by the Danish prison administration, more specifically, the 
law of 3 December 1850 had been followed when disciplining convicts, 
while the regulations of 7 December 1846 had been used in regard to 
remand prisoners.425 The management of prisons were, then, a matter of the 
prudence of managers, rather than any fixed procedures authorized by law.  
Along with the prison regulations of 1906 an ordinance specifically for 
St. Croix, concerning the authority to administer disciplinary punishments 
that regulated the administration of disciplinary punishment in “convict 
prisons” [strafanstalter] and “other prisons” [arresthuse] was issued. A key 
source of inspiration in the drafting of the ordinance was an equivalent 
ordinance of 5 June 1874 regarding disciplinary punishment in Iceland’s 
convict prison. The wording of the Icelandic ordinance is almost exactly the 
same as the West Indian. However, the two ordinances differed on the issue 
of disciplining female prisoners. In Iceland and in Denmark it was not 
permitted to administer corporal punishment to female prisoners. During the 
drafting of the West Indian ordinance it was held that corporal punishment 
was indispensable when disciplining inmates in West Indian prisons, even in 
the case of female inmates. The reason that was given was that  
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in the Danish West Indies, the female prisoners can be just as 
ungovernable as the males, and corporal punishment is the only kind for 
which they have real respect, to which must be added that the women of 
the working classes do just the same work in the fields as the men, 
whereby their bodies are so strengthened and hardened that they can bear 
bodily pain equally well with the men.426 
In general, the measure of disciplinary punishment, proposed by the 
drafters, was more severe than comparable Danish and Icelandic 
disciplinary regulations. Accordingly, the West Indian police masters should 
be authorized to administer punishments up to fifteen strokes of a ratan for 
males over the age of eighteen compared to the nine strokes that the 
Icelandic regulation provided for. The rational for the severity of 
punishment was to be found in the “entirely uncontrolled and extremely 
passionate character of the population.”427 
With the regulations of 1906 we see the legally authorized formation of 
a specifically West Indian prison system whose differences from the 
metropolitan system were made explicit in its legal foundation. Certainly, 
differences had always existed, but as the preceding sections have shown 
the deviations were not officially sanctioned nor approved of by authorities 
in Denmark. The ideal West Indian prison system was from the perspective 
of prison authorities in Denmark essentially a replica of Danish penal 
institutions with minor adjustments to local circumstances, such as the 
climate. The authorization of the 1906 regulations provides evidence for the 
fact that the metropolitan policy towards West Indian prisons had indeed 
altered its course during the second half of the nineteenth century. It had 
gone from the insistence on a West Indian prison system that would be 
capable of effectuating the same penitentiary objective as the Danish prison 
system—even demanding the transportation of offenders across the Atlantic 
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in order to further that goal—to the promotion of a culturally adapted prison 
system that would be properly equipped to handle that “uncontrolled and 
extremely passionate character of the population.” It was a thoroughly 
colonial system that was “efficient, in accordance with the tropical climate 
…, and … advantageous to the general public … .”428 
As Diana Paton astutely notes, it was not the reintroduction of corporal 
punishment that sat the colonial prison apart from its metropolitan 
counterpart. Penological science in general had seen an increasing 
skepticism towards a penal system devoid of corporal punishment all 
together. Corporal punishment was never negated by the discovery of the 
delinquent’s soul and psyche as the primary target of penitentiary 
punishment. Indeed, the stick, the whip, and penal transportation reappeared 
in the penal policies of the early twentieth century as a reinforced arsenal of 
the moral prerogative of punishment.429  
During the same period, however, criminology and criminal 
anthropology became influential explorers of the cause and remedy of 
crime. By further individualizing the penal procedure, criminology 
intensified the penitentiary treatment, but also simultaneously questioned its 
universality.430 It is precisely in regard to the individualizing procedure of 
punishment that Paton locates the dislocation between colonial and 
metropolitan penal regimes. In the colony, the character of offenders were 
equated not with particularly delinquent classes as subsets of the general 
population, but with the colonial population itself. This is the same process 
that occurred when the ordinance on prison discipline could justify the 
extenuating punishment of West Indian female inmates by referring to the 
“uncontrolled and extremely passionate character of the population,” and 
not a specific character of female criminal offenders in the West Indian 
prison. The same could be said in regard to issues of West Indian inmates’ 
health, labor, or diets. 
Paton suggests that this was a “common” aspect of “colonial discourse” 
by which “divisions and distinctions within the colonized population were 
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erased.”431 In this chapter, I have attempted to question the limits of colonial 
discourse by drawing attention to the affinities between discourses of 
punishment at different scales, especially the inherently comparative and 
consultative discourse of international penitentiary experts. In the material 
that I have examined for this chapter, I have found a similar discursive 
tendency to equate the colonial criminal with colonial populations. Thus, the 
evaluation of colonial prison systems often hinged on the degree to which 
colonial prison systems could approximate the perceived character of 
colonial populations. I have not, however, attempted to establish any 
coherent causality between the discourses of international penitentiary 
experts and the practical implementation of prison administration in the 
Danish West Indian colony or any other colonies for that matter. Further 
research on the international networks of penitentiary experts and their 
practical influence in colonial as well as metropolitan contexts would do 
much to shed light on this possible connection across different scales of 
governmentality. 
As a concluding remark, I want to stress the multi-vocal nature of 
punishment in the Danish West Indies. Programs of punishment were never 
univocally accepted or agreed upon. During the drafting of the 1906 
ordinance David Pretto, a member of the Colonial Council of St. Thomas 
and St. John rejected the draft on the grounds of “being entirely opposed to 
corporal punishment, more especially when to be inflicted on women.”432 
Pretto’s opposition was apparently shared by parts of the public, as was 
remarked by 3rd member for Frederiksted’s Country District to the Colonial 
Council of St. Croix, Merwin. At the first discussion of the draft Merwin 
recounted that the contents of the draft had coursed quite a stir in the 
community by bringing “back to memory the times of slavery with its 
whipping system” and that further discussions of the ordinance was better 
carried out within the confines of a committee.433 Another representation of 
an alternative public sentiment towards punishment was provided by a 
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petition sent to the commission of 1902 from the board of The Native 
Insular Convention. The petition argued for an expansion of the penitentiary 
institutions of the islands to include a correctional institution 
[forbedringsanstalt] for idle children of around fourteen years of age.434  
Among the colonial public, then, the potential of correctional treatment 
had certainly not disappeared. The same was true of individual voices 
within the ranks of government at both sides of the Atlantic. 1n 1882, 
Governor Christian Henrik Arendrup discussed the possibility of converting 
the prison at Richmond into a penitentiary in accordance with the separate 
system, complete with cellular imprisonment. Arendrup’s suggestions were 
dismissed by chief justice P. M. Andersen who thoroughly disagreed with 
the governor’s preference for the separate system. Andersen held that the 
climatic conditions did not agree with the strict isolation of the separate 
system. Furthermore, “the nature of the negro” made solitary confinement a 
disproportionately severe punishment.435 The ease with which Andersen, the 
seasoned colonial official, dismissed the newly appointed Governor’s 
ambition of intensifying the correctional objective of imprisonment by 
referring to the “natures” of colonial climate and population, is itself a 
testimony to the discursive relation between the rationality of punishment 
and the practical knowledge of colonial nature and population. 
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Chapter Five 
Market, Community, Progress 
 
 
Day and night, morning and evening, — it is all the same to us in these 
agonizing days; all that interrupts the passing of time are telegrams from 
St. Croix telling of more arson, looting, and murder and unimaginable 
brutality [raahed].436 
 
 
Thus described an anonymous Danish woman residing on St. Thomas the 
experience of proximity to the labor riots that engulfed St. Croix in the days 
of 1 and 2 October 1878. In the form of letters, parts of which were 
published in the Danish newspaper, Aarhuus Stiftstidende, the anonymous 
dane left no doubt in the readers mind that this was a form of rioting that 
was specific to a particular class of black laborers. She recalled to the reader 
how “I.”—presumably her husband—had returned from St. Croix, were he 
had been involved in the efforts to contain the rioting, with staggering 
descriptions of the rebellious scenes that these “devil hordes” [djævlehobe] 
partook in: 
…that the women and children were equally as mad as the men; all 
baring arms: cane-axes [rørøxer] on long shafts, stones and some 
firearms. They sat fire to the shops in Frederiksted, dragged out the 
goods, poured petroleum on them to make them burn better, and in their 
joy of seeing all this destruction they took off their clothes, sang and 
danced naked around the fires, and howled, roared and vandalized 
[ødelagde] to a degree that only the blacks are capable of.437 
Similar scenes of monstrous anarchy were reported by the Danish weekly 
magazine Illustreret Tidende that described how “an uncontrollable lust for 
destruction” had “seized the negroes,” causing “wild negro hordes” to go on 
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a “diabolic rampage across the island burning down one plantation after the 
other.” The rioters’ craze for setting ablaze as much property as possible, 
had, according to the article in Illustreret Tidende, been so great that it had 
probably prevented a regular “bloodbath” by allowing the white planters 
and their family to escape the “intoxicated” mob unnoticed. 
These reports of the riots in the Danish press evoked an almost 
mythological imagery of the bestial and diabolic instincts of the black labor 
population when explaining the cause and dynamic of the riot. They did not 
mention the underlying tension and resentment that had been looming and 
brewing within the rural laborers towards their white employers since the 
strict labor regulations—the so called “Labor Act”—had been enacted in 
1849 immediately following emancipation. Most people in the West Indies, 
however, were perfectly well aware of the conundrum that the creation of a 
labor market as a consequence of emancipation had posed to the power 
relations of colonial society. Though the majority of employers, planters, 
and officials agreed that legislations that regulated the freedom of the labor 
market were necessary for sustaining a sufficient labor force and thereby 
securing the general economy of the islands, especially the plantation 
economy of St. Croix, discussions of the degree, limit, and benefit of 
regulation were, however, a recurring phenomenon.438 
In the aftermath of the riots, which had coursed significant damage to 
property and persons, a royal commission was appointed to examine the 
courses of the rebellion and give recommendations to the prevention of its 
reoccurrence.439 The commission’s overall conclusion was that the initial 
breakout of the riot had not been the result of premeditated plans of 
rebellion, but had been sparked by an isolated incident that had ignited the 
general discontentment among workers with salary levels and prizes of 
travel permits.440 While the commission did not view the riot as a planned 
insurrection as such, it did identify the 1849 Labor Act as an important 
structural factor in the root causes of the discontentment among the laborers 
that had been ignited with such great force on 1 October 1878. According to 
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the commission, the labor act had been enacted to limit the “negative 
effects” of emancipation on the plantation economy, restricting labor 
mobility, and tying plantation laborers to year long contracts. Initially 
conceived as temporary provisions, the regulations were, however, never 
revised, and so never facilitated the gradual transition from slave labor to 
free labor for which it had been intended. Instead, argued the commission, 
the conditions of labor, with long contracts and work gangs, had instilled the 
laboring class with the perception of still being kept in the otherwise defunct 
conditions of slavery.441 
In form as well as purpose the laws to regulate the labor and mobility of 
the newly freed subjects resembled the "police" regulations that aimed at 
securing the social and economic order of the former slaver society. The 
main characteristic of slavery's organization of labor was the restriction of 
mobility. As the power structure of slavery was abolished new mechanisms 
were required to fill the vacuum. Faced with the challenge of containing the 
mobility of the newly emancipated population the colonial government 
utilized the techniques with which it was most familiar: the contingent 
governmental technology of "police." Accordingly, the Labor Act has 
primarily been by historians as an extraordinary contingency measure 
constructed to retain control of the emancipated labor force with the 
interests of the planters in mind.442 
However, the conception of what a well ordered society meant and the 
means by which such order should be obtained in the mid-nineteenth 
century cannot be contained within the principles of eighteenth century 
polizeiwissenshaft. Instead we have to take into consideration that 
alternative analysis and management of order that was formulated in 
opposition to the artificiality of seventeenth and eighteenth century “police” 
regulation, and later ascended to a position of centrality in liberal 
governmental rationality. The alternative to “police” is “political economy” 
and the alternative to polizeiwissenshaft is economics.443 Conceptions of 
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“police” and “economy” bore with them broader sentiments about the 
dynamics of human relations in terms of equality, hierarchy, nature, and 
moral capacities towards civilization and industry. At the heart of debates 
over the principles of economics or political economy, about the efficacy of 
iconic semantic gestures such as “laissez faire” or “the invisible hand,” was 
ultimately the problematic of race. If the perceived differences between the 
races of the human species were determined by natural conditions rather 
than societal institutions, then perhaps “the invisible hand” should be less 
preferred to “the beneficient whip” as a mechanism of order. 
At the center of the problem of a sustainable emancipation, then, we find 
the somewhat illusive concept of “the negro’s character” and the best 
mechanisms to facilitate its improvement. This in turn was a contest 
between two forms of organization that both bore a claim to be natural 
orders and were depicted as both each others opposite as well as underlying 
prerequisite. These were ‘the community’ and ‘the market.’ The following 
chapter considers how these two ideal types of social and economic 
organization was imagined an perceived in relation to the problem of 
governing an emancipated population of Afro-Caribbeans in an era that saw 
the cementation of social darwinism—or the theory of evolution applied to 
the analysis of social processes—as well as ‘scientific’ economics. 
 
Ambivalent Natures 
The depiction of rioting blacks in the Danish press in 1878 certainly 
retained a sense of the static primordial character of the African race. This 
reflects a continually looming disillusionment with the liberal project in the 
colonies. The British experience had shown that emancipation from slavery 
and the endowment of liberty was not in itself sufficient to cultivate an 
economic and moral conduct within the formerly enslaved, black subjects. 
The mere establishment of personal liberty had not brought about the level 
of civility in the freed slaves that a liberal society had come to expect of its 
citizens. The tales of barbarity that were depicted in the reports by the 
Danish press regarding the 1878 riots were far from the optimism that 
proponents of emancipation had shown in regard to post-emancipation 
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society in the Danish West Indies. During a tour of the British West Indian 
colonies, two members of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 
reported in regard to St. Croix that “[i]t is not yet fully the abode of liberty, 
but we trust that it soon will be, and that the people, emancipated from 
every remnant of bondage, will rejoice as free men on the soil that gave 
them birth.”444  
For critiques of the liberal approach to the post-emancipation project, 
the “abode of liberty” had turned out to be more of an incubator for the most 
basic of instincts of the black race from which no one benefitted. Around 
the same time that abolitionist activists expressed their hope for the post-
emancipation prosperity of St. Croix, critiques of the implementation of 
emancipation in the British empire were growing increasingly discouraged 
with the potential of Afro-Caribbeans to develop the capacities necessary to 
participate meaningfully in a free society.445 Instead calls for a return to 
conditions reminiscent of slavery were growing in popularity. Robert Young 
has referred to this development as a shift from “Evangelical tolerance” to 
“Imperial prejudice” in the public attitudes towards race that was garnered 
by an increasing influence of race theory since the 1840s.446 
One of the most notable contributors to the British disillusionment with 
liberal emancipation was the Scottish lawyer-historian-essayist Thomas 
Carlyle. Carlyle was driven in his writing by an “inegalitarian attitude to the 
‘inferior’ races,” which he shared with other prominent British and French 
authors and scientists of the day such as Charles Dickens, John Ruskin, 
Alfred Tennyson, Charles Kingsley, Ernest Renan, Georges Cuvier, and 
Arthur de Gobineau, as well as authors in the spurring community of race 
scientists and social darwinists, such as George Gliddon, Josiah C. Nott, and 
Robert Knox.447 In 1849 he expounded his controversial views on the 
effects of emancipation on the state of labor and industry in the British West 
Indian colonies in the London periodical Fraser’s Magazine. The essay 
entitled “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question” caused quite a 
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controversy, with one commentator referring to Carlyle’s essay as “a true 
work of the devil.”448 In the essay Carlyle launched a vicious attack against 
the idle character of the liberated “negro”: 
Sitting yonder, with their beautiful muzzles up to the ears in pumpkins, 
imbibing sweet pulps and juices; the grinder and incisor teeth ready for 
every new work, and the pumpkins cheap as grass in those rich climates; 
while the sugar crops rot round them, uncut, because labor cannot be 
hired, so cheap are the pumpkins.449 
But Carlyle’s essay was more than a rant of racial stereotyping. In 
correlation with Carlyle’s “negrophobia,” as David Theo Goldberg has 
termed it, we find “a critique of laissez faire capitalist political economy 
prevailing at the time.”450 In the essay Carlyle coined the phrase “the dismal 
science” as a dysphemism for the science of economics: “the social science 
… which finds the secret of this universe in ‘supply and demand,’ and 
reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone… .”451 The 
actual target of Carlyle’s criticism was not the lazy and derelict members of 
the “negro race.” Rather, Carlyle was targeting the alliance of economists 
and abolitionists—“Exeter Hall philanthropy and the Dismal Science”—
452that claimed to know from economic and Christian principles that all men 
essentially held the same capacities for industry and civilization, and that 
the potentials for fulfilling such capacities were determined not by race but 
by social and economic institutions. Carlyle’s anti-emancipation position 
was simultaneously an anti-economics argument. 
With “an ear for fact and nature”453 Carlyle argued for the reintroduction 
of “human governors” as a replacement for the failing forces of supply and 
demand in the power relations of labor in the West Indies. Emancipation 
had dislodged the black man from his intended purpose—an intention that 
Carlyle credited to the Maker’s will. Liberated from the bonds of slavery, 
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the black man found himself prohibited by his own indolence “[t]o do 
competent work, to labor honestly according to the ability given them,” and 
as such was “prevented from fulfilling this, the end of his being.”454 For 
Carlyle this constituted an infringement upon “the eternal law of nature for a 
man”455 as well as “the divine right of being compelled (if ‘permitted’ will 
not answer) to do what work they are appointed for, and not to go idle 
another minute, in a life so short!”456 It was the duty of any “unprohibited” 
person to help secure this right and thus bring about a second 
“emancipation,” reinstating the natural and divine order: 
The idle black man in the West Indies, had, not long since, the right, and 
will again, under better form, if it please Heaven, have the right (actually 
the first "right of man" for an indolent person) to be compelled to work as 
he was fit, and to do the Maker's will, who had constructed him with such 
and such prefigurements of capability457 
Order would be achieved through “a regulated West Indies” where a “black 
working population in adequate numbers” would be bound by contracts of 
considerable length to serve “those that are born wiser than you, that are 
born lords of you—servants to the whites, if they are (as what mortal can 
doubt they are?) born wiser than you.”458 The model of contractual servitude 
that Carlyle imagined for the West Indian laborers was more an 
approximation of “the old European serfs” than a reversal to pre-
emancipation slavery.459 
As the most prominent proponent of “the dismal science,” John Stuart 
Mill was obliged to respond to Carlyle’s attack. Mill did so in an essay with 
the only slightly less ominous title, “The Negro Question,” which appeared 
in the following issue of Fraser’s Magazine. Interestingly, Mill did not 
counter Carlyle’s discourse of natural law, justice, and right that legitimized 
the bondage by “human governors” of those less wise with a discourse of 
economic theory. He did not explain why the spontaneous order of economy 
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and the laws of free market forces prescribed that “human governors” 
should leave the regulation of labor to the spontaneous processes of 
economic relations and the mechanism of supply and demand. Instead, 
Mill’s rebuttal was framed in a similar language of rights and justice. 
Accordingly, he attributed the triumph of the abolitionist movement to its 
standing on the side of “justice” and of “religion,” and to its leaders’ “stern 
sense of moral obligation;” their discourse being less about “benevolence 
and philanthropy” and more about “duty, crime, and sin.”460 In other words, 
the campaign against slavery had been an endeavor for universal human 
justice rather than a misguided generosity towards a specific impoverished 
class of people. 
However, whereas Carlyle’s argument of a natural order between the 
races and classes of society had been one of a static and basic hierarchy 
based on predetermined properties, Mill’s analysis of human nature relied 
less on original properties and more on external influences. In a quit 
remarkable passage, Mill explained to the readers the “laws of external 
nature,” the knowledge of which had been attained through “analytical 
examination.” The same method of analytical examination could be applied 
to “the laws of the formation of character,” and had Carlyle done so, 
claimed Mill, he would not have come to the erroneous conclusion that all 
differences among humans have their origins in “an original difference of 
nature.” As an analogy to the formation of human character, Mill evoked the 
image of a three and the range of external influences that effected the 
capacities of its growth. Mill’s analogy deserves to be quoted in full: 
As well might it be said, that of two trees, sprung from the same stock, 
one cannot be taller than another but from greater vigour in the original 
seedling. Is nothing to be attributed to soil, nothing to climate, nothing to 
difference of exposure—has no storm swept over the one and not the 
other, no lightning scathed it, no beast browsed on it, no insects preyed 
on it, no passing stranger stript [sic] off its leaves or its bark? If the trees 
grew near together, may not the one which, by whatever accident, grew 
up first, have retarded the other’s developement [sic] by its shade? 
Human beings are subject to an infinitely greater variety of accidents and 
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external influences than trees, and have infinitely more operation in 
impairing the growth of one another, since those who begin by being 
strongest, have almost always hitherto used their strength to keep the 
others weak. What the original differences are among human beings, I 
know no more than your contributor [i.e. Carlyle], and no less; it is one of 
the questions not yet satisfactorily answered in the natural history of the 
species. This, however, is well known—that spontaneous improvement, 
beyond a very low grade,—improvement by internal developement, [sic] 
without aid from other individuals or peoples—is one of the rarest 
phenomena in history; and whenever known to have occurred, was the 
result of an extraordinary combination of advantages; in addition 
doubtless to many accidents of which all trace is now lost. No argument 
against the capacity of negroes for improvement, could be drawn from 
their not being one of these rare exceptions.461. 
In this passage, Mill is essentially describing a process of human 
injustice, or rather processes of human nature that leads to discrepancies in 
the development of different human races and societies. If the European 
were to be considered superior to the African, then it would not be because 
of an original divine will, but the objective result of a natural process, yet 
not a process that was governed by the laws of nature, but rather a combined 
effort between the basic tendency of human beings to act in accordance with 
their best interest and the unpredictability of accidents. The essentially 
economic argument that Mill was making was that all men were equal from 
the perspective of economic processes. Human actions and thus the 
development of human races are the result of the agency of interest and 
incentive. Thus, if you change incentives, you change behavior. 
In that sense, the abolition of slavery was a step closer to a condition 
were incentives could take effect. Slavery represented an artificial prohibitor 
for the natural processes of economic life by stifling the agency of 
incentives. Thus, while the abolition of slavery was an act of political 
economy, it was also a political intervention that essentially altered juridical 
relationships and relations of sovereignty, and as such the political 
intervention of abolishing slavery required more than an economic rational. 
It had to be framed within a discourse of universal human justice; a 
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universal justice that re-articulated the relations of men as essentially equal. 
In order to reinstate the natural equality of men, slavery would have to be 
abolished. And in so doing, the ideal conditions under which economic 
processes could obtain its spontaneous order were also approximated 
further. 
So, within the dispute between Carlyle and Mill, we find two very 
different approaches to the governmentality of post-emancipation society. 
Both rested on an analysis of the nature of the black race, but with very 
different answers as a result. Yet, neither of the contributors claimed that the 
idle laborers should be left to themselves. Neither of them were arguing for 
a policy of limited government. Mill did not refer to a liberal economic 
theory of the market’s ability to spontaneously reestablish economic order. 
Both felt strongly that government was obliged to intervene and eliminate 
disorderly elements, wether by reinstating compulsory work or installing a 
pedagogic campaign of character improvement.  
Besides displaying the degree of hostility that “the negro question” 
could arouse in public debates, the dispute between Carlyle and Mill, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, also hints at the proximity, which the liberal 
political economist and the conservative aristocratic historian shared, to an 
ethics of despotism in regard to the government of a colonial population in a 
post-emancipation society. Wether by compulsion or improvement, the 
laborer himself had no say in the contours of his future. 
This ambivalence in liberal thought between the freedom of economic 
life and governmental powers of intervention in social life has a lineage that 
goes back to the concept of “legal despotism” that featured prominently in 
the writings of the French Physiocrats. This opposition between an 
autonomous order of economic space and a regulated order of social space 
is also highly present in the writings of Jeremy Bentham. In his economic 
writings Bentham promoted an idea of “spontaneous harmony,” while his 
writings on crime and punishment featured a relentless reverence for the 
power of social and individual discipline and regulation.462 For some 
historians these two faces of Bentham, and of British utilitarianism in 
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general, have never amounted to a dichotomy, but rather reflects the 
intertwined strategies of liberal political government. Referring to a mid-
nineteenth century British liberal-interventionist policy, Karl Polanyi wrote 
that “laissez-faire was planned.”463 For Polanyi, laissez-faire market 
economy represented a utopian condition requiring a global coordination of 
economic liberalism: “Nothing less than a self-regulating market on a world 
scale could ensure the functioning of this stupendous mechanism.”464 To 
imagine that such a global self-regulating market would be established 
simply by being left alone was a fiction, Polanyi argued. It required a 
sustained deployment of a whole range of regulations, tariffs, 
administration, and government intervention. “There was nothing natural 
about laissez-faire,” asserted Polanyi and added: “The road to the free 
market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, 
centrally organized and controlled in-terventionism.”465 Economic 
liberalism was flanked by a government apparatus of social security that 
was installed in order to minimize the risks that the detrimental effects of 
free markets and society inflicted on one another. These types of security 
mechanisms were epitomized by the new technology of the penitentiary 
prison (cf. chapter four) as well as campaigns to combat idleness and 
insobriety among the delinquent masses that themselves were seen as 
products of industrialized and commodified production and labor. Similarly, 
the imposition of self-regulating markets involved an increased risk of 
unemployment for workers and increased competition from foreign imports 
for farmers; both factors having great impact on the costs and therefor 
standards of living in a commercialized society. As Fred Block puts it in his 
introduction to the 2001 edition of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: “it 
requires statecraft and repression to impose the logic of the market and its 
attendant risks on ordinary people.”466 The introduction of free markets 
required great amounts of maintenance, and it in no way effectuated the 
withdrawal of governmental intervention upon which the ideology of 
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economic liberalism rested. The maintenance of free markets multiplied the 
need for regulation and thus the very state whose activities had been 
targeted as unnatural and artificial “could not but [be] entrust[ed] with the 
new powers, organs, and instruments required for the establishment of 
laissez-faire.”467 In other words, laissez-faire was an end in itself rather than 
a means to meet that end. 
In order to further develop the theoretical aspects of this ambiguous 
relationship between a regulation and intervention that in its purpose does 
not seem different from the earlier technology of “police” and a principle of 
letting alone the spontaneous and inherent regulation of natural orders that 
informed a liberal technology of government, and to situate the development 
of labor regulation in post-emancipation Danish West Indies within the 
dissertation’s general discussion of the configuration of governmentality, it 
will once again be necessary to delve into Foucault’s College de France 
lectures. 
 
From Police to Security 
Michel Foucault approached the ambivalence between laissez-faire 
economics and an interventionist social policy within liberalism through the 
notion of “security” and identified a set of important modifications of 
governmentality from the political technology of police towards the political 
technology of economy. In the thirteenth and final lecture of the 1978 
course Foucault described the relationship between police and an opening 
up of a new governmentality. A governmentality that was not characterized 
by the regulative techniques of police but by the naturalness of the 
economy. This new governmentality that was spurred on by the économiste 
of late eighteenth century France, delineates the objective of government to 
be not the regulation of the people’s wellbeing in pursuance of a growth of 
the state’s forces, but instead ensuring the self-regulation of social and 
economic relations according to the natural order of things. The objective of 
good government would no longer be the creation of order through police, 
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but the elimination of disorderly elements through mechanisms of 
security—providing security for the natural order of economic relations to 
develop against the risk of interference of disorderly elements such as 
vagrant, idle, and delinquent subjects. 
Foucault writes of ’mechanisms of security’ as a wide range of actions 
that government is designed to carry out in contemporary liberal societies, 
and that are distinct from the common conception of security as protection 
against imminent dangers to person and property. These mechanisms are 
described by Foucault as “state intervention with the essential function of 
ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or 
processes intrinsic to population.”468 In this conception of security, the 
modern police institution will be limited to the negative functions of 
preventing “the occurrence of certain disorders,”469 while the task of 
securing an ordered and natural society becomes delegated to the many 
social and economic institutions of welfare states. The all-encompassing 
apparatus of police is thereby gradually limited to the purpose of preventing 
disorder and apprehending ’unnatural’ and disorderly individuals—the 
suppression of that whole population of individuals that would be known as 
’delinquents.’ On the other hand, all the aspects of police that aspired to 
establish the wellbeing of the population would be branched out into 
specific divisions of state’s internal administration: health, education, 
sanitation, urban planning, etc. The activities and objects of government are 
thus not transformed, but  the conditions of intervention and rationalities of 
application are reconfigured and modified in accordance with new 
conceptions of the function and objective of government and with new 
knowledges about the appliance of governmental technologies and about the 
reality that is intervened in. 
In relation to this general process, Foucault singles out four principle 
modifications of governmentality. Firstly, Foucault identified a shift in what 
governmental thought conceived of as the correlate of the state. While 
raison d’État and the political technology of police conceived of their object 
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of government as “a collection of subjects,” the new governmentality was 
required to know, regulate, and manage “a civil society” whose natural 
processes and regulations government would have to respect and protect.470 
Secondly, the character of the knowledge that was produced regarding the 
activity of government was modified. The knowledge of state becomes 
scientific in the sense that it is no longer “a calculation of forces” but an 
evidence-based science that forms the basis of government. This 
“scientificity” of the state and of the activity of government was the 
crystallization of economics as a scientific discipline that was external to the 
art of government but retained its influence over it. This process limits 
government in the sense that the actions of government can be wrong in 
regard to the scientific basis behind its policies. Importantly, it is a scientific 
knowledge that does not pertain to the state or to government itself, but 
rather to that which is the object of government, and, thus, the techniques of 
government will have to be conducted in accordance with this scientific 
knowledge of society and economy in order to be both successful and 
legitimate.471 The third modification regards the conception of population. 
First, the dynamics of population becomes adorned with a naturalness. The 
dynamics of population follows laws of transformation that are determined 
by its own intrinsic naturalness. Second, the modality of interaction and 
bond between individuals in the population becomes subject not to the will 
of the state but to “the law of the mechanics of interest.”472 And third, the 
security of this new reality of population with its naturalness and internal 
mechanism of regulation becomes the responsibility of the state. The fourth 
modification pertains to the techniques of government that can be applied in 
relation to the previous three modifications. If the domains of government—
i.e. society, population, and economy—are defined as being subject to 
natural processes, then what type of techniques and interventions of 
government will be accepted as valid and effective? “The basic principle of 
the state’s role,” Foucault surmises, “will be to respect these natural 
processes, or at any rate to take them into account, get them to work, or to 
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work with them.”473 The range of interventions by government are thereby 
limited in the sense that the negative form of rules and regulations losses 
their efficacy and legitimacy as instruments of government. Instead of 
preventing particular activities, government will attempt to “arouse, to 
facilitate, and to laissez faire,” and ensure that the natural regulation 
intrinsic to the domains of government works by inserting “mechanisms of 
security” that ensures “the natural phenomena of economic processes or 
processes intrinsic to population.”474 
The central aspect of these modifications is the role that freedom comes 
to assert within governmentality:  
Henceforth, a condition of governing well is that freedom, or certain 
forms of freedom, are really respected. Failing to respect freedom is not 
only an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is above all ignorance of 
how to govern properly. The integration of freedom, and the specific 
limits to this freedom within the field of governmental practice has now 
become an imperative.475  
Here we find the seed of the tension within liberal governmentality between 
the imperative of freedom in the practice of government and the 
responsibility of government to provide security for the freedom of natural 
process within society, population, and economy. Freedom, thus, becomes a 
normative and relative concept. It is certain forms of freedom that most be 
respected and worked with by government. When the exercise of other 
freedoms jeopardizes the freedom of natural processes then it becomes the 
responsibility of government to intervene. Yet, still, the intervention, 
Foucault argues, will generally take on the productive form of management 
rather than the repressive form of regulations. The intervention, through 
mechanisms of security, will, thus, be based on a calculation of the utility of 
the intervention in relation to the kind of freedom that is exercised or in 
need of security. The benchmark in these types of calculations is provided 
by analyses of the naturalness of the processes at play in each given case. 
Thus, it is not the individual’s rights of freedom that limits the intervention 
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of government, but naturalness of the domain of government. In The Birth 
of Biopolitics, Foucault refers to liberalism as a “governmental naturalism.” 
What he is suggesting is that the origins of principles of liberal government 
are not to be found in a recognition of “the essential, basic natural rights of 
individuals,” but rather in a knowledge of the spontaneous mechanisms of  
the economy, society, and population “in their innermost and complex 
nature.”476 Foucault continues: 
Once it knows these mechanisms, it must, of course, undertake to respect 
them. But this does not mean that it provide itself with a juridical 
framework respecting individual freedoms and the basic rights of 
individuals. It means, simply, that it arm its politics with a precise, 
continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in 
society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation 
of its power is not given by respect for the freedom of individuals, but 
simply by the evidence of economic analysis which it knows has to be 
respected. It is limited by evidence, not by the freedom of individuals.477  
Liberalism certainly did bring with it a juridical conception of basic human 
and civil rights, but these were not the kind of freedoms the originators of 
liberal governmentality were referring to, Foucault argued. This 
interpretation of the original protocol of a governmental naturalism opens 
for the possibility of analyzing the interaction of liberal government and the 
colonial context in a way that differs from the often normative evaluations 
of liberalism in the colonies as dislocated from its european origins. 
 
National Character and the Economy of Progress 
For historians that have been interested in the imperial career of liberalism, 
the inherent tension between ideals of liberty and equality on the one hand 
and the coercive character of projects of social intervention and political 
“strategies of exclusion”478 on the other, have often been interpreted as 
indicative of a “rule of colonial difference”479 or a “dislocated liberalism”480 
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within the political rationality of colonialism.481 Particularly J. S. Mill’s 
career as a colonial administrator have served as emblematic of the liberal 
disjuncture in regard to colonial governmentality. Somehow, Mill’s 
otherwise egalitarian principles did not translate into his political practice as 
part of the colonial administration. Jennifer Pitts has argued that Mill’s 
interpretation of historical development favored “a rough dichotomy 
between savage and civilized,” which combined with his utilitarianism 
worked “to justify despotic, but civilizing, imperial rule.”482  
According to Pitts, Mill’s whole philosophy rested on an appreciation 
for the diversity of individual as well as national character. Mill shared this 
appreciation with Bentham but also criticized his utilitarian predecessor for 
not being able to grasp the civilizational hierarchy that this diversity 
represented. The conditions that determined these differences in national 
character were not to be found in a preordained natural rank of human 
races—characters were dynamic phenomenons that could rise as well as 
stagnate and decline—but they did reflect different stages of human 
progress.483 Mill’s insertion of the idea of national character in a dynamic 
hierarchy of progress meant that improvement and national mobility was 
possible within the system. Indeed, for Mill, individual and national 
improvement constituted the foremost objective of legal and social 
institutions. However, the meaning of improvement was relative to the 
preexisting conditions of each national character. “For a tribe of North 
American Indians,” Mill wrote in his Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, 
“improvement means, taming down their proud and solitary self-
dependence,” while, “for a body of emancipated negroes” a similar process 
of improvement meant “accustoming them to be self-dependent, instead of 
being merely obedient to orders.”484 The ends of improvement differed from 
each type of character, and so, the means of improvement were also 
different. A clear affinity can be detected here between Mill’s technology of 
improvement and Enoch Wines’ global program for prison reform (c.f. 
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chapter four), which in a similar manner promoted a relative conception of 
penitentiary systems. 
A common feature of the improvement of national characters was that 
the progression process had to be instigated from above, so to speak, by 
those at a higher level of civilization. Mill remained confident that, as Pitts 
puts it, “whole cultures could be deliberately engineered” by injecting “the 
best achievements of one society … into another less fortunate one … .”485 
Mill might have adhered to a universal ethos of improvement, but the 
technical aspects of engineering cultures and characters were specific and 
particular to the preexisting habits and customs of each character under 
improvement. 
More than emblematic of a corrupted universal liberal ideal, Mill’s 
engineering of character reflected the “governmental naturalism” that 
Foucault identified as a principle protocol of liberalism’s political 
technology. Only through a knowledge of the particular conditions of social 
and economic processes could the most prudent and efficient procedure for 
character improvement be ascertained. It was a question of knowing the 
specific preconditions of present characters, and of putting that knowledge 
to work in future efforts of reconfiguring those precondition to further 
improvement. It was never simply an issue of denying backward cultures 
access to otherwise universal rights of self-government. More than simply 
representing a constitutional ideal of uniformity, liberalism as a political 
technology worked on and with a reality of cultural diversity that was 
conceived as reflecting different stages of civilizational development. From 
that perspective, a uniform principle of government through personal 
liberty—which itself rested on the elitist precondition that only the better 
educated and more industrious elements of society could be afforded such 
liberty—was only one element of a larger economy of governmental 
strategies.486 
It was most vividly exposed in the context of colonial rule that liberal 
government was armed with a broader arsenal of political techniques than 
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what is often assumed. Here the developmental conception of human 
progress was actively operationalized in an ethics and politics of 
improvement that took precedent to the principle of individual liberty. But 
that does not mean that the influence of the developmental perspective was 
restricted to liberal political thought in the colonies, or that it derived from a 
confrontation with a different type of subject peoples.487 A criticism of 
liberal government in the colonies refers back to a general political strategy 
of liberalism, as Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess argues:  
Consideration of Empire, in other words, reveals the place of a 
hierarchical view of humanity at the heart of liberal political reason. Far 
from treating the rule of uniformity as the core of liberalism, we should 
see it rather as the tip of the liberal iceberg. The more destructive features 
lie beneath the surface.488 
Thus, while the relation between liberty and coercion, and principles of 
uniformity and diversity, within liberal political reason, is best represented 
as a state of tension, it is less a reflection of an inherent contradiction in the 
liberal logic, than an indication of the range of possible configurations of the 
liberal economy of power. The political career of liberalism in the West, in 
comparison to the colonies, has been to an equal degree characterized by a 
“liberal government of unfreedom.”489 
 
Between Community and Market 
When emancipation became a reality in the Danish West Indies in 1848, a 
range of problems emerged for those responsible for the government of the 
colony. Principle among them was the question of how to best retain a 
steady and stabile workforce for a plantation economy that was the 
economic and social foundation of the colony, particularly on St. Croix. 
This problem activated the “governmental naturalism,” to which the 
previous sections addressed themselves, at its most ambivalent. The general 
emancipation was proclaimed on July 3 by Governor-General von Scholten, 
who subsequently resigned from his position. In the absence of government 
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leadership and any preprepared contingency measures for the regulation of 
the formerly enslaved population, a group of planters convened shortly 
thereafter on July 10 and decided that a committee should be formed and 
charged with proposing new arrangements for the regulation of labor.490 The 
committee of planters worked quickly to produce a set of labor regulations 
that were published on St. Croix on 29 July 1848. The regulations required 
that laborers were permanently employed with contracts of minimum one 
year duration.491 Juridically speaking, the planters had thereby effectively 
counteracted the preliminary risk of labor shortage and accompanying spike 
in the price of labor. For the short-term, at least, the planters had prevented 
the emergence of a labor market in the Danish West Indies. 
On 26 November 1848 Acting Governor-General Peder Hansen arrived 
in the West Indies, charged with reorganizing social and political conditions 
in accordance with the altered circumstances.492 In regard to the issue of 
labor regulations this charge resulted in the enactment on 26 January 1849 
of the Provisional Act to Regulate the Relations between the Proprietors of 
Landed Estates and the Rural Population of Free Laborers—also known 
simply as the Labor Act.493 
Governor Hansen’s Labor Act retained the protectionist ethos of the 
planter’s earlier regulations. The primary function of the Labor Act was to 
keep the state of things as close to status quo as possible. Phrases such as 
“heretofore,” “as usual,” and “as customary” were used frequently 
throughout the twenty-three articles of the act. It represented an effort to 
retain the organization of labor, as well as the organization of rural society, 
as it had persisted for decades prior to emancipation. The provisions 
regulated “the mutual obligations” between laborers and employers, by 
determining the length of contracts, the hours of work, the amount of wages, 
etc. The regulations, however, also structured the domestic lives of workers, 
requiring that they made their home with their families at the estate to which 
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they had contracted their labor. As had been “customary” during slavery, the 
entire lives of free laborers were to be structured around their activity of 
work, and to a large degree confined to the plantation estate. Article nine of 
the act stipulated that laborers would be provided with “the use of a house, 
or dwelling-rooms for themselves and their children,” as well as “a piece of 
provision ground” between “thirty” and “fifty feet in square.”494 Besides 
housing, estate proprietors were also required to provide sufficient 
healthcare for the laborers and their children and elderly. Pregnant laborers 
were similarly entitled to a particular work schedule and sufficient care 
during their pregnancy. 
These conditions of mutual obligations lead some commentators to 
speak very positively about the prevailing organization of labor in the early 
period of post-emancipation:  
No one acquainted with the Islands can deny, that this law satisfies all 
reasonable demands. It is at present, and will no doubt for a long time be, 
the tie that connects the whole community, and prevents its complete 
dissolution.495 
The reality was, however, that the Labor Act of 1849 was a very convenient 
police measure for estate proprietors as well as colonial authorities—a 
“successful co-operation of the government and the enlightened part of the 
population” as one commentator later referred to it.496 Proprietors were 
secured a permanent labor population under conditions that were very 
similar to what had existed prior to emancipation, while the colonial 
government was spared the cost and trouble of having to all at once provide 
for every emancipated individual in terms of healthcare and provisions, not 
to mention the challenge to the preservation of public order that a fully 
mobile emancipated population would present. Whereas some spectators 
viewed the labor regulations as a mutually beneficial arrangement, it would 
not be unreasonable if others saw in them a continuation of the structure of 
slavery by other means. But how was the rationale behind these regulations 
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depicted? What were the perceived causes and effects of such restrictive 
measures? 
One such analysis was presented in 1862 by the medical physician and 
social economist, Frederik Krebs, who was deeply engaged in the politics of 
agriculture and labor in Denmark, both as an avid author and commentator, 
and as contributor to two parliamentary commissions on the reorganization 
of the system of poor relief and the regulation of labor.497 His interest in 
West Indian affairs had been established during a visit to the islands in 
1844-43 as a ship’s doctor and through his marriage with the daughter of an 
attorney in Christiansted. 
In his analysis of the transition from slavery to freedom, Krebs 
conceptualized post-emancipation society as a post-revolutionary society, 
not unlike similar sudden transitions that were occurring elsewhere in 
modernizing societies, “from the priveleges [sic] of corporation, to liberty in 
all kinds of work, from the protective system, to free-trade.”498 A common 
prerequisite for the beneficial outcome of such transitions were to be found 
in the “extreme prudence, and foresight,” with which they were 
implemented.499 Put differently, the transition from slavery to freedom was 
a fragile process that would require firm and careful guidance. For, as Krebs 
made clear, the political challenge was not simply one of restructuring the 
legal constitution of society, but fundamentally one of shaping subjectivities 
and conduct: 
It is an easy thing to say, that free labour is better than slave-labour, but it 
is very difficult to get free labour to take the place of slave-labour; in 
other words, to make the slave have the feelings that are proper to a free 
man.500 
And yet it was those mental dispositions of slavery that, in Krebs’ 
depiction, legitimized the form of the labor regulations and proved the 
prudence of their implementation. There were two principle conditions that  
justified the restriction on laborers freedom of movement and labor, in 
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Krebs opinion. One referred to the effect of slavery upon the work ethic of 
the emancipated laborer: 
Every one who has reflected on the subject of slavery, must be able to 
understand that it undermines the slave's love of labour, and his motives 
for gain, and how apt an emancipated slave is to think, that liberty, and 
exemption from work, are words of similar meaning.501 
If the Labor Act did not require laborers to be employed on a minimum of 
one-year contracts, chances were, according to Krebs, that they would be 
reluctant to take up any work at all due to the cultural and mental 
associations between field-labor and slavery. The probability of this 
scenario was augmented by the ability of the rural laborers to sustain 
themselves by very little means. This ability could not be attributed solely to 
the effects of slavery, but was considered by Krebs as a particular property 
of the African race: 
Every one that knows anything of the negro-race, must be aware, how 
little negroes need for their subsistence in a warm climate, and that they 
can procure what they require of the necessaries of life, for a few stivers, 
the whole being some fruits and vegetables, that are generally cheap 
articles.502 
Finally, Krebs considered the Labor Act to be prudent by fixing salaries in 
consideration of the abnormal conditions of the emancipated labor market. 
Because of planters high demand for labor, wages were correspondingly 
high, and in fact so high that in combination with the two other factors, 
laborers could suffice with only working a few days a week. Accordingly, 
the unusually high demand did not produce an otherwise expected rise in 
supply. 
Taking these factors into consideration, the Labor Act was, in Krebs’ 
view, in complete agreement with the best interests of the emancipated 
laborers by effectively counteracting the residual effects that the state of 
slavery had conditioned them with. “A class of labourers just liberated from 
the bonds of slavery,” Krebs claimed, “is of all things, most in want of 
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protection from itself. For in its midst are found elements, that threaten with 
destruction.”503 
In regard to the organization of Danish society, Krebs deplored what he 
viewed as the dissolving of “organic groups” that in his opinion 
characterized social change in Denmark.504 By the term “organic 
communities” Krebs was referring to the traditional estates of the country 
side and the trade guilds of the cities, which had provided its members with 
a certain level of certainty in terms of daily necessities of life. This tendency 
had given rise to a class of rural day-laborers who lived very uncertain lives 
and were frequent recipients of poor-relief.505 In contrast, the system of 
tenant-labour or contractual-labor provided more stability and comforts for 
not only the laborer himself but for his family as well.506 But while he 
scorned the breakup of traditional, organic communities, Krebs did not 
advocate for a return to conditions of villeinage or any organization of labor 
that approximated a serf-like condition. His solution to the problems of 
poverty in rural Denmark was a complete transition to wage-labor. When 
rural laborers were no longer payed partly in provisions and partly in wages, 
the actual income of the laborers as a whole as well as individually would 
become transparent. Then it would be possible to determine if the poverty of 
rural laborers was an effect of the level of their real wages, and 
subsequently decide whether or not the wages should be raised or lowered. 
So, Krebs was not vehemently against the marketization of labor, or at least 
the monetization of wages. At the moment when traditional forms of 
organizing labor along the lines of community dissolves and the process 
becomes irreversible, the complete implementation of a market-based labor 
organization was far more preferable, to Krebs, than the partial and 
inconsistent hybrid in between the two. For Krebs, the in-between was not 
sustainable. 
Yet, when commenting on a comparable process in the West Indies, 
Krebs found no reason to “experiment” with what seemed to be a reasonable 
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intermediary construction that both laborer and proprietor could be satisfied 
with. While the process of reorganizing labor conditions might have been 
comparable to similar processes in Denmark and the rest of Europe, the 
constitutive parts involved in the process was of a very different kind. “It is 
especially difficult for Europeans to understand,” Krebs asserted, “the 
peculiar character of the coloured and black race, its good, and its bad 
qualities.”507 The West Indian laborer was very different from the Danish, 
having been instilled with particular traits due to his exposure to the 
institution of slavery and from his racially determined properties. Thus, 
Krebs surmised, “[w]hat may be natural, and right in lands, which for many 
generations have been unacquainted with bondage and slavery, may be very 
dangerous in countries that have been only a short time without such 
institutions.”508 Following this assertion, the marketization of labor in the 
West Indies could not be considered prudent advise. Only within the 
confines of the organic community of the estate could the necessary 
management of the West Indian laborer’s character be obtained as well as 
provide the means for its improvement by promoting “a proper feeling for a 
pure domestic life.” In Krebs’ observation, the lack of appreciation for the 
domestic had been the most damaging consequence of slavery. Thus, the 
nourishment of domesticity within the character of the emancipated held the 
key to the longterm sustainability of post-emancipation society. The Labor 
Act provided security for the organic community to develop, grow, and 
nurse the character of the emancipated, while simultaneously securing the 
foundation of the West Indian economy to the benefit of laborer and 
proprietor alike. 
Let us then consider another document that provides further testimony 
of the calculations behind the labor regulations. It also gives voice to some 
of the conflicting understandings of the proper organization of labor in the 
Danish West Indies. The document in question was a “Draft of Labor-
Regulations for the Sugar Estates of St. Croix” compiled in 1872 by a 
commission that was given the task of proposing modifications to the 1849 
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Labor Act and its subsequent amendments by ordinances of 22 February 
1855 and 24 August 1867. In the commissioning letter, the Danish West 
Indian Government had forwarded the Danish Home Government’s 
aspirations that the modified labour-regulations would facilitate “greater 
freedom in arrangements for labour than allowed by the existing labour-
regulations.”509 The governmental expectations for a reformulation of 
labour-regulations were, then, clearly a liberalization of the strict and 
inflexible regulations that governed St. Croix’s labour market. The majority 
of the commission did not, however, envision the relation between worker 
and employer as an exchange ruled by free-market mechanisms. On the 
contrary, labour was a problem far to important to be left to the 
unpredictable ways of the market, and should rather be under the control of 
a thoroughly thought through set of regulations to the benefit of all parties 
involved. In the view of the commission majority, the proponents of a 
liberalization of labour regulations were forgetting that St. Croix was an 
agricultural economy based on one single production: sugar cultivation and 
sugar manufacture. Open competition among planters on labour relations 
would not help to sustain sugar production, but would instead lead to its 
demise and thereby the poverty of the entire community, including the 
laborers whose moral and economic betterment was the object of new 
labour-regulations. “[T]he labour-regulations are,” the commission majority 
contested,  
so to speak, both the Law of the Land and the established Custom or 
Usage of the Land, at one and the same time;—that those Regulations not 
only contain enactments on things and matters the adjustment of which is 
naturally and universally admitted to be within the province of the 
Legislature, but at the same time lay down rules for the organisation of 
regulations which are otherwise left to be determined by the employers 
themselves, by agreements, which they make binding between 
themselves, and to which the labourers consent by their contracts.510 
Labour-regulations for St. Croix, and specifically regarding sugar 
producing estates, would necessarily have to reach beyond the specific 
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regulations of worker and employer rights and duties, and fix the general 
terms for employment contracts. To do so would not represent a breach of 
the naturalness of economic relations. In fact, it would be done in 
accordance with established customs and usage. The legitimization of 
existing legislation was exactly that it had developed from custom and usage 
rather than being imposed as unnatural legislation. Rules and legislation that 
aimed at preserving the occupation of an entire community, as was the case 
with sugar production on St Croix, was justified and made necessary by its 
conservative function. These legislative considerations were not peculiar to 
St. Croix, the commission majority argued, but principles followed in 
“every manufacturing town or district of Great Britain.”511 
The main concern expressed by the Danish government regarding the 
existing labour-regulations pertained not so much to the efficiency of sugar 
production, but to the development of the Afro-Caribbean rural population. 
The regulations that forced workers to live on the estates, they worked on, 
and prescribed everything from their daily food rations to their matrimonial 
relations, and robed them from the financial and moral benefits of property, 
had a detrimental effect on the development of their moral character that as 
a result of emancipation necessarily had to be cultivated. From the 
perspective of the commission majority, however, this concern was 
superfluous since the workers while indeed being forced to build their 
homes on the estates had amble opportunity to build an industrious 
character. In addition to the protection that workers were secured by law, 
their estate dwellings provided the workers and their families with 
opportunities to cultivate their own produce and livestock, as well as foster a 
competitive environment where the industrious workers were sufficiently 
encouraged and rewarded for striving “to reach beyond the daily 
necessaries.”512 To that effect, the character building environment of the 
sugar estates were no different from “every other labouring community,” the 
commission majority argued, and asserted that “any one that has been about 
in the negroe-villages on the Estates will have noticed the same difference 
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there between the circumstances and condition of the industrious and sober 
labourer and that of the indolent and careless labourer….”513 
As evidence for their arguments, the commission majority referred to the 
success of two immigrant labour groups. According to the commission 
majority, “Eastindian Coolies” and immigrant laborers from the Dutch 
island of St. Eustatius had both faired well in adapting and profiting from 
the labour-regulations on St. Croix. The Indian workers that were 
introduced in 1863, proved that the wage system was adequate in allowing 
for workers to save up their earnings. In 1868, when their five year contract 
expired, 256 Indian workers of the 300 originally introduced returned to 
India with around $13.000 in savings, the commission majority claimed. As 
for the laborers arriving from St. Eustatius, after being emancipated in 1864, 
they quickly benefitted from the protection and care enjoyed at the estates 
on St. Croix. When they first arrived “they had barely the one suit on their 
backs,” whereas after settling down at the estates “they always appear 
decently clad” and “several of them owning even horse and cart.” There was 
apparently no reason to doubt that the working environment of the sugar 
estates provided both opportunity for those so inclined to save up money 
and build a household of their own and security and comfort for those 
recurring basic care and elevation from the depraved state of slavery. The 
commission majority reaffirmed their conviction that labour-regulations in 
line with the existing ones were better suited and superior to free-market 
mechanisms in regulating labour relations on St. Croix by stating that 
the uniform rate of wages thus, then, lay no obstacles whatever in the way 
of the individual developing his resources, while his stable position and 
his fixed lucrative home on the Estate certainly afford better conditions 
for a labourer’s progress towards becoming a better man, than would be 
the case under a system, where the rates of wages are regulated simply by 
the demand and supply of labour, and where the labourer is half way 
home-less. A labouring population free of cares for their existence is so 
great a boon to the Community, that it is not to be wondered at, if we here 
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have been cautious with regard to changes or modifications in relations 
that have secured that population against such cares.514 
What followed in the majority’s motivations for the draft was an … of a 
conservative economic theory. One that favored the regulative mechanisms 
of a police administration and discarded the advantages of “principles of 
economy” that would leave the regulation of labour conditions entirely up to 
“agreements employer and labourer according to their own will.”515 The 
core of the argument lay in the peculiarities of St. Croix’s conditions of 
production. St. Croix represented a singular production community 
suffering from labour shortage and unlike similar communities in Europe 
and America was not  
a link of one whole complex of communities, where exchange of labour-
force is constantly going on, so that scarcity one place immediately 
causes plenitude in another place,—where it so in this island, instead of 
its being a link in an isolated group of Islands, were, with only one single 
exception, the cry is for the introduction of labourers to carry on the 
industrial occupation common to all, viz: the growing and manufacture of 
sugar,—then, the adjustment and ordering of those matters might be left 
free, without danger to the existence of Sugar-production, or Sugar-
growing,—in other words without the risk of endangering the existence 
of the Community itself as such.516 
What was at stake was “the whole welfare of the community”517 and the 
strict regulation of labor relations would be the instrument to secure it. The 
competitiveness of free-market regulation would be detrimental to the 
community and undermine the security provided to both employer and 
worker of a stabile livelihood and labor force. Workers living on the estates 
and under the mandatory care of their employer would be unaffected by 
fluctuations in international markets on which the food supply depended.518 
Likewise, employers would not have to worry about sudden migrations of 
labor to islands with more favorable wages or working conditions, since 
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workers were bound by their one-year contracts. The worker-employer 
relationship was, then, to the mutual benefit of both parties, but could only 
be sustained as long as that relationship remained ordered by legislation. If 
the constitution of the relationship was to be opened up to competition and 
governed only by the forces of the market, the relationship would surely 
dissolve, and with it the welfare of the community of St. Croix. Thus the 
labor regulations acted as a security mechanism for the processes of 
community, which served the interests of planters and laborers, and in the 
long-term was the only disposition that would be able to improve the 
character of the labor and sustain the sugar economy at the same time. 
To every majority there is a minority and in the case of the commission 
that minority was made up of lower court judge and chairman of the 
colonial council, C. Sarauw. Sarauw disagreed with the commission 
majority on almost every point. He diverged from the majority’s opinion 
that held that as a matter of principle the legislature’s “scope of action” 
could not “be defined … by abstract notions, but according to the necessities 
and requirements of the individual community….”519 Instead he favored a 
regulation of labour relations “in accordance with true political 
economy.”520 In regard to the majority’s recommendation that using day-
laborers should not be allowed as it would undermine the system of year 
long contracts on which the labour-regulations rested, he dissuaded the idea 
“that a natural right which this ordinance [the Labor Act] left, should now 
be taken away or encumbered with unnatural fetters.”521 Similarly, Sarauw 
opposed the majority’s recommendation to enforce a provision stating that 
any dissolution of labour contracts had to be approved by the police-master. 
While it had been included in the 1849 labour-regulations, it had not 
previously been enforced. The majority recommended to amend the 
provision so that only the worker had to present himself personally at the 
police office. The purpose of this amendment was apparently to give the 
police-master the opportunity to “counteract hasty dissolutions of 
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contracts.” To Sarauw, this extension of the 1849 provisional act was 
exceeding its original intention and would  
introduce an unnatural and unnecessary restraint in the relations of the 
contract and will be used to exercise a pressure on the parties which will 
generally act on the labourer, seldom on the master.522 
Sarauw’s overall impression of the draft was that it appeared to him “as 
an artificial and unnatural structure.”523 The regulations were unnatural by 
the fact that they sought not only to set rules pertaining to labour contracts, 
work hours, or wages, but also to prevent any agreements on terms of labour 
that were not in complete accordance with legislation. The scope of the draft 
went beyond merely fixing the minimum requirements of labour conditions, 
and instead encroached itself upon the free will of employer and laborer to 
come to their own terms of employment in accordance with the natural 
order of economic relations. The draft was artificial by the fact that as a 
consequence of its objective to regulate every aspect of the complex 
employer-laborer relation and to counteract any foreseeable deviation from 
the ideal relationship, it had become so detailed in its provisions that it 
would be impossible to enforce.524 
Despite the thorough deliberations of the committee, the labor 
regulations remained unrevised. The Labor Act with its minor amendments 
remained in effect on St. Croix. It was however abolished for St. Thomas 
and St. John in May 1872.525 
What emerges from this close reading of the commission’s reports on 
the question of labor regulations are, in fact, positions that were reflected in 
conflicts taking place at different scales of political programs. The clear and 
familiar evocations of natural relations of political economy versus the 
regulative conservatism of police mechanisms found in the deliberations of 
the two reports of the commission, indeed reflects a general conflict among 
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the competing governmentalities of ‘security’ and ‘police’ that so 
incapsulated the nineteenth century, and were perhaps articulated most 
clearly in the Carlyle-Mill debate that together with the scenes from the 
1878 riot framed the first sections of this chapter. Interestingly enough, 
however, the antagonism between the proponents of police—strong, 
legislative, state intervention—and the proponents of liberal, limited, state 
management, did not seem to hinge upon a concern with coercion or 
despotism in regard to the governed subjects. The Labor Act was not 
considered expedient or inexpedient on the basis of the degree of coercion 
that it prescribed. Proponents of the Labor Act did not argue for coercive 
measures by referencing a general rule that coercion worked. They argued 
that coercive measures were necessary and appropriate when applied in the 
context of a post-emancipation labor organization and when regarding 
former slaves of the African race. Police regulations were being deployed 
not with reference to the will of a sovereign, but to the constitution of a 
particular reality. Opponents of the Labor Act were not opposed to the logic 
behind its provisions. Yet, they did not agree to the organizational model by 
which the problematics of post-emancipation socio-economic relations 
would be resolved. For the proponents, the model of the community 
represented the ideal-type of a paternalistic, perhaps pastoral, model of 
government where “human governors” were trusted with the task of 
providing the conditions necessary for the improvement of “the negro 
character.” This ideal of community was considered “organic,” as Krebs 
reminded us, and thus not artificial or unnatural constructions of 
government. For opponents of the Labor Act, like Sarauw, there could, 
however, only be one natural model for the organization of labor, and that 
model was the market. To him, and by extension “the true principles of 
political economy,” the Labor Act represented an inhibitor for the processes 
of spontaneous order that a market free of “human governors” naturally 
provided. Regardless of their disagreements regarding the model of natural 
processes that the different positions each prescribed, they were both acting 
in accordance with an observable nature that was both particular to the 
specific context as well as having universal applicability to some degree. It 
seems plausible to argue that proponents of community and of markets were 
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both the result of a governmental naturalism that sought to arrange the 
conditions of actions in accordance with specific natural processes. What 
the Labor Act signifies is in fact a dispositif of security that incorporates 
police measures rather than reject them as artificial intervention by state-
sovereignty.  
 
1878 Riot and the Crises of Community 
Throughout the many deliberations over the regulation of labor, no one 
seemed to seriously consider the aspirations of those whom the regulations 
were to affect. The rural laborer had figured prominently in successive 
commission reports in the shape of a racial stereotype, an amalgamation of 
infantile behavior and the very basic elements of self-interest and incentive. 
It seemed inconceivable that the self-interest of rural laborers would lead 
them to attempt to cut off the paternal hand that was sustaining their 
livelihood. In 1862, Krebs wrote confidently that  
As the state of things have now become, there is no reason to fear an 
insurrection. A feeling of common interests, seems to have become 
prevalent amongst the inhabitants. … By far the greater numbers of the 
labouring class have settled themselves quietly to their work, the 
importance of which, as the means of acquiring wealth and consequence, 
they have already learned. They have already reaped such rich fruits from 
their efforts, that they are essentially interested in the community's being 
preserved from disturbances and revolutions. There is no reason to fear 
any such, from that quarter. Those that are most interested in this matter, 
have no anxiety in this respect. When the planters and other proprie-tors 
of large properties do not fear, there is doubt-lessly nothing to be dreaded 
from that quarter, if but the present system warranted greater security, 
which is not the case.526 
By 1878, however, Krebs’ optimism had been proven wrong as field 
laborers resorted to violent rebellion as an instrument to improve their 
conditions of labor, which they had long been discouraged by. The riot 
came as a shock to government and planters alike, and spurred the sense of a 
crises of liberalism that had pertained since emancipation. In the aftermath 
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of the riots, which had coursed significant damage to property and 
persons,527 a royal commission was appointed to examine the causes of the 
rebellion and give recommendations to the prevention of its reoccurrence.528 
Despite much debate on the issue, the provisional labor regulations had 
not been subject to any substantial revision as Danish West Indian society 
moved further away from the initial chaotic phase following emancipation. 
To add insult to injury those men directly responsible for governing and 
regulating the workforce, the commission found, had also diminished in 
character. In its report the commission retold the myths of the efficiency of 
planter paternalism in regard to labor discipline and general living 
conditions during the era of slavery. It used to be that plantation owners 
were bound to their property through family heritage and were obliged by 
their predecessor’s efforts to govern the estates not just for profit, but for the 
art of government in its own right. Accordingly, the welfare of the estate's 
laborers was of great concern to the planters, and strong ties between planter 
and laborer existed as a consequence. This paternalistic bond between 
planter and worker was gradually severed as the former type of planter 
gentility was supplanted by a new breed of predatory investors and 
entrepreneurs for whom the chase for profit took precedent to concepts of 
good plantation governance. The new planter class of former caretakers, and 
of predominately Irish decent, the report noted, had come to be property 
owners by taking out substantial loans with their new property investments 
as collateral. This meant that the investor-planters had to raise enough profit 
to not only provide for themselves, pay their workers' wages, take care of 
the costs of running the plantations, but also to pay of their creditors. The 
conditions of labor suffered accordingly. 
Under these circumstances, the commission found three main causes of 
worker discontentment. Firstly, the right of estate-owners, or managers, to 
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levy fines on workers for being absent from work, and the tendency among 
managers to abuse that right for their own benefit. The commission found 
that it would be more proper if only the public authorities could administer 
fines. Secondly, the unfair terms for contract renewal or termination. 
Thirdly, mobility regulations that forced workers to take on new contracts 
(transportation to other islands would purposefully be limited during the 
days following 1 October, when contracts were scheduled for renewal, 
while the police would order people to find contractual service within three 
days, thereby, in effect, forcing workers into new contracts). 
It was not only the conduct of managers and plantation owners that had 
developed for the worse. The commission had found that the labor 
population had suffered from similar detrimental external influences. 
Despite efforts to restrict labor mobility, labor shortage was an ongoing 
problem for employers on St. Croix. The shortage of labor had led to the 
importation of workers from other West Indian islands. These “foreign 
elements” were in general considered “skilled workers but also often bad 
subjects.” Labor shortage was also behind the practice of hiring short term 
labor from the cities without contracts, the so called 'porter system'. As the 
porter system grew in popularity, the animosity of workers with long term 
contracts became increasingly stronger. The Porters were better payed and 
under no contractual obligations to continue working on the plantation if 
they chose to leave. 
The work of the commission, then, did not just relate itself to the 
immediate police problem of bringing an unruly labor population under 
control, but was concerned with the longterm social and moral fabric of 
colonial society. The solution needed was one that would establish ‘police,’ 
a well ordered society, but through the use of dispositions that differed from 
both the previous police techniques of the colonial administration and the 
liberal ideals of self-government and limited state intervention. One 
fundamental pivot of colonial liberal police techniques would be the racial 
relations among the inhabitants. The commission claimed that Afro-
Caribbeans’ esteem for the white race (meaning the authority of planters and 
government officials) had been severely damaged by developments after 
emancipation. This development had been caused by moral deterioration 
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among plantation managers and proprietors as well as the government's 
weakening authority and ability to maintain order through military force and 
police presence. The financial difficulties facing the islands were found to 
be an important factor in this process of degradation. Planters' declining 
prosperity, Government cut-backs, and unsuccessful attempts to sell off the 
islands were all, in the eyes of the commission, to blame for the black 
population's low regard of the white race. It would be the fundamental 
objective of colonial government to implement policies that would reinstate 
authority and stabilize racial relations. 
As a consequence, “the negro’s character” was deemed an essential 
target of intervention. “The negro’s character” was judged by the 
commission to be at ”a low spiritual and social level" and ”only barely 
elevated above the state of slavery." “The negro” retained character traits 
that showed great potential but also great danger: A mixture of blind 
obedience towards superiors and a raw form of imperiousness towards 
weaker creatures. “The negro” was said to be characterized by a great 
measure of passion that flares when awaken by his discontent. Once in this 
state of passion he would only be stalled by military authority. Accordingly, 
the commission was adamant that a strong military presence would have to 
be reinstated before any long term reforms could be implemented. Military 
force would, however, only serve as a preliminary measure to quell any 
rebellious activities. Any substantial changes to the structures of colonial 
society would not come from repressive measures but from productive 
initiatives of mandatory education and landholding.  
Afro-Caribbeans had to be free not only in theory but in practice. The 
only way to elevate the black race, according to the commission, and 
thereby bring prosperity to the colony, would be to ensure that black 
workers would live liberal lives of education, property and family. In order 
to secure this development the negative virtues of the black race would have 
to be restrained through anti-vagrancy legislation. Without a vagrancy law, 
and freed from the constraints of the old labor regulations, black workers 
would be free to follow their “natural” inclination to work as little as 
possible, maybe even leading the worst of characters to not work at all, 
instead being drawn to a life of thieving. The tropical conditions added to 
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the difficulties of instilling a proper work ethic in Afro-Caribbean workers. 
How were one to persuade free blacks to work hard every day in plantation 
fields when the tropical environment provided plenty of fruit and sugar 
canes, and gentle nights rendering permanent shelter obsolete. If it was 
possible in tropical conditions to live of the land and your immediate 
surroundings without any cultivation, then why would any individual not 
naturally endowed with the incentive to invest his or hers work in increasing 
value and savings, chose the difficult path of industriousness? 
The commission’s solution to the problems of idleness and vagrancy 
specifically, and the improvement of character in general, was twofold. 
Firstly, it was important to provide an effective deterrent. The obvious 
solution was the promise of forced labor as punishment for vagrancy. 
Secondly, and located in the other end of the scale of governmental 
techniques, idleness and vagrancy would be combated by nourishing within 
the rural workers an interest and incentive to cultivate the land and establish 
permanent households of their own. The commission found these elements 
in what they referred to as “the squatter system.” “Squatters” referred to 
individual plantation workers that had saved up enough funds to rent or buy 
a small piece of unused land on which they could grow different crops. This 
group of industrious workers exemplified the virtues that the commission 
wanted to instill in the moral constitution of all rural workers: hard work, 
economic sense, and appreciation for the value of private property. Whereas 
education initiatives would build the long-term foundation for “the 
acquisition of healthy moral concepts,” the expansion and promotion of 
‘squatter-conduct’ would serve as an immediate inspiration and positive 
influence on the majority of laborers for whom industrious virtues were 
unknown.  
In time, the commission imagined, the squatters would amount to a class 
of their own separated from the laborer class by their attachment to the local 
community by virtue of their property-holding status that would entice their 
commitment to maintain order and discipline. If government would support 
the industrious and hard-working laborer in his efforts towards such goals it 
would serve as encouragement to others. Another positive effect of 
expanding the squatter-system would be “a moral influence” sparked simply 
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by the possession of property itself and the sense of commitment and 
urgency that the privilege of being able to pass on that property to one’s 
descendants could cause. A new truth about the universal economic 
aspirations common among all human-beings was being introduced to the 
governmentality of the Danish West Indies.529  
The commission did not seem to have been aware of the failure of 
previous proposals of a similar nature. Already in 1853, member of 
parliament, A. F. Tscherning, had proposed to divide state-owned 
plantations into smaller parcels to be made available for rural laborers. The 
acquisition of their own land, it was assumed, would increase the laborers 
independence vis-a-vis their employer. Tscherning’s initiative was, 
however, not implemented.530 
The commission made surprisingly few comments regarding the 
auspiciousness of the labor regulations. Other than arguing that the labor 
regulations had permitted the degenerated elements of the planter class to 
deteriorate conditions of labor, and thus fertilize the disscontempt among 
workers, the commission did not seem to be advocating for the introduction 
of a completely unregulated labor market. Rather, the commission-majority 
was arguing that the current circumstances did not allow for such wide-
ranging freedoms in the labor market. The main obstacle for a free labor 
market, by the commission’s own admission, was the “character of the 
negro.” The “negro’s character” would first have to be improved upon by 
what essentially amounted to a reorganization of the community in which he 
had been placed. By analyzing the causes of the riots the way it did, the 
commission was acknowledging crises of community that had evolved 
within the plantation environment. The organic community of the estate had 
not brought about the mutually beneficial order between proprietor and 
laborer that had been expected and continually voiced by commentators and 
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legislators. By evoking the image of the “squatter” as an ideal-type for the 
conditions of improvement, the commission was advocating for the 
reinstallation of a dispositif of community and cooperation—disengaged 
from  the inhibiting milieu of the plantation—from which “the negro” would 
gain the necessary appreciation for virtues of obligation, duty, and 
responsibility that would allow him to conduct himself as a rational actor in 
an eventually free-market economy. 
 
Communities of Improvement 
The previous sections have argued that the question of “the character of the 
negro” was pivotal in the arrangements that were introduced to secure the 
sugar economy, particularly in regard to the availability of labor, following 
emancipation. The question of natures were in fact integral to the rationality 
behind the installation of security dispositifs in accordance with a liberal 
governmentality. Despite the centrality of the supposed negative 
dispositions of the black field-laborer’s predisposed racial character to the 
policy of economic protection that was advanced by colonial authorities, 
this strategy did not evolve towards the feudal social imaginations that were 
expressed by commentators like Carlyle. The ambition among policy 
makers remained to affect “the negro character” in a positive and productive 
direction. Even after the events of 1878, which to the public imagination 
confirmed the inner-most primal nature of the black race, the belief 
remained that those basest of human behaviors could be overcome by 
introducing more beneficial environments to nurture liberal sentiments and 
ethics. The logic of liberal economic pedagogy remained valid; change 
incentives and you change behavior. 
This ambiguous optimism regarding the acclimatization of the inhibited 
subjectivities of former slaves, which for example was expressed in the 
policy suggestions of the 1879 commission, was garnered by a genre of 
specialist literature that applied itself to the specific problematic of 
managing the tropical environment and its peculiar populations. Volumes 
such as W. P. Livingstone’s Black Jamaica: A Study in Evolution (1899) 
and Benjamin Kidd’s The Control of the Tropics (1898), were examples of 
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expositions that insisted on a program of government that was based on 
evolutionary analyses of the current stage of the development of the black 
race and its potential for future progress. They were concerned with 
formulating a production of freedom that was scripted to the observable 
facts of the nature of the black race and its different stages of development. 
The central claim of this literature was that the laws of biology—the 
principle of evolution—also applied to the laws of society and economy. 
The general process of human history was as an evolutionary development 
of human races. The recognition of human history as a process of evolution 
did, however, not lead authors such as Kidd and Livingstone to conclude 
that the supremacy of the white race over the black race was thus natural, 
just, and permanent, as Carlyle and other race theorists had argued before 
them. The principle of evolution was inherently a principle of progress, and 
the current state of the black race was therefore not a consequence of its 
original capacity, but merely a reflection of the level of development to 
which it had arisen at that moment in time. From that current stage it would 
naturally progress if the conditions permitted it. 
In his book, Livingstone put forward a program of government that was 
aimed at providing the right conditions for the progress of the black race in 
Jamaica, which in many elements echoed the propositions of the Danish 
1879 commission. The essential object of government, according to 
Livingstone’s program, was to take on the paternal role of the guardian of 
its black population and provide them with the instruments necessary for 
them to elevate their cultural and industrial capacities to a higher level of 
civilization. These instruments were to be instilled through education (both 
in terms of a general formal schooling and more specific agricultural and 
artisanal training), religious influence, and the promotion of more domestic 
ways of living based on property ownership and the family unit. From its 
vantage point at a higher stage of development, the obligation of “the white 
race,” and specially of “statesmen and legislators and all in authority,” was 
“unmistakable” to Livingstone: “It is to uplift and mould into a responsible 
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and progressive people the black humanity lying about its feet.”531 
Disregarding the moral imperative of advancing the development of “the 
black humanity,” the task would also bring with it a “material advantage” 
and was thus legitimized as a matter of statecraft and not simply of 
philanthropy:  
To educate and train the negro is to enter into a remunerative commercial 
investment. It is to increase his economic status, to expand his desires, 
and to multiply his material requirements. To satisfy these he must draw 
on the nation to which he is attached, and as his development proceeds 
his purchasing power will undergo a corresponding enlargement, and the 
more profitable will become his demands. The negro race is, in fact, one 
of the greatest potential markets in the world.532 
The biopolitical link between the improvement of the conditions of the 
population and the wealth of the state that we investigated in the third 
chapter in regard to the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade is reinvigorated 
here in Livingstone’s logic. Yet, it is a different kind of improvement and a 
different mechanism of wealth that is alluded to. The improvement of 
slaves’ living conditions is replaced by the improvement of the former 
slaves character. The nurturing of hope within the life-aspirations of the 
slave is replaced by the engendering of material desire within the freed 
subject. The increased capacity to labor in the improved body of the slave is 
replaced with an increased purchasing power of the black consumer. 
A similar coupling between improvement of character and augmentation 
of economic activity was prevalent in political economic analyses of the 
Danish West Indies at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a lecture 
given to the Danish Economic Society [Nationaløkonomisk forening] on 17 
January 1907, the then permanent secretary to the Ministry of Finance, F. P. 
Hiort-Lorenzen, presented his analysis of the causes of and possible 
remedies to the “economic crisis in the Danish West Indies.”533 To Hiort-
Lorentzen, the final four decades of the nineteenth century had constituted 
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an “ongoing decadence” in the economy of the colony.534 He identified 
several causes of this decline. Among the responsible factors he mentioned 
technological innovations such as the steamship and the telegraph, which 
had limited the importance of St. Thomas as a steppingstone in the 
transatlantic network of goods and communication; unfavorable tariffs and 
prices of export commodities, principally sugar; natural disasters such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes; and the ongoing extraction of capital by short 
term investors and merchants. Sugar cultivation on St. Croix had been 
particularly devastated by the increasing costs of production following 
emancipation and the decreasing price of cane sugar. 
Hiort-Lorenzen identified two principal policies that would do much to 
rectify the economic and social state of the islands. Firstly, a reorganization 
of the Danish tariffs and duties system would make it more profitable for 
sugar producers to export their produce, as well as lower the prices of 
imported consumption goods such as flour and fat. Secondly, and of greater 
importance to the longterm sustainability of West Indian society, Hiort-
Lorenzen proposed to actively support and encourage the establishment of 
smallholder cooperatives among the Afro-Caribbean laborers. In order to 
promote smallholding it should be made easier for laborers to acquire land. 
He stressed that the land should be required as property and not simply 
rented. 
The fact that the black laborer should be able to require land as property 
was, in Hiort-Lorenzen’s view, in accordance with the conditions of 
agricultural cultivation in the West Indies, which were dependent on black 
labor to work the fields in climatic conditions that was said to be beyond the 
physical capacity of the European laborer. Hiort-Lorenzen was arguing that 
in fact the Afro-Caribbean laborers had an almost Lockean right to the 
property of the land, the value of which could only be attained by their 
labor. But Hiort-Lorenzen’s proposition also reflected an adherence to 
principles of cultural determinism. Agricultural land and its cultivation was 
presented by Hiort-Lorenzen as an essential cultural appendix to the Afro-
Caribbean national character. “To deprive the negro of the soil,” Hiort-
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Lorenzen argued, “is tantamount to denying the Greenlandic their kayaks or 
the North Sea fishermen their motorboats.”535 Providing black laborers with 
the opportunity to acquire land as property was thus legitimated by a 
Lockean right to property by cultivation as well as a cultural right to 
practice ones national character. The Afro-Caribbean field laborers was tied 
to the soil by history, custom, and culture, and it would only be just if they 
were given the opportunity to seal that bond through property rights. The 
theory of character improvement through the social and economic 
organization of smallholder cooperatives was thus affirmed by a culturalism 
that confirmed the authenticity of Afro-Caribbeans’ affinity with that type 
of cultivation and community organization. The introduction of smallholder 
cooperatives was not merely a practical measure to meet a particular end, it 
was also, and significantly, in accordance with the cultural practices of 
Afro-Caribbeans and thus an affirmation of their rights to practice their 
culture. 
There was, however, also a utilitarian justification at the center of Hiort-
Lorenzen’s proposal. The ownership of land, he held, presented “the only 
possibility of progress and prosperity” for the inhabitants of St. Croix and 
St. Jan.536 Ownership of land carried with it an incentive to strive for self-
improvement by providing the prospects of achieving equal opportunities in 
economic and social advancement.537 It was of outmost importance, then, to 
the economic future of the colony to facilitate the establishment of “a class 
of negro smallholders on St. Croix and St. Jan.”538 
Hiort-Lorenzen referred to the very popular American economist Henry 
George and his widely read book Progress and Poverty (1879)539 to support 
his conviction that the conduct and habits of the black laborers could 
actually be improved through the management of smallholdings. George 
promoted a peculiar combination of an egalitarian economics facilitated by 
a perfected free market mechanism. The only involvement of government in 
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the economic domain should consist of a de facto nationalization of the 
value of rent based on the original value of unimproved land. The so called 
“single tax” would prevent pure speculation in the value of land, which 
allowed landowners to profit immensely without adding any actual value to 
the land or society in general. Land speculation was, in George’s economic 
theory, the prime cause of the correlation between the general material 
progress of industrial economies and the escalating poverty among the 
working class. Confiscating the profits from rent would put an end to the 
increase in rent as well as the decreasing wages. The revenue that “the 
single tax” would generate for the state would then be invested in improving 
the social and cultural conditions of society’s poorer classes. 
George was a strong believer in the social power of cooperative 
improvement. This aspect of his philosophy was not only present in his 
economic theory but formed the basis of his theory of the development of 
civilizations. The final part of Progress and Poverty on “The Law of Human 
Progress” is devoted to this history of civilizations. In Progress and Poverty 
George disputed the claims of race theory and social darwinism that the 
character of individuals were predetermined by their race, and therefore 
insusceptible to influences of improvement. George’s opposition to the 
influence of darwinism and race theory in political economy resided in his 
readings of these interpretations of human development as being essentially 
amoral. If all human capacities were predetermined by racial origins then 
there would be no agency or effect in the concept of improvement. The 
principal effect of race was to extinguish the potential of the individual to 
improve and aspire towards something better, a higher level of existence, 
morally as well as materially.  
According to the principles of race theory and social darwinism, the 
development of races occurred through a process of natural selection in 
which the fitter race or civilization won out in the game of evolution to the 
detriment of the lesser fit races. Thus, when the anglo-saxon race could 
arguably take the place as the superior race in relation to the “asiatic” race 
or the “negro” race, it had evolved as such through a natural process of 
selection based on the predisposed capacities of each race. If such a 
scenario, in fact, reflected the actual process of the genesis and development 
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of civilization, then any attempt to impress upon individuals of the lesser fit 
races any form of moral education and improvement would be futile and 
pointless. Evolution had already proven that the limited capacities of these 
races had not allowed for them to advance such improvement within their 
character despite the fact that in evolutionary terms it would have been the 
only purposeful course of development. It was this type of evolutionary 
determinism that George saw as amoral, in the sense that morality had no 
influence upon the fitness of a race and in turn upon the life of individuals. 
In the final analysis, then, the effect of race theory and social darwinism was 
to deprive the individual life of purpose and meaning. This was a very 
different interpretation of the impact of the theory of evolution and natural 
selection on the principles of social and political economy than those 
represented by Livingstone and Kidd. 
In George’s reading, the law of natural selection could not be 
extrapolated from the animal kingdom and applied to the development of 
races and civilizations. The history of civilizations was not a process of 
evolution in which competing civilizations either evolved or became extinct. 
History had shown that the superiority of civilizations waxed and waned 
like the moon, rather than evolve like Darwin’s species. Once grand 
civilizations, regardless of their power and magnificence, would at a given 
point in time face decline, and see its position of dominance overtaken by 
another. Furthermore, this dynamic history of civilizations could not be 
shown to reflect the perceived predispositions of races. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, the position as the hegemon of civilization might have 
been occupied by the anglo-saxon people. In other eras of history, however, 
it had been dominated by Asian and African empires at a time when the 
anglo-saxon tribes of Europe had barely been able to sustain their own 
existence. Current conditions of global dominance did not reflect original 
capacities. Otherwise the history of civilizations would have been much less 
dynamic. 
George likewise discarded the validity of the law of heredity in regard to 
the formation of individual character: 
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How little does heredity count as compared with conditions. This one, we 
say, is the result of a thousand years of European progress, and that one 
of a thousand years of Chinese petrifaction; yet, placed an infant in the 
heart of China, and but for the angle of the eye or the shade of the hair the 
Caucasian would grow up as those around him, using the same speech, 
thinking the same thoughts, exhibiting the same tastes. Change Lady 
Vere de Vere in her cradle with an infant of the slums, and will the blood 
of a hundred earls give you a refined and cultured woman?540 
Blood and race counted for very little compared with social conditions as 
factors in the formation of habits and virtues. Civilization and improvement 
was not a condition of particular races or nation. Rather, it flourished in 
conditions were humans were freed from other duties to pursue activities of 
philosophy, art, and education. Increased specialization and division of 
labor had allowed the farmer to leave issues of security to the soldier and 
instead free up time for mental and moral improvement. “Men improve as 
they become civilized, or learn to co-operate in society.”541 The principle of 
improvement through cooperation was as valid in regard to macro histories 
of civilizations as it was to the micro organization of human communities. 
Hiort-Lorenzen’s proposal to organize the West Indian smallholders in 
cooperative movements was then in line with Henry George’s political 
economic thinking. It also reflected the tendency among smaller dairy and 
pig famers in Denmark since the 1880s to organize themselves in 
cooperatives—the so called andelsbevægelse [cooperative movement].542 
Hiort-Lorenzen imagined that the West Indian smallholders could be 
organized on the model of the Danish andelsbevægelse. Together the new 
smallholders would clear overgrown pieces of land, preparing them for 
cultivation. Each smallholder would then cultivate their own individual 
plots, but the produce would be sold through the cooperative. This model 
would secure the advantages of large scale production while retaining the 
individual ownership of and responsibility for the cultivation and 
management of the holdings, and thereby facilitate the beneficial fostering 
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of industrious and economic conduct, as individuals and as a community, 
within this new smallholding class.  
Hiort-Lorenzen was convinced, then, that not only was the introduction 
of industrious conduct in the subjectivity of black laborers possible, the 
specific model of the black smallholder had in fact been effectuated 
successfully in other West Indian colonies. As examples of the beneficial 
effects of smallholding in the British West Indian colonies, Hiort-Lorenzen 
referenced the accounts of the aforementioned Livingstone who had 
described the prosperous conditions of Afro-Caribbean smallholding in his 
Black Jamaica: “In Jamaica it is the negro settler on the cool mountains who 
has reached the highest stage of development.”543 
How, then, did the model of black smallholders, as put forward in Hiort-
Lorenzen’s lecture, purport a solution to the post-emancipatory problem of 
labour? The smallholder concept did in fact bracket of a pool of potential 
labor force from working in the struggling industry of sugar production. 
Then how could smallholding be conceived as beneficial to the general 
economy of the colony and the specific demands of planters for a sufficient 
labor force to work the sugar fields and the sugar factory? It certainly did 
not seek to bind individual workers to specific estates by enforcing longterm 
contracts. In fact, as we have seen, the commission to evaluate the causes of 
the labor riots in 1878 had recommended the implementation and expansion 
of the “squatter system” as a countervailing mechanism to the negative 
effects of the contract system that was put in place by the Labor Act. Instead 
of the juridical form of the contract, the concept of smallholding took on the 
form of the household as the mechanism that would regulate the power 
relations of labor.  
The mechanism of the household, of domesticated life, held the potential 
to alleviate the most pressing socio-economic problems that were impacting 
the supply and quality of labor. In his lecture, Hiort-Lorenzen surmised that 
the successful establishment of smallholder cooperatives could do much to 
counteract such detrimental factors as high child mortality, heavy alcohol 
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consumption, and mass migration.544 In 1916, the superintendent of schools 
in the Danish West Indies, C. Rübner-Petersen, and medical official on St. 
Thomas, Viggo Christensen, both argued that the proliferation of 
smallholding and peasant proprietors would greatly reduce child mortality 
rates. According to the two authors, child mortality could not be specifically 
attributed to hygienic and sanitary conditions, but were rather connected 
with poor nutritional intake and insufficient parental care, which in turn 
were effects of the general state of poverty among the labor population and 
its associated negative social conditions.545 Improvement of sanitary 
conditions such as a cleaner water supply would do little to reduce child 
mortality, relative to the general mortality, unless “the labor population 
learns to apply the same rules for the care and nourishment of infants” that 
the medical profession prescribed.546 What was needed was “an awakening” 
of an interest for childcare within the labor population.547 The authors 
argued that smallholding would provide the necessary conditions to alleviate 
the social effects of poverty as well as the incentives for laborers to 
prioritize the welfare of their children over shortsighted personal gain.548 
There were two essential elements to this transformation of subjectivity. 
First, the creation of  “an orderly family life” was an important part in 
signifying the value of children. This involved the delineation of gendered 
functions and hierarchies. The father would take on the role of the provider, 
while the mother would solely be concerned with domestic duties, and not 
be forced by economic considerations to seek employment elsewhere, 
thereby neglecting the needs of the children.549 This confirmed the 
sentiment of the Royal commission of 1902, which claimed in its report that 
“there exist no better means of fostering the sense of family [familiefølelsen] 
than the consciousness of sitting upon one’s own piece of land.”550 Second, 
as proprietor of the family plot, a permanent attachment to the place of 
                                                
 
544 (Hiort-Lorenzen 1907, p. 135) 
545 (Christensen 1916/1917, p. 357; Rübner-Petersen 1916, pp. 26-27) 
546 (Christensen 1916/1917, p. 359) 
547 (1916/1917, p. 362) 
548 (1916/1917, p. 363) 
549 (Rübner-Petersen 1916, p. 27) 
550 (Den Vestindiske Kommission 1903, p. 118) 
 
 
230 
residence would be established. Property rights to the plot was assumed to 
provide the incentive for continual maintenance and improvement of the 
property.551 Together, these elements would facilitate the establishment of a 
Home, the benefit of which, the labor and sentiment of the parents would be 
directed towards. The orderly home would serve as the primary mechanism 
to counteract child mortality. 
When proponents of smallholding could make such promising claims, it 
was due to a great confidence held by many that the mechanism of the 
household possessed a potential to shape the conduct of individuals 
according to the ideal of a moral and industrious member of society and 
relinquish them of their former habits and virtues of vice, adultery, idleness, 
and frivolity. In order to become economic subjects, the wage laborer would 
have to establish his own household, to domesticate himself, complete with 
a wife at home and children to care for. As a countermeasure to the 
animalization of slavery, and the savagery of the African nature, the freed 
slaves were to enter into a process of domestication that would eventually 
tame the beast within.552 
The ideal image of the family and the household as a model for good 
and proper government has a long genealogy in the history of Western 
political thought. In Foucault’s account of sovereign power the patria 
potestas serves as the emblem of sovereignty in its most absolute form, 
granting “the father of the Roman family the right to ‘dispose’ of the life of 
his children and his slaves.”553 Whereas the figure of the farther had a very 
different purpose in the descriptions of pastoral power, in which the 
shepherd (or pastor) of a flock (or congregation) was charged with 
procuring its wellbeing and salvation by knowing of and caring for the 
constitution of each individual member as well as the flock as a whole.554 
Also, the original meaning of ‘economy’ as retained in the ancient Greek 
term oikonomia, referred to the management of the household and the 
family, the distribution of its wealth, goods, and resources, as well as the 
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conduct of the members of the household, the wife, children, and slaves.555 
Modern notions of economy and welfare and their close connection with 
political government is thus tied together by the image of the family and its 
internal dynamics of conduct and management. 
As the pastoral and the economy merged with political government and 
the pursuance of wealth and order as part of the emergence of European 
administrative states from the eighteenth century onwards, the family and 
the household in turn was identified as a prioritized object of government 
intervention. With the advent of biopolitics and the maintenance of the 
population as the main purpose of government, the function of the family in 
relation to government shifted from “a chimerical model for good 
government” to “a privileged instrument for the government of the 
population.”556 As an object of biopolitical intervention, the family 
constituted the interstices of the power relations between individuals, 
society, population, and state.557 The management of population health and 
reproduction, as well as social morality and virtues, was to a large degree 
conducted via the medium of the family unit.558 But it also constituted a 
privileged site of what Ann Stoler has referred to as “the education of 
desire.”559 The family and household served as pedagogical spaces where 
“bourgeois sensibilities” supported by nationalist and racial notions were 
cultivated.560 British abolitionists viewed Christian marriage as the most 
fundamental civilizing institution to which the liberated slave would 
necessarily have to comply.561 Edmund Burke went as far as to advocate for 
compulsory marriage among slaves in his “Sketch of the Negro Code” 
(1780). For, as Burke argued, “a state of matrimony, and the government of 
a family, is a principal means of forming men to a fitness for freedom, and 
to become good Citizens.”562 For colonial subjects—and black colonial 
subjects specifically—the interconnected institutions of the household, the 
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family, and marriage were considered powerful mechanisms to civilize and 
improve their character and moral virtue. 
It was not at all certain, however, that the connotations of the image of 
household and family government were perceived as simply beneficial, not 
least by the members of the labor population themselves. From the 
perspective of the laborers, the form of household government that they 
were most familiar with was the form of plantation management, which 
with little doubt conferred much more ambivalent sentiments than the 
simply beneficial model of economic and pastoral government. During 
slavery, plantation management, at least in theory, combined the nearly 
unlimited ancient right of “the Roman paterfamilias, or the Greek 
oikonomos-householder,”563 to penalize members of the household with the 
objective of pastoral power to conduct the souls of slaves through Christian 
teaching. Through plantation discipline, planters were institutionalizing the 
oxymoronic “discursive economy” of “Christian imperialism.”564 When 
slaveowners whipped and dismembered the bodies of slaves they were also 
prying open a gateway to their souls. 
This was not at all the type of household-government that the 
smallholder proponents wanted to convey. Rather, smallholding and the 
domestic ideal, based on the structures of Christian matrimony, reflected the 
principles of modern political economy at the micro-scale of household 
economy. The family household entailed its own biopolitical regulation of 
the health and welfare of its members. The process of domestication 
emphasized the maternal responsibilities of black women, reserving for 
them a place in the home and giving them responsibility for the welfare of 
the children and the sanitation of the domestic space. The cooperative 
organizational form secured the centrifugal effect of the subjectivizing 
mechanism of each smallholder unit, expanding outwards as a general 
matrix of social self-conduct, producing industrious men and domesticated 
women—a thoroughly gendered community of progress. 
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Hiort-Lorenzen’s proposal was not met with unopposed enthusiasm. 
During the subsequent Q and A session, Holger Ramsing, a former army 
first lieutenant, building inspector, land surveyor, and telegraph manager on 
St. Croix, objected to the idea that “Negroes” should have easy access to 
acquiring land. “These People,” Ramsing contented, were in general 
“completely incapable of independent enterprise.”565 Ramsing remarked that 
previous attempts had shown that the West Indian field-laborer at present 
did not have the necessary education and training required in smallholding. 
The education of “the negro population” should be promoted and obtained 
before any plans to provide the necessary bank loans and identify available 
land could be initiated. 
Ramsing reasserted his views on the matter in his testimony to the 1916 
parliamentary commission regarding the Danish West Indian Islands, albeit 
in a more nuanced and elaborate exposition. He regarded the establishment 
of smallholding as a beneficial measure towards the general improvement of 
the islands’ occupational opportunities.566 In order for a smallholder 
movement to be truly beneficial for West Indian society, however, Ramsing 
reasserted the need for effective and sustained education “until the rational 
principles of cultivation have truly entered the consciousness of the 
population.”567 In its current state, Ramsing considered the black working 
class, “who’s most prominent characteristics are ignorance and laziness,” to 
be “extraordinary unfit” to the task of independent smallholding.568 While 
the process of domestication and the ideal of the peasant proprietor was 
saturated with an idealist optimism, the general perception towards the 
intellectual and industrious capacities of the Afro-Caribbean labor 
population was thoroughly pessimistic. As a consequence, the initiation of a 
large scale parcelling out of land into smallholdings was constantly 
postponed by the acknowledgement of associated processes of character 
improvement that would serve as a condition for success of an eventual 
smallholding class. The project of improvement was in fact caught in a 
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circular argument. The project of smallholding could not succeed without a 
more educated laboring population. However, the incentive to educate and 
improve one’s skill set and general position in life would be created by the 
establishment of homes and farms, the proper and profitable management of 
which would in turn be dependent on a certain level of education. 
Ramsing’s opinions, like most of the testimonies recorded by the 1916 
commission, were framed by the tensions created by the “labor agitations,” 
as the activities of the organized labor movement in the colony were 
commonly referred to, especially by its opponents. The labor union, lead by 
Hamilton Jackson, was actively disrupting production processes at 
strategically opportune moments, for instance during the sugarcane harvest, 
which was a highly labor intensive process, by simply ordering workers to 
abandon their jobs. Obviously, such disruptions were of great consequence 
for the planters and employers. Jackson and his followers were therefore the 
object of scorn and resentment from the majority of the islands’ white 
population and Danish investors in the metropole. In his testimony to the 
commission, Peter Lassen-Landorph, board member of Plantageselskabet 
Dansk Vestindien (The Plantation Corporation Danish West India), referred 
to Jackson’s “agitation” as invoking more than the mere refusal to work by 
attempting to incite “racial hatred” towards the white inhabitants.569  
In similarity with the 1878 riots, the strikes in 1915-16 were 
symptomatic of the failure to arrange the regulation of labor relations in a 
manner that acknowledged and supported the wishes and aspirations of the 
labor population. Albeit with very different means, the labor union was 
demonstrating the discontentment with an organization of labor relations 
that were supposed to be formulated on the basis of the habits, cultural 
practices, and level of civilizational advancement of the very same group of 
individuals that were very openly voicing their opposition against said 
organization. 
 
Liberogenic Devices and the Crises of Governmentality 
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What type of subject is it that we find emerging from the post-emancipation 
program of labor regulation through racial improvement? To a certain 
degree, it reflects the search for the fabled homo æconomicus within the 
habits and conduct of a formerly enslaved, African population. The projects, 
first of pseudo coercive labor regulations, and then, later, of promoting 
smallholding can both be interpreted as attempts to gradually introduce 
“subjects of interest” into economic life. By promoting subjects of interest, 
these programs of government were in fact attempting to establish the 
preconditions for a reconfiguration of the mechanism of value creation from 
a system of slavery that was relying more on coercion than either will or 
interest, to an autonomous economic process that was dependent on the 
multiplying value of the actions of subjects of interest. In Foucault’s 
treatment of liberalism and neoliberalism, the theory of homo æconomicus is 
given a pivotal role as an argument for the limitation of government in 
regard to economic processes, or at least a recognition of and respect for the 
autonomous nature of economic processes.570 In Foucault’s interpretation, 
homo æconomicus becomes a figure of counter-conduct against the power 
of the sovereign to regulate the economic domain. The sovereign is 
incapable of knowing the complexities of the relations between economic 
men to a degree where he can competently regulate their interactions. The 
sovereign should therefore govern as little as possible in relations of 
economy, not because he has a limited right to do so, but because he is not 
competent and knowledgeable enough to do so.571  
In the context of post-emancipation politics, we see a quite different 
application of the figure of homo æconomicus. Here, economic man 
becomes the ideal of a pedagogical project of character improvement that 
was deeply imbedded in the theory of racial progress and the explicit 
hierarchy that it implied. The promotion of economic men and subjects of 
interest in the Danish West Indies shared a clear affinity with what Foucault 
refers to in The Birth of Biopolitics as “liberogenic devices.” By this term, 
Foucault means “devices intended to produce freedom which potentially 
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risk producing exactly the opposite.”572 I believe that this concept captures 
quite well the ambivalent processes of labor regulation and improvement 
that have been examined in this chapter. What was the Labor Act of 1849 if 
not the production of freedom by the restriction of freedom? Compulsory 
contract labor certainly was a coercive restriction of the newly freed 
laborers’ instinct towards abandoning their former place and type of 
employment. Yet, the restrictions were justified as serving the interests of 
the laborers “as a member of a family” and providing for his needs in times 
of sickness and old age. Perhaps most importantly the compulsory inclusion 
into the community of the estate had “shown him the proper path, by the 
reasonable application of his statutory freedom, that is by industry and 
regularity, toward elevating himself to a higher level of civilization.”573 
From one perspective, this was a simple a cynical calculation: the cost of 
allowing the emancipated population full and unregulated liberty would be 
to great to bare. From a different perspective, however, the cynicism is 
replaced by altruism: only by limiting and guiding the exercise of the 
emancipated’s freedom would they be able to develop their character 
towards a level of civilization that would allow that new state of freedom to 
become sustainable and not degrade into a primitive and savage condition of 
disorderly idleness and debasement. 
The coercive community of contractual labor was formulated as a 
temporary arrangement, a contingency measure to contain the risks of 
emancipation. However, precisely because the governmental project itself 
was shaped by evolutionary theories of human development that surveyed 
millennia of human history, the temporary measure was recast as a 
perpetually transformative process. Thus, when concerns were raised over 
the expediency of the labor regulations, F. E. Elberling could respond in 
1862 by questioning the proportions of the criticism: “But is 12 years a long 
time in the development of a human-race?”574 The Labor Act was not 
merely a contingency plan for the protection of a colonial economy, its 
provisions were tools of human engineering. And as such, the temporal 
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scale could not be limited to single years or decennia. The progress of 
human races were to be counted in centuries and millennia. As a 
consequence, any proposals of reform to the perpetual community of 
improvement were dismissed with reference to the broad temporal scope of 
human development as well as the empirical observation that the labor 
population was not yet at a stage of development that could sustain an 
unrestrained freedom. The Danish West Indian population were to be 
confined to the same “waiting room of history” that many of the worlds 
colonial populations found themselves contained within. But as were the 
case with other colonial populations that felt themselves inhibited by the 
“not yet” of the developmentalist apprehensions of colonial 
governmentality, the West Indian laborers contested their position with a 
loud “now.”575 
Thus, the labor population eventually rejected the promised 
development towards homo æconomicus. Having attained their statutory 
freedom, the labor population was more appealed by the promises of homo 
juridicus, the subject of rights. The riot of 1878 and the strikes in the final 
years of Danish rule, were especially intense manifestations of that political 
objective. However, as an example of the irony of history, these assertions 
political claims to individual liberty and rights were interpreted by many as 
signs of degeneration of the emancipated population rather than maturity as 
a political community deserving of political rights. 
This development exemplifies an inherent ambivalence or paradox of 
liberalism in the context of post-slavery colonialism: Liberalism’s 
adherence to a naturalism meant that the production of freedom was made 
impossible in the case of former Afro-Caribbean slaves. The questioning of 
the limits of their natural capacities, likewise limit the utility of 
implementing programs of social progress. The calculus of utility, which, 
according to Foucault, defines the limits of liberal governmentality,576 
determined that to invest in the production of freedom was beyond the 
agenda of colonial government. 
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This point leads us in the direction of the specificity of the type of 
government that should be pursued when dealing with ‘the African race’ 
that was first referred to in the introductory chapter. The government that is 
based on knowledge of the naturalness of the black race is a government 
that cannot rely on the production of freedom alone. It must be flanked by 
strict regulations of the conduct of individuals. The important point here, is 
that this is not a result of a distorted form of governmentality, but precisely 
the product of a governmentality based on the naturalness of liberal political 
economy, which having gone through the calculus of utility, provides the 
answer to the question of what the role of government should be in the post-
slavery society. 
We should, however, always be hesitant to conceptualize abstract 
universals such as “liberalism” as a homogenous entity. “Liberalism” took 
on many forms, and was enacted and performed in many different ways 
according to local political, economic, and social circumstances. The 
governmental response to the problem of emancipation and freedom in the 
Danish West Indies exemplifies this fact. Rather than dogmatically 
appropriating iconic ‘theories’ of liberalism to the specific problematic of 
post slavery labor, the strategy of procuring both a sustainable labor force 
and the personal liberty of the formerly enslaved that the government of the 
Danish West Indies pursued produced a tactic that was shaped by an 
analysis of the British model of laissez-faire economics. It was a 
conceptualization of freedom that was in fact positioned as a particular type. 
Having observed the effects of British emancipation, Danish officials opted 
for a structure of labor regulation that was designed to guide more firmly the 
newly freed into a life of liberty and aid them in the acclimatization process 
as they moved from a mental state of slavery to a mental state of self-
government. Instead of relying on the autonomous forces of the market and 
economic interests in regulating both the labor market and the choices of the 
freed laborers, Danish officials forced laborers into a landed life of 
husbandry. Bound to their estate but provided their own piece of land, 
laborers would be compelled to internalize a domestic subjectivity while 
simultaneously contributing to a stabile labor-force that was so desperately 
required by the plantation economy. The hope was that as the laborers 
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became gradually more attuned to the responsibilities of freedom, the 
regulations would be altered to correspond to the developing conditions. 
The end-result of this gradual liberalization of the colonial labor market 
would be a harmonious integration of a “matured” labor class of responsible 
economic actors with a labor legislation that relied more on the natural 
agency of market forces and less on the prejudiced artificiality of 
government regulations. In light of this interpretation, the “police” 
regulation of labor and mobility, imposed by the colonial government, 
appears less like residues of an anachronistic absolutist rule with its 
propensity for state interventions and control mechanisms, and more like a 
strategy of liberal governmentality, designed to facilitate the eventual 
withdrawal of government and state intervention from the spheres of 
economic and civil life. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
 
I began this dissertation by questioning the implied meaning of the term  
“the nature of the negro,” which, during the final years of Danish rule in the 
West Indies seemed to retain a considerable semantic credence among 
commentators on the efficacy of Danish colonial government. Furthermore, 
I suggested that Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality would be 
helpful in analyzing the historical processes through which the nature of the 
governed had attained such weight within governmental discourse. 
Foucault’s governmentality concept has found wide usage among scholars 
of colonialism in general, but has not yet been applied in the context of the 
Danish West Indies or in the larger frame of Atlantic history. In this brief 
conclusion I would like to draw attention to a few central perspectives that 
this dissertation has addressed through this analytical lens. 
The three analytical chapters (chapter three, four, and five) have all been 
concerned with problems of population, conceptions of natures, and the 
resulting dispositifs of government. The analysis showed that processes of 
governmentality in the Danish West Indies expressed certain tensions or 
ambiguities manifested themselves in rationalities and strategies of 
government. Freedom was flanked by coercion, uniformity was flanked by 
diversity, and universality, was flanked by particularity  
Chapter three, Slavery, Security, Population, emphasized that the 
processes of incorporating the activities of individuals into the utility of the 
state, which Foucault conceptualized as the political technology of police, 
was influential in the development of the political and juridical conditions of 
slavery. In the late eighteenth century, political economists were arguing 
that the society of slavery was not merely unmoral, but unnatural. The 
concept of population, and its demographic development was the yardstick 
that was applied when measuring the naturalness of a society. Danish 
authorities accommodated this criticism by exploring new and better ways 
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of organizing the conditions of the slave population. The problem that the 
authorities were facing, however was that they had to respect not only the 
natural processes of population, but also the security risk that the slave 
population was posing as “domestic enemies,” as well as the seignoral rights 
of planters to sovereignty over their estates and their property, including 
slaves. In regard to both problems, the juridical mechanism of the law was 
not seen as the most effective solution. Slavery was certainly not devoid of 
law. Legislative police regulations were accumulating to a degree where it 
became a matter not of constitutional law, but prudent administration. Still, 
it was not the legal mechanism of prohibitions that characterized 
government’s response to the risks of slavery. The abolition of the Atlantic 
slave trade is used in the chapter to exemplify a dispositf of security that did 
not primarily rely on the legal mechanism, but instead aimed at governing 
through incentives (of both slave-holders and slaves).  
This strategy of government brings into light the necessity of 
government to know and consider the habits and desires of the slave 
population in order to best position the incentives that would lead to certain 
behaviors. Yet, this knowledge of slaves’ incentives seems to have been 
based on presupposed assumptions about universal human aspirations 
towards liberty and family more than a particular ethnographic knowledge 
about the specific nature of African and Afro-Caribbean slaves. 
The findings of chapter four, Punishment, Natures, Race, highlight the 
fact that these tensions and ambiguities were articulated in discourses at 
scales of different scope. It also draws attention to the multidirectional 
character of these discourses. The focus on a discourse of penitentiary 
punishment that was constructed around the double movement of securing 
universal principles while exploring particular systems of punishment 
exposes a multi-scalar conception of natural orders that did not seem to be 
mutually contradictory. Universal principles of punishment could be build 
on conceptions of the naturalness of economic processes and the sociability 
of men, while the particular system of punishment could rely upon 
conceptions of the nature of ‘primitive races,’ without presenting a 
discursive contradiction. ‘Natural punishment’ could signify an array of 
settings and practices. The reason that there was no contradiction is to be 
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found in the increasing influence of racial knowledge—“the knowledge of 
the negro’s nature”—as the chapter also shows in the case of the Danish 
West Indies. However, the case also shows that there was no fixed protocol 
to a punitive government based on the knowledge of the nature of Afro-
Caribbeans. 
Chapter five, Market, Community, Progress, continued the theme of 
naturalness. The chapter traced different responses to the problem of how to 
best regulate relations of labor. It is argued that those responses were 
articulated on the basis of a knowledge about the nature of the Afro-
Caribbean laborer on the one hand, and, on the other, of a knowledge about 
the nature of economic and social processes. Immediately after 
emancipation in 1848, the Labor Act of 1849 reflected one such response. It 
relied on a strict legislative regulation of labor relations by making it 
mandatory to engage in long-term contractual agreements, and for laborers 
to reside on the estates on which they were employed. More than reflecting 
a legal mechanism of prohibitions, the Labor Act served as a protective 
measure for the social and economic processes of ‘community.’ The 
community of the estate, it was supposed, would provide the best conditions 
for the former slaves to acclimatize to the state of freedom. As such, the 
Labor Act, which by definition was coercive in character, was 
simultaneously reflective of a long-term response to the problem of 
emancipation through the production of freedom, i.e. a transformation from 
a subjectivity of slavery to a subjectivity of liberty. The community of the 
estate was thoroughly rejected by the laboring population when, in 1878, St. 
Croix was engulfed in a large riot coursed by labor disputes. This event 
gave renewed voice to suggestions of a different mechanism of 
community—the smallholder or the peasant proprietor. The rationale was 
that this would provide a more efficient liberogenic device than what the 
estate community had been able to produce. The thoroughly domestic 
condition of the smallholder would provide the correct incentives for the 
Afro-Caribbean to approximate his conduct to the ideal of the economic 
man—homo æconomicus—who was guided solely by the force of his 
interests, and by being so would automatically benefit the wealth of society, 
and gradually move beyond the grasp of the sovereign power of 
 
 
243 
government. Both the community of the estate and the domestic community 
of smallholders, as mechanisms of government, were based on a historicist, 
developmentalist conception of the evolution of human civilizations and 
races. They rested on the truth that Afro-Caribbeans were at an inferior level 
of human development than their European and Euro-Caribbean employers 
and governors. The objective was, then, to elevate the Afro-Caribbean 
population to a level of civilization from which they would be properly 
prepared to participate in a liberal economy and enjoy the civil rights that 
served as its corollary. This was a general character of liberal 
governmentality, and as with liberal government in many other contexts, the 
ongoing project of improvement did not amount to the eventual transfer of 
civil rights that was implied in its justification. 
Combined, these chapters show a process of governmentality that in 
general terms resemble what Foucault describes for Europe from the 
eighteenth century onwards. Population clearly becomes an important 
correlate of government, just as the naturalness of economic and social 
processes are phenomena that government will have to be concerned with 
and respect when planning its policies. Despite the comparable development 
of governmentality, the chapters have also highlighted some obvious 
differences. The context of slavery provides one such difference. The 
combined problematics of ‘domestic enemies’ and ‘dispersed sovereignty’ 
to some extent limited the options of government. However, for that very 
reason government would have to rely on strategies that depended less on 
the sovereignty of the state, i.e. legal mechanisms and police regulations, 
and instead resort to the mechanisms of security that acted trough incentives 
and on the interests of subjects.  
Governmentality in the Danish West Indies also differed from 
Foucault’s depiction by the importance of race, and the truth that the 
knowledge of race inflicted on the conditions of governmental rationality. 
The racial knowledge defined the particular type of subject that was being 
governed in the colony and as such contributed to the prioritization of 
governmental techniques. This aspect was demonstrated in chapter four in 
regard to the limits of penitentiary punishment that the knowledge of 
African race posited. This is not, however, a novel conclusion, and in this 
 
 
244 
regard, the dissertation mirrors the argument of a “rule of difference” within 
colonial governmentality that allowed for an excessive application of 
coercive and violent measures. This disciplinary excess is, however, not 
interpreted as a fundamental disjunction from a Western, liberal 
governmentality. Rather, the rationality of government that informed the 
techniques of rule in the Danish West Indies was framed by the logics of 
government that pertained to an adherence to mechanisms of community 
and a naturalness of things, and as such can not be said to divert in principle 
from the logics of liberal governmentality.  
This brief conclusion prompts us to consider how to conceptualize 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality in a wider, more heterogeneous 
context than he perhaps originally conceived it for. Is it preferable to speak 
of a multiplicity of governmentalities? 
Foucault actively pursued the idea of multiple governmentalities in his 
analysis of the transformation from a governmentality of police to a 
governmentality of security, or liberal governmentality. However, when it 
came to discussing the simultaneous existence of liberal and socialist 
governmentalities, he rejected the notion that socialism could be qualified as 
reflecting a separate form of governmentality in its own right. In Foucault’s 
interpretation, socialism did not provide its own governmental rationality. 
Socialism could only be implemented as “connected up to diverse types of 
governmentality.”577 Socialism had been connected up to liberal 
governmentality where it functioned as “counter-weights, as a corrective, 
and a palliative to internal dangers.” Socialism had also been connected up 
with police governmentality, functioning as “the internal logic of an 
administrative apparatus.” In neither case had Foucault observed “an 
autonomous governmentality of socialism.”578 From this denial of a socialist 
governmentality is it then possible to speak of a colonial governmentality, 
or would be more productive to think colonial techniques of government as 
appendages to a liberal governmentality of a police governmentality? 
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There are two points to be made here. Firstly, there is not much in terms 
of analytical creativity to be gained by taking the path of ‘Foucauldian 
fundamentalism’ by speculating as to what Foucault himself would consider 
the true and proper conceptualization of governmentality. The analysis of 
governmentality remained an unfinished and open-ended project for 
Foucault, and it only benefits from staying that way. Secondly, it seems to 
me that the governmental context of colonialism is particularly diverse to 
the extent that pinpointing a specific authoritative form of governmentality 
would, as critics of the colonial governmentality approach has remarked, 
flatten the political landscape of colonialism. 
Perhaps the problem could be formulated differently. Rather than 
designating the particularly colonial technologies of government, perhaps 
liberal governmentality could be conceived in a more heterogeneous 
manner, baring a varied range of configurations of economies of power. “A 
form of liberalism,” Foucault remarks, “does not have to be true or false.” 
He continues:  
One asks whether a form of liberalism is pure, radical, consistent, or 
mixed, etcetera. That is to say, we ask what rules it adopts for itself, how 
it offsets compensating mechanisms, how it calculates the mechanisms of 
measurement it has installed within its governmentality.579  
The case of the colonial government of the Danish West Indies, which has 
been pursued in this dissertation, suggests that the differences in terms of 
governmentality were more a question of a configuration and calibration of 
governmental techniques than a considerable and autonomous divergence in 
the type of governmentality that was produced. In order for this claim to be 
further substantiated, further research is needed into the production, 
distribution, and application of knowledges and techniques of government 
that takes a scalar perspective rather than a comparative. The points of 
origin and implementation of governmental rationalities most not be 
prioritized at the expense of the processes of distribution that in the case of 
penitentiary knowledge provided a catalyst for its diversification as well as 
its particular framework of application. These processes of distribution gave 
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voice to a whole range of applications for the penitentiary technology rather 
than a singular, proper arrangement of penal practice. Similar analyses 
could most likely be successfully advanced in regard to the distribution of 
sciences of state and economy that informed chapter two and five. Yet, it 
fell beyond the scope of this dissertation to pursue the scalar rationalities of 
such assemblages. 
Such a multifaceted analysis would illuminate a complex network of 
actors involved in governing practices that stretched well beyond the 
boundaries of the geopolitically defined territory of one state or the others 
claimed colony. What is called for is a contextualization of power types to 
the specificities of their configuration. If specific historical genealogies are 
taken into account, an analytical approach that is more sensitive to 
particularities and difference within different divisions of the colonial as 
well as metropolitan spheres can be pursued while retaining a critique of the 
general form of liberal governmentality that pervades modern forms of 
colonialism, including the practice of singling out whole groups of people as 
unfit for self-government based on the presumed character of their nature. 
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Archival Sources 
 
All archival sources used in this dissertation are stored in the Danish 
National Archives [Rigsarkivet]. A catalog of material pertaining to the 
Danish West Indies can be found at www.virgin-islands-history.dk.  
 
Danish Chancellery 
3. Department 
1 Crime reports from the West Indies 
 
Central Government Archives 
Chamber of Customs 
435 The slave emancipation, as enacted by a rescript of 27 July 1847 
The Central Directorate for the Colonies 
911 Prisons and prison system 1885-1905 
912 Prisons and prison system 1848-1894 
 
West Indian Local Archives 
West Indian Government 
3.81.14 Subject files: 1, Legislation and administration etc.: Files  
  concerning the Civil Criminal Law of 1866, 1874-1899 
3.81.170 Subject files: 3, Administration of justice: Files concerning  
  the prison system in the Danish West Indies, 1844-1863 
3.81.172 Subject files: 3, Administration of justice: Files concerning t
  he prison system in the Danish West Indies, 1900-1907 
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English Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes the processes of governmentality in the Danish 
West Indies from the late eighteenth century to the end of Danish rule in 
1917. The theoretical framework of the analysis is constructed from a 
reading of Michel Foucault’s work in the late 1970s on the problematics, 
techniques, and rationalities of government in Western Europe. Foucault’s 
investigations took the form of a historical genealogy that he referred to as 
“the history of governmentality.” He argued that governmentality deployed 
itself as a configuration of dispositions of power in the form of “economies 
of power.” This theoretical framework is applied in three chapters that 
analyses the biopolitics of slavery, the government of penal techniques, and 
the political economy of labor after slavery respectively. 
The dissertation argues that parallel to the development of governmental 
practice in Europe, programs of government in the Danish West Indies were 
increasingly premised on the reality and sanctity of the nature of 
“population,” “society,” and “economy” that would have to be respected 
and taken into consideration. This principle also extended to a conception of 
the nature of the Afro-Caribbean colonial subjects. The conformity and 
adherence to the perceived naturalness of colonial subjects had the 
unintended effect of stifling projects of social progress in the area of 
penitentiary reform as well as the organization of labor. In the weighing of 
utility and freedom, the “nature of the negro” tipped the scale towards 
prioritizing utility. As a result, the freedom of former slaves was limited to 
the extent that they manifested their disscontempt in violent riots and 
strikes.  
To interpret this development simply as a retreat to repressive forms of 
power and the failure of liberal principles in the colonial context, clouds the 
complex character of liberal governmentality in general. The limitation of 
Afro-Caribbean freedoms was not installed in spite of liberal rationalities, 
but in conformity with an ambivalent logic of improvement inherent in 
liberalism itself. 
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Dansk Resume 
Denne afhandling analyserer de dansk vestindiske øers guvernementalitets-
processer fra slutningen af attenhunderedetallet til afslutningen af det 
danske herredømme i 1917. Analysens teoretiske ramme bygger på en 
læsning af Michel Foucaults arbejde i slutningen af 1970'erne med 
ledelsesproblematikker, -teknikker og -rationaliteter i Vesteuropa. Foucaults 
undersøgelser udformede sig som en historisk genealogi, hvilket han omtalt 
som "guvernementalitetens historie.” Han hævdede, at ledelsesrationalitet 
indsatte sig selv som en konfiguration af dispositioner af magt i form af 
"magt-økonomier." Denne teoretiske ramme anvendes i tre kapitler, der 
henholdsvis analyserer slaveriets biopolitik, ledelsen af straffeteknikker og 
arbejdskraftens politisk økonomi efter slaveriets ophævelse. 
Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at parallelt med udviklingen af 
ledelsespraksis i Europa, blev begreberne "befolkning", "samfund" og 
"økonomi" tildelt en naturlig virkelighed og hellighed, som politiske 
programmer i Dansk Vestindien i stigende grad var nødsaget til at 
respektere og tage højde for. Dette princip var også gældende for opfattelsen 
af de afro-caribiske subjekters natur. Den forudfattede tilpasningen af 
ledelsesteknikker til de koloniale subjekters naturlighed, havde den 
utilsigtede effekt, at sociale fremskridtsprocesser i forhold til reformer af 
straffevæsenet, samt organiseringen af arbejdskraft, blev bremset. I 
afvejningen af ‘nytte’ i forhold til ‘frihed,’ havde “negerens natur” den 
effekt at nytte blev prioriteret højest. Som følge heraf blev de tidligere 
slavers frihed begrænset i en sådan grad, at de manifesterede deres 
modstand i form af voldelige optøjer og strejker.  
At fortolke denne udvikling blot som en tilbagevending til repressive 
former for magt og mislykkede liberale principper i den koloniale kontekst, 
skygger for den liberale ledelsesrationalitets kompleksitet. Begrænsningen 
af afro-caribiernes friheder blev ikke installeret på trods af liberale 
ledelsesprincipper, men i overensstemmelse med en ambivalent 
forbedringslogik, indlejret i selve liberalimens ledelsesrationalitet. 
